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General Summary
There is widespread agreement that crime in Ireland has become both
more frequent and more costly in the past two decades. Crime is today a
recognised social problem, its magnitude a subject of public concern and the
possibilities for its amelioration a matter of public debate. The statistics
which the Garda Siochana compile and publish are the only available
evidence on which such discussion can be based, lifting the annual Report on
Crime from relative obscurity to a prominence it is not really designed to hold.
In newspaper coverage and in the D~iil, the annual increases, or, more rarely,
decreases in the number of indictable offences are taken as a score card of gar-
da failure and success, of disorder and public order. However, despite the in-
terest in the problem of crime and in the crime statistics, there have been few
research studies of the issues involved.
This paper is an attempt to approach those issues using the concepts and
methods of the social sciences. In particular, it examines two basic, though
often unstated, assumptions that underlie the discussion of crime in Ireland.
The first is that the published crime statistics offer an unambiguous measure
of the changes that are occurring in the level and pattern of crime. The second
is that Ireland is currently re-enacting the experiences of other industrial
countries, particularly the United States and Great Britain. Both assump-
tions have been questioned; the present study attempts to do so systematic-
ally.
There are three main objectives: (a) to evaluate the available statistical
evidence on trends in the level and the pattern of crime in Ireland, selecting
the most meaningful indicators from that evidence for use in the analysis; (b)
to measure the changes that have taken place in the 1951-1975 period; and,
most importantly, (c) to interpret those changes, offering an explanation as to
why they have taken place. The three objectives are intended to form a unity,
the coherence resulting from the guidance provided by the major theoretical
perspectives on the relationship between social change and crime. It is argued
that the most useful perspective is one that focuses on changes in the manner
in which a society is organised. Such changes establish the framework within
which individual and collective action become possible, including those ac-
tions that are defined as criminal.
Statistics on Crime
In comparison to what is available for most countries, the crime statistics
collected and published by the Garda Siochana offer a wealth of detailed and
reliable evidence. The enhanced reliability stems from the use of a consistent
set of rules for classifying and counting the offences of which the gardai are
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aware. However, over the 25 years considered, substantial changes have been
introduced into those rules
, 
necessitating caution in the use of the garda
statistics. And the traditional limitations of official crime statistics - under-
reporting and under-recording of the "true" level at which offences occur -
have been minimised rather than eliminated.
Given the preoccupation in the study, with measuring and interpreting
trends, the selection of indicators from the garda crime statistics is deter-
mined primarily by the confidence that can be placed in the comparisons over
time: the difference between offence levels in any two years should reflect the
actual .rate of change in the prevalence of that offence. This does not require
that the official statistics represent a full inventory of all violations of the rele-
vant statutes, only that extraneous influences are minimised and act in a con-
sistent manner over the time period studied.
Nine crime indicators were selected. Five represent specific offences cor-
responding to major forms Of property crime: housebreaking, shopbreaking,
larceny of motor vehicles, robbery, and receiving stolen property. Larceny
from motor vehicles and pedal cycle larceny were also included, as both in-
dicators share with larceny of motor vehicles a connection with a specific form
of property. The average value of the property stolen in burglary
(housebreaking and shopbreaking combined) was used as a measure of the
changing seriousness of financial loss from property crime. It is possible for
property crime to become more frequent, but the amount misappropriated
per offence to remain unchanged. In addition to the eight indicators relating
to property crime, the level of indictable assault is included as a guide to
changes in offences against persons.
The published garda statistics were supplemented for this study in two
basic ways. First, the changes in the nine indicators were examined separate-
ly for each of three types of area: the Dublin Metropolitan Area, the next four
largest cities combined (Cork, Galway, Limerick and Waterford), and the
remainder of the country, which with some misgivings is termed the non-
urban areas. Second, the files maintained by the gardai on homicides during
the 1951-1975 period were used to move beyond the simple enumeration of
known offences that forms the bulk of the analysis. Information was collected
on the location and the circumstances, including the characteristics of the in-
dividuals involved, in the 169 homicides recorded in two periods: the 1950s
and 1970/74.
The analysis of the nine indicators involved a series of comparisons. At the
national level, the major general forms of property crime were compared with
those directed at specific forms of property, and property crime was con-
trasted with the trends found for assault and homicide. In doing so, both the
magnitude of the overall increase registered and the trend by which that in-
CRIME IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND
crease occurred were considered. There are three basic forms that trends in
crime statistics can assume: (a) constant growth at an invariant rate; (b) a
curvilinear trend, in which the rate of change increases in the course of time;
(c) a discontinuity in the level and pattern of crime through a structural shift,
in which an abrupt break occurs, marking the end of one period and the
beginning of another.
Trends in the Crime Statistics
In order to measure the changes between 1951 and 1975 in the frequency
and the gravity of crime, the annual numbers of recorded offences and the
average values of stolen property were assembled in sequence. The trends in
the nine indicators thus revealed can be expressed both graphically through
charts and statistically through regression analysis.
However expressed, the national trends for the major property offences
confirm that a substantial increase has occurred in the frequency of those
crimes. In 1975, there were five times as many recorded shopbreakings, six
times as many housebreakings, and 29 times as many robberies as had been
recorded in 1951. Larcenies of motor vehicles had increased 27-fold over those
years, and larcenies from unattended vehicles, seven-fold. The frequency of
other property offences evinced either a slight increase (receiving stolen
property) or the absence of an upward trend (pedal cycle larceny), while the
average value of property stolen in burglaries during 1975 was one and a half
times greater than the average for 1951, taking inflation into account.
A substantial increase was also registered for offences against persons: the
number of indictable assaults rose seven-fold over the 25 years, a trend in ac-
cord with that found for the statistics on homicide.
The basic consistency of massive increases is paralleled by a consistent se-
quencing of the upward trends. For all offences except assault and pedal cycle
larceny, the bulk of the growth in crime levels occurred subsequent to 1964.
Throughout the 1950s and continuing into the early 1960s, the various in-
dicators record cyclical fluctuations around an essentially horizontal trend
line. Few sustained increases were evident in the initial 13 years of the series.
In all property offence indicators except that of pedal cycle larceny, a
dramatic and apparently permanent break with that pattern occurs around
1964. Henceforth, the pace of increase was rapid, though for some indicators
it tapered off by 1973 or 1974. A watershed clearly divides the trends in those
indicators; the proper statistical specification for what took place is that of a
structural break: what occurred after 1964 had no precedent in the earlier
years.
Thus, if the nine crime indicators and the homicide data are indeed ac-
curate guides to what took place between 1951 and 1975, a substantial in-
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crease in the level of crime cannot be gainsaid. Not only did the numbers of
recorded offences grow dramatically, but also a watershed can be identified in
the mid-1960s, marking a decisive break with the pattern of essentially stable
offence levels that obtained throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Crime did
indeed become a more acute social problem. However, there is no basis for as-
serting that the pattern of property crime, and particularly its seriousness, ex-
perienced a comparable transformation. Crime may be more prevalent today,
but the available evidence argues against an image of crime becoming more
efficient and sophisticated in its execution - or more profitable.
In our imagery of crime, dangerous places are urban places. Using the data
on the distribution of offences among area-types over the 1964-75 period, it
was possible to test the accuracy of that perception.
Overall, the evidence argues for the essential similarity in the trends for the
three types of area. Only for homicide, housebreaking and larceny from vehi-
cles did urban trends dominate the upward movement in the crime statistics
found at the national level. In all other instances, the non-urban areas
recorded increases equivalent or in excess of those found in the four-cities,
and for several indicators the non-urban trends were greater than those found
in Dublin. Urban offence levels are higher than those found in rural areas,
and that difference is somewhat accentuated over the 12 years, but the up-
ward trend for assault and for major property offences are clear in all areas.
Certainly the presence of substantial increases in crime levels outside of the
major cities is clear. Such consistency in urban and non-urban trends is not in
accord with the basic assumptions of most discussions of crime in Ireland to-
day. The theme of similarity across types of areas is further highlighted by the
consistency in the sequencing of large increments over the 12 year period.
On the basis of the data on homicide, it can be concluded that the contexts
of interpersonal violence changed markedly over those years. Homicides in
the 1950s were distributed evenly among urban and rural areas and among
the regions, with a distinct tendency for homicides within families to
predominate. By the 1970s, a clear urban focus for homicides had emerged;
the increased prevalence can be attributed entirely to the cities. Moreover,
since rural homicide remained essentially unchanged over the 25 years, the
changing pattern of homicide - with the diminution of the importance of
family homicide and the Corresponding increasing proportion of homicides
that involve strangers - occurred in the urban centres.
Social Change and Crime: An Interpretation
A belief that rising crime rates represent one cost a society incurs for
becoming modern, industrial, and affluent is understandable given the ex-
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periences of most countries over this century. But a sceptical view of the ap-
plicability of those experiences to Ireland is the most sensible point of depar-
ture for any interpretation of recent Irish crime trends.
There are two general perspectives within sociology for explaining why
social change should be linked to an increased level of crime and an altered
pattern of crime. One perspective adopts the argument that all change,
whatever the specific form it assumes, potentially disrupts the manner in
which people live and think. By removing people from restraints and controls,
as well as from the familiar, change generates an increased propensity toward
crime. Such an approach, which is usually termed a social disorganisation
perspective, highlights the universal aspects of the process of modernisation:
the growth of cities, industrial development, and affluence. A second perspec-
tive focuses on the specific manner in which the patterning of social life
becomes altered in the course of change. It is not change per se, but the re-
structuring of details of ordinary lives that creates conditions conducive to a
changing level and pattern of crime. Where an explanation is sought on the
basis of a changing structure of opportunities and possibilities, the label
structural perspective should be used.
When national level trends covering the years 1951 to 1975 were examined,
the extent of the transformation that occurred in the mid-1960s emerged
clearly. For seven of the eight property offence indicators, for the inter-
relationships among the indicators, and for the relationships the indicators
have with measures of property availability and of economic conditions, the
mid-1960s marks a watershed. The pattern of offence levels and of offence
characteristics that had prevailed for several decades came to a conclusion
around 1963, and was replaced by a new pattern. It seems reasonable to as-
sociate the emergent pattern with changes in Irish social structure that began
in the late 1950s: the increase in crime was one offshoot of the adjustments
being made to deep-seated structural change. The nature of the evidence
precludes rejection of social disorganisation arguments, but it can be con-
cluded that their applicability to Ireland is limffed.
Urban/rural differences are also relevant to an evaluation of the usefulness
of social disorganisation and structural perspectives. Had recent trends been
such as to create marked disparities between types of areas, then social dis-
organisation explanations would appear appropriate. Such disparities were
not marked, and while this does not in itself affirm the appropriateness of
structural explanations, it does suggest that the latter approach is the more
promising. For Ireland, a single transformation could be identified, largely
ignoring boundaries between city and countryside, that between 1964 and
197’5 significantly increased the level of crime, and, to a much lesser extent,
altered the manner in which criminal activity is carried out.
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Taken together, the national and the urban/rural trends are evidence of a
substantial transformation in the level and pattern of Irish crime, a transfor-
mation that was pervasive to the society generally. The consistency among
the nine indicators is marked; given the variety of offences involved and the
length of the time-period studied, it is remarkable. A watershed was reached,
a departure from the level and pattern that had obtained since the early
1950s. Such consistencies Support, by and large, the assertion that recent
changes in Irish crime arose as responses to the specific social structural
changes that began around 1960. The comparisons undertaken between types
of offences and types of areas do not provide convincing evidence for a view
that crime was but one manifestation of a growing disorganisation within the
society.
What specific components of structural change in Ireland are implicated in
the new level and pattern of crime that emerged after the mid-1960s? Only a
partial answer emerges from this paper. The strongest support for a connec-
tion between structural change and crime was found for those offences in
which the amount and the distribution of the property "at risk" changed
most dramatically over the 25 years. Trends in the availability of property are
related to those for offence levels and offence seriousness in the manner sug-
gested by the structural perspective. While the evidence is persuasive, it is not
definitive; however, there is certainly ample justification for further research
along the lines advocated in the paper. The results from the analysis of the
impact of economic conditions on crime was more definitive, though negative:
the cyclical changes in economic conditions during the 1950s, 1960s, and
1970s are but slightly related to the level of crime, and cannot have
engineered the "break" that occurred in the mid-1960s.
The contrast between the social disorganisation and the structural perspec-
tives can be made too emphatic. Both associate substantial changes in a social
structure with a movement toward a higher incidence of crime. If preference
is given to the structural approach, it is because it directs attention toward
what is most important: the suddenness, rapidity, and pervasiveness of in-
dustrialisation in Ireland, a process that occurred far more recently here than
in other western nations. Industrial development is the primary force,
implicitly if not explicitly, in most attempts to explain the growth of crime. It
is important particularly through its impact on urbanisation. Dublin, in con-
trast to most capital cities, was not a magnet for successive waves of rural
migrants, and along with other Irish cities, grew gradually, largely from
natural increase. Within the context of the distinctive nature of Irish in-
dustrial development and urban growth, the mid-1960 watershed is quite ex-
plicable. There is no need to equate crime with disorder or to react to the
trends with despair.
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Placed in the context of the social changes Ireland experienced in the late
1950s and in the 1960s, the upward trend in the crime statistics become less
alarming. A transformation occurred in the extent and pattern of crime,
representing an adjustment to fundamental changes in the social order. Now
that the impact has largely been absorbed within the system, it is reasonable
to anticipate a more restrained pace to any future increases in the crime
statistics. The statistics for the late 1970s indeed support such a view. But it is
again necessarY to stress the limitations of the statistical evidence. Crime
statistics are imprecise indices of the amount of crime in the community and
can be treated as measures of year to year fluctuations only with caution. The
most sensible use of crime statistics is within the framework of a perspective
that is applied to a specific time-period, and that was the objective of this
study.
Chapter 1
lntroduaion: The Problmn of Crirae
In the mid-1970s, the level of crime came for the first time since
Independence to occupy centre stage as a topic of public concern and political
debate in the Republic of Ireland. Crime became a recognised social problem,
perceived as symptomatic of still graver societal ills, requiring remedial action
as a matter of urgency. All this was embodied in the imagery of a war on
crime, in which the gardai did battle with an enemy, a criminal element,
clearly distinguishable from decent citizens. Annually, with the publication of
the Garda Commissioner’s Report on Crirat, and sporadically, as questions in
the D~iil produced interim tabulations, crime statistics were examined as the
index of the success with which the war was being waged. Each fresh batch of
statistics became translated into newspaper headlines and a renewed outcry
that something be done.
This paper is a response to this sudden emergence of crime and the
statistics on crime as important topics of public debate. It cannot be denied
that crime today is more prevalent and inflicts greater injury and cost than
was the case 15 or 20 years ago. Concern is obviously justified and an ex-
planation is clearly called for - there would be little rationale otherwise for
undertaking a major inquiry into crime as a social problem. However, it is a
topic that is best approached cautiously. Crime statistics increase or decrease
in response to many influences, of which actual changes in the frequency of
criminal activity is but one. It is as easy to misinform as it is to inform on the
basis of an uncritical reference to statistics on crime.
Caution is also required in a more general sense. Much of the discussion on
crime in Ireland seeks parallels with what has been experienced in other
countries. The lessons to be learned in this manner are not necessarily ob-
vious; what occurred in the United States or in Britain earlier in this century
is not an unfailing guide to what is happening, or will happen, in Ireland. The
temptation to view crime as a disease that has spread in epidemic proportions
around the globe since the Second World War is understandable. But it is
possible, and indeed likely, that a variety of causal processes underlie the
growth in crime rates that have been registered, and that the similarities
among countries are at least partly illusionary. This is important, for if the
antecedents to a problem can vary, so will the policy choices that will prove
the most efficacious in any particular situation.
The need for caution in making inferences from crime statistics and in ap-
plying lessons learned elsewhere stimulated this study. There are three main
objectives:
CRIME IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND
(1) To collate the published information on trends in crime, undertaking
such adjustments as are needed to assure their relevance to the impor-
tant questions being asked, and to supplement that information with
new material derived specifically for this study.
(2) To analyse that information so as to have the clearest possible measure
of the degree to which changes have actually occurred in the frequency
and in the gravity of crime.
(3) To offer an interpretation of why those changes have taken place, with
a view toward explaining what has happened and anticipating what
might happen in the future.
The years covered are 1951 to 1975. During that period a clear perception
developed that Ireland had changed from a society in which crime was infre-
quent and inconsequential to one in which a clear and growing threat exists
to public order. It was indeed toward the middle of that period that the crime
statistics collected by the gardai first began to increase at a rapid pace,
representing a decisive break from the essentially unchanging levels of known
crime that had obtained since the foundation of the state. By systematically
putting together the available evidence, and by analysing and interpreting it,
I hope to be able to explain the watershed which, both in the public percep-
tion and in the garda statistics, took place during the 1960s. The first step,
however, will be to confirm that it did take place.
These three objectives must be met, in my opinion, if an adequate under-
standing of crime as a social problem is to be achieved. The statistical
evidence does not speak for itself; it is valuable to the extent that it can be ex-
amined in the light of an interpretive framework that can assign a meaning to
the changes that are registered. Similarly, unless the statistics on crime are
adjusted and supplemented, their relevance to the issues involved in discus-
sions of the problem will be dubious. This paper, therefore, is an attempt to
bring together the materials needed for an adequate public debate on the
topic of crime. Given the complexity of the issues, it cannot be, and is not in-
tended to be, a definitive statement.
Given the availability of the annual garda crime statistics, the amount of at-
tention given in the chapters that follow to consideration of the adequacy of
the evidence may seem misplaced to some readers. We have all become ac-
customed, perhaps too accustomed, to the news headlines that declare an in-
crease, or more rarely, a decrease in the amount of crime. But however they
are used, crime statistics are not equivalent to a set of financial accounts,
making clear statements on gain and loss. That is neither the reason nor the
basis for their collection. What we know from a set of crime statistics is how
the public and the police are responding to the amount of crime present in the
community. Information is available on the number of occasions on which
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members of the public alert the gardai that a crime may have been committed
and on the instances in which the gardai independently reach such a conclu-
sion. Thus, increased police efficiency, heightened public concern over crime,
or rising expectations as to what the police can, or should do, may all result in
more "crime" being recorded; so may modifications introduced into the data
collection procedures. Since no formal system of auditing crime statistics is
followed, such modifications often go unremarked, spuriously altering the
number of crimes registered.
If the first objective can be met, with the statistical evidence so adjusted as
to eliminate or render manageable possible extraneous influences, then it
becomes feasible to measure the amount of change in crime that has occurred
in Ireland over the recent past. Both the level and the pattern of crime poten-
tially change. By level, I refer simply to frequency. A changing pattern of
crime, however, reflects the nature of criminal activity, particularly as
manifested in the sophistication and organisation with which crimes are com-
mitted and the seriousness of the loss or damage. The pattern is also manifest
in the relative importance of various types of crime. Public concern is clearly
directed at both the prevalence and the nature of crime: in newspaper stories,
political speeches, and conversation, there is a clear feeling that crime today is
not only more frequent, but more sinister, more’threatening. While measure-
ing trends in the nature of crime is a more formidable problem than assessing
the change in frequency, it should be undertaken to the extent possible. This
paper is therefore concerned with both the level and the pattern of criminal
activity in Ireland.
To provide more precise statements on the increase in crime than were
hitherto available is to make a contribution. But the important objective is to
interpret what occurred. If between 1951 and 1975 major changes took place
in the extent and nature of crime in Ireland, presumably those changes were
tied to other, more general, trends in Irish society. Assistance in defining that
link can be obtained from the efforts made by criminologists to isolate the
basic social processes that can be treated as causes of increasing criminal
behaviour. Out of the voluminous literature devoted to the topic, expectations
can be derived as to how general social change, say, in the form of urbanisa-
tion and industrialisation, transfers into a more substantial crime problem.
The applicability of such expectations to the Irish situation of recent years
must, as was noted, be carefully considered. It should, however, be possible to
develop a perspective that can guide the interpretation of the trends that are
found.
I hope the objectives of the study are now clear. The remainder of this
chapter is concerned with conveying the manner in which they will be pur-
sued. To do so requires that I describe some of the more important aspects of
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the approach that I adopted and outline the organisation of the paper.
Tk/e most fundamental characteristic of any approach is the answer given
by the researcher to the question: What do I mean by crime? It is an embar-
rassingly difficult question. According to the standard dictionary definition, a
crime is "an act punishable by law, as being forbidden by statute or injurious
to the public welfare" (Oxford Shorter English Dictionary, 1964, p. 423).
That seems reasonable, but to adopt such a definition is to cast far too wide a
net - the contents that are hauled up will be so numerous and so diverse as to
defy comprehension. Applied to the Irish crime statistics for 1977, that defini-
tion of crime results in 410,698 instances in which offences were brought
before the courts for adjudication. If each offence represents a distinct "of-
fender", then one out of every five citizens over age 14 was accused of commit-
ting a crime in that year.
Burglary, robbery, murder, and assault represent but a tiny fraction of the
411,000 offences. By adding petty larcenies and similar offences, the fraction
merely becomes small. Eight of every ten court proceedings in the mid-1970s
(83.7 per cent in 1977) arose out of legislation enacted to regulate the use
made of motor vehicles by their owners. Efforts to improve society, whether
through dissuading people from littering the streets and footpaths or to in-
duce them to wear car safety belts, have increasingly~ome to rely on the
criminal law. The inevitable result is a constant expansion in the range of
behaviours that can be classified, at least formally, as criminal. But are people
who break such laws criminals?
The compilers of the Oxford Dictionary acknowledge this difficulty, in-
serting a caveat in parentheses after their definition: "commonly used only of
grave offences." This does delimit the potential field of interest somewhat,
though the distinction involved is necessarily arbitrary. Also, a return to the
dictionary can be avoided. A variety of approaches have been devised by legal
scholars and legislators for distinguishing grave offences. In the common law
tradition, within which Irish criminal law developed, four basic distinctions
are made in terms of gravity (0 Siochain, 1977, pp. 3-36).
(a) Treason: singled out as especially reprehensible;
(b) Felony: "a crime on which the law looks with a special gravity because
of its seriousness and its particular offensiveness against the liberties of
the people," a distinction that includes murder, forgery, embezzle-
ment, rape, larceny (of all varieties), arson, and robbery;
(c) Misdemeanour: "the lesser social crime, lacking the offensiveness of a
felony, and not capable, in the eyes of the law, of inflicting any grievous
wrong on the individual or on the community," which includes assault,
fraud, poaching, and public nuisance;
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(d) Statutory Summary Offences: such as those regulating road traffic, in
which particular actions are defined as criminal despite the absence of
anything inherent - as there is held to be, say, in a burglary - that is
criminal, the "crime" being created to facilitate compliance.
Such distinctions are venerable, but of limited usefulness, at least for my pur-
pose. Certainly in terms of social injury, it is not clear that a person who
breaks the summary offence against driving while intoxicated is less a danger
to the public than is a shoplifter. Nor is it particularly informative to treat
robbery and petty larceny as if they were of equal gravity.
This is a problem endemic to the field of criminology, not just to the pre-
sent study. The traditional resolution to it has been legalistic, to argue that
crime is whatever the statutes declare it to be, accepting the diversity that in-
evitably results. As a practical matter, studies adopting such an approach in-
troduce arbitrary restrictions, excluding traffic offences or concentrating on a
set of offence categories that are obviously serious. Clinard’s (1978) study of
crime in Switzerland offers a particularly relevant model of research on
national crime trends that adopts a legalistic approach.
A second approach is to insist that criminology, to be scientific, must define
its own subject matter. Its proponents put forward "natural properties" of ac-
tions that make them criminal, such as their social injuriousness or their
violation of universal "conduct norms" (see Schwendinger and Schwen-
dinger, 1975 for the history of this apl~roach). The existence of a legal prohibi-
tion is irrelevant, at least in most such formulations. If this can be ac-
complished, the diversity that confronts criminologists will be replaced with a
homogeneous phenomenon; the potential for achieving a causal explanation
of crime is thereby increased.
To a considerable extent, the approach that is preferable depends on the
questions that are being posed. A legalistic view of crime seems unavoidable
given the terms of reference for this study. The crime statistics are generally
treated as "social facts" in the Durkheimian sense - as objective phenomena
in their own right. A change in those statistics does exert an influence on how
people act and certainly on state policy. That some behaviours that may be
injurious are excluded and others that may be innocuous are included in the
level of recorded crime does not make an understanding of the statistics unim-
portant. They are a force in the society with real consequences.
Adopting that approach does impose limitations. In particular, it leaves
open the question of whether all the Statistics are equally relevant, and if not,
where the boundary for inclusion is set. It is a question that will be treated in
Chapter 3.
Having specified what is meant by-crime in this study, some other clarifica-
tions should be made. It is in the terininology of the social sciences, a macro-
CRIME IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 13
level study. That is, it examines relationships and patterns at an aggregate
level. The data on crime being considered are primarily at a national level.
What I wish to understand are the factors underlying changes in national
crime levels and patterns. The explanation will be sought in terms of the man-
ner in which the country has changed over the same period. This is not,
therefore, a study of what types of individuals commit crimes or what factors
in their personalities or backgrounds are responsible. Also I wish to under-
stand the relationships such as those that might exist between the level of
crimes against property and the amount of unemployment, or that between
the abundance of motor vehicles and the level of motor vehicle larceny.
It is possible to specify and examine such relationships, and to do so within
a theoretical perspective, but it is to be stressed that proof will be elusive. This
is not a study in which hypotheses can be definitively rejected or supported.
Explanation can only take the form of plausible interpretations. I hope,
however, that enough information will be provided for the reader to make his
or her own assessment of exactly how plausible my interpretations and
conclusions are.
Having stated the objectives for the study and outlined the approach that
will be used, it remains for this introductory chapter to indicate how the
paper is organised. In the six chapters that follow, the quality of the statistical
evidence on crime in Ireland will be evaluated, the trends found in that
evidence presented and interpreted, and, finally, a step back will be taken to
obtain an overview of the evidence, indicating what conclusions can be drawn
and with what certainty.
Chapter 2 provides the framework for all this. It summarises the major
perspectives that criminologists have used in trying to understand long-term
changes in crime. From this literature, it is possible to distil a perspective on
how the broad patterns of social change - to which the labels modernisation,
industrialisation, and urbanisation are generally applied - come to affect the
level and nature of crime. The perspective is developed through a three part
process. From the considerable body of writings that are relevant, two
important ways of looking at the connection social change has to crime will be
singled out and discussed in detail. Once this initial section has established a
core of ideas that appear promising for my purpose, the question of their
applicability to the Irish experience over the past quarter century can be
addressed. Social change in Ireland does not appear to conform to the
assumptions and expectations of writings generated in other countries. The
implications of this distinctiveness will be considered in the third, concluding,
section of the chapter, resulting, I hope, in a perspective on crime that will
prove useful for Ireland.
Chapter 3 is devoted entirely to the crime statistics: what information is
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available for Ireland, how its usefulness and meaningfulness can be evaluated,
the results of such an evaluation, and the most effective manner in which the
statistical evidence can bc presented. Like all social statistics, those
describing crime should be used with caution. In my opinion, however, the
Irish crime statistics can, if used properly, be made to speak to the major
issues involved, both generally and specifically for this paper. The basis for
that assertion is to be found in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 uses the national crime statistics to Chart, both graphically and
statistically, the trends over the years 1951 to 1975. In later sections of the
chapter, the relationship of those trends in the level and pattern of crime to
changes in such features of Irish soc!ety as the abundance of property and
economic conditions is measured.
In Chapter 5 the focus changes to comparisons between types of areas with
a view toward understanding where the national changes were concentrated.
Differences in urban and rural crime trends are of particular interest. Such
differences potentially are of considerable policy relevance - in terms of the
distribution of police rnanpowcr, for example - but can also help to rnakc
sense of what is occurring. Is the increase in levels of crime concentrated in
urban areas? Is the pattern of crime similar in urban and in rural areas? By
using a set of crirnc statistics collated specifically for this study, such
questions can be examined for the years 1964 to 1975.
Because of the data on which they arc based, Chapters 4 and 5 give us a
picture of crirnc from which all drama and emotion have been abstracted.
Aggregate statistics can inform us as to how many burglaries wcrc recorded
in a given year, the total or average value of the property thus appropriated,
and the percentage of offences in which the garda.i made arrests. While useful,
such information is silent on the human context in which crime takes place
and in how that has changed. Data on homicide, however, do not suffer from
such a limitation, and in Chapter 6 the detail available on each offence is used
to try and recreate, at least in part, the context in which crimes of violence
occur. Specifically, homicide in the 1950s is contrasted with that in the 1970s.
Finally, Chapter 7 returns to the three objectives and summarises what has
been accomplished for each.
Chapter 2
Crime and Social Change: Perspectives and Expectations
Introduction
A belief that rising crime rates somehow derive from social change is
probably inevitable given the experiences of most countries over this century.
A higher level of crime seems to be regarded today as one cost a society incurs
for becoming industrial, modern, and affluent - the dark side of progress.
This chapter surveys and evaluates the answers proposed by sociologists and
criminologists to the question of how societal change comes to be reflected in
the level and pattern of crime. Those answers can be grouped into two major
perspectives, which will be labelled "social disorganisation" and "struc-
tural". I hope that a discussion of the main tenets of those perspectives can
suggest which aspects of Irish crime trends deserve our attention and help
build a framework for interpreting what those trends mean.
The question posed in this chapter is not new. While the question of why
some people do, and some do not, commit violations of the criminal law may
be more familiar to most readers, it is, at least within the social sciences, less
venerable. Criminology as a social science began, in effect, early in the
nineteenth century with the first systematic efforts to collect national crime
statistics. Like statistics describing other "moral phenomena", such as
suicide and alcoholism, those on crime were found to evince a characteristic
rate for each country, a rate that remained remarkably consistent over time.
Moreover, the relative contribution of various offence categories to that rate
also appeared to be stable (Taylor et al., 1973, p. 37; McClintock, 1974). To
the "moral statisticans", who sought to produce a science of society based on
regularities in social statistics, this indicated that social life was not of
capricious origins, resting on individual propensities. Instead, they concluded
that crime and like phenomena are products of a particular set of social ar-
rangements, making explicable differences in national crime rates. When
later in the century the crime statistics registered substantial increases,
changing social arrangements offered the obvious explanation.
As a result, it is possible to draw for this chapter upon a literature ac-
cumulated over a century and a half. The focus, however, will be on recent
formulations of the two major perspectives. Those formulations were, despite
their indebtedness to earlier generations of social scientists, written in a con-
text that is in an important sense unprecedented. At a time in which the
traditional values of progress and social justice were seemingly being fulfilled
to a degree never before experienced, crime was increasing at an alarming
pace. It is in the light of this paradox that the post-Second World War
literature on crime can be most usefully evaluated. The application to Ireland
is particularly apt: just when long-standing problems of development and
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employment had apparently been resolved, crime came to be regarded as a
major social problem.
The section that follows summarises the two perspectives and draws some
conclusions as to the aspects of social change that are potentially important
for understanding what has occurred in Ireland. The process of social change
¯ actually experienced by Ireland, and its correspondence to the assumptions of
social disorganisation and structural perspectives, is considered in a separate
section, while a concluding section evaluates the applicability of both
perspectives to the Irish context.
Perspectives on Crime
Two main themes can be identified in the substantial body of writing that
attempts to explain why social change should be linked to increases in the
level of crime and to changes in the pattern of crime. One such theme is that
all change, whatever the specific form it assumes, potentially disrupts the
manner in which people live and think. Change, simply by removing people
from restraints and controls, as well as from the familiar, generates an in-
creased propensity towards crime. A second strand of thinking takes a nar-
rower, less general, approach, arguing that what matters is the specific man-
ner in which the patterning of social life alters. The implications of change are
to be found in the details of how everyday patterns of working, family life, and
leisure become altered in the course of social change.
Where emphasis is placed on the qualities of change per se, the term "social
disorganisation perspective" will be used for purposes of this summary. A
focus on the changes in the structure of social activities will be termed a
"structural perspective." This distinction is made because it highlights some
important issues in the study of crime trends. However, the boundary
between the two perspectives can be drawn too emphatically; certainly quite
a few of the authors who will be cited do not regard it as a major frontier.
Both perspectives can be adapted to a situation in which prosperity and
growth are accompanied by increasing crime rates. Moreover, they share a
basic understanding of where an explanation must be sought: a given level
and pattern of criminal activity is to be understood in terms of the prevailing
social structure. If recent years have seen a fundamental change in crime, this
should be attributed to the occurrence of profound economic and social
change during that period.
Social structure is the concept used by sociologists to indicate the form or
pattern of organisation in the social groups and institutions that constitute a
society. It is a model which specifies the basic social groups and institutions,
the most important positions which people hold within them, and the nature
of the relationships among these positions and groups. Positions, groups, and
institutions are linked by patterns of interaction that are recurrent and
CRIME IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 17
regularised. The concept thus refers to the pattern of interconnectedness.
Social change emerges from contradictions among the components of social
structure, as well as from external pressure; in sociological terms, history is
constituted out of changes in social structure (Gerth and Mills, 1953; Smelser
and Lipset, 1966). An illustration using the most basic of social groups, the
family, may make clearer what I mean by social structure. The characteristic
set of positions within families (husband-father, wife-mother, daughter-sister,
son-brother) assume a particular set of relationships to one another that
typifies, say, a peasant society or an industrial society. A family in a-peasant
society will have distinctive relationships to the economic system and political
systems, markedly different from the relationships by which working class
families of industrial cities will participate in those systems. In each instance,
the pieces fit together in an identifiable manner. As the economic system
changes, however, so will the relationships through which family members
participate in it, with consequent changes in relationships within the family.
Every society manifests a social structure with distinctive attributes, but it
is possible to isolate broad types of social structure and to use the resulting
classification as a tool for analysis. The type relevant to the theme of this
study is the advanced capitalist society. As defined by Giddens (1973, pp.
141-142) an advanced society entails "a social order in which industrialism
has come to predominate in the production of marketable goods within the
economy." Industrial capitalism is one variant of this basic type. A society
can be termed capitalist if its economic system is predominantly organised to
ensure that production is (1) directed toward producing profit for privately
owned capital and (2) dependent on a market in which labour is bought and
sold along with other commodities.
The social change process of interest to this paper, therefore, is that which
Ireland experienced as she made the transition to become an advanced
capitalist society. A variety of pathways exist through which societies can
make that transition (Giddens, 1973, pp. 144-152), and the impact of social
change on crime in Ireland ought to approximate most closely that which is
typical of societies that tiad previously taken a similar path. I propose to use
the main principles of social disorganisation and structural perspectives as
the guide to those aspects of social structural change that are of greatest
relevance to crime trends and then to consider their relevance to the Irish
situation. Both perspectives, for example, emphasise the consequences of ur-
banisation, though with quite different views on why and how it is important.
By examining Irish urbanisation in the post-1950 period, and its relationship
to other aspects of social structural change, some expectations on urban/rural
differences can be generated. I hope in this manner to take advantage of what
has been learned in other countries about crime and social change without
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making facile assumptions in which Ireland’s future is prefigured in the
American or British present. The first step is to summarise and then evaluate
the two perspectives.
The Social Disorganisation Perspective The social disorganisation perspective,
which in its many formulations has had wide currency as an explanation of
aggregate crime rates throughout this century, emphasises the disruption and
dislocation that inevitably accompanies change. Though the content of
change is therefore not usually highlighted, in effect the concern is with the
processes of urbanisation and industrialisation. The intellectual roots of this
approach can be found in the work of Emile Durkheim (1933); transplanted
across the Atlantic, his perspective provided the inspiration for the work of
several generations of American criminologists.
To Durkheim, the incidence of crime in modern societies is but one con-
comitant of the alteration in the source of integration within social structures
that occurs with social evolution. Gonsensus and homogeneity, which forged
social solidarity within the communal village, become displaced by the func-
tional interdependence that characterises the complex and segmented divi-
sion of labour in industrial society. As traditional authority is eroded and an
expanding division of labour results in occupational specialisation, differences
between individuals become more pronounced; the strength of what is shared
in experiences, attitudes, and abilities diminishes, and the possibilities for in-
dividual variation and innovation are enhanced. Such individual variation
leads to deviance. The difficulties involved in maintaining a satisfactory level
of moral regulation in a situation of rapid change explains, for Durkheim, the
high levels of deviance characteristic of industrial society. The adequacy of
the link which moral regulation provides for individuals to the larger social
structure varies internally within a society. The stress and strain engendered
by change determines the social categories that will have the greatest propen-
sity to anomie, Durkheim’s term for a state of deregulation.
The intrusion of social disorganisation was not Durkheim’s explanation for
the presence of crime. Rather, crime became pathological when, in response
to disorganisation, it moved to levels beyond that which was "normal" for a
particular society. The relevance of his approach to the situation we are try-
ing to understand is therefore potentially considerable.
In applying Durkheim’s ideas, later theorists have explained the impact of
social change on rates of deviance through shifts in the criteria by which peo-
ple assess their situation. What appear to be "objective" conditions take on a
potential to engender stress in a manner that is understandable only in terms
of how individuals perceive their situation. Proponents of the social dis-
organisation perspective, therefore re-framed the argument into one of
relative deprivation, "the deprivation that arises not so much from the ab-
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solute amount of frustration as from the experienced discrepancy between
one’s lot and that of other persons or groups that serve as standards of
reference" (Coser, 1970, p. 59).
The most ambitious attempt at formally linking social structure and crime
within the social disorganisation rubric is Merton’s (1957) anomie theory.
For Merton, crime is one of several alternative responses to anomie, which he
defines as a state in which culturally mandated goals fail to be relevant to the
institutionalised means available for achieving them.
Poverty as such and consequent limitation of opportunity are not
enough to produce a conspicuously high rate of criminal behaviour.
Even the notorious "poverty in the midst of plenty" will not neces-
sarily lead to this result. But where poverty and associated disad-
vantages in competing for the culture values approved for all
members of the society are linked with a cultural emphasis on
pecuniary success as a dominant goal, high rates of criminal
behaviour are the normal outcome (Merton, 1957, p. 147).
A criminal, therefore, is someone who retains the cultural goal of financial
success, but finding himself or herself at a disadvantage in utilising the ap-
proved means for achieving it, substitutes a set of practices that are defined as
unlawful.
When stated with such precision, the social disorganisation approach has
not been sustained. The influence of anomie theory within criminology has
dwindled, though Clinard and Abbott (1973, pp. 176-177) argue that some of
its former lustre might be restored if it were deployed to explain recent trends
in Third World nations. However, as a weaker assertion that change induces
stress that in turn is manifested in crime, social disorganisation theories still
form the bulwark of mainstream criminology: "As a country develops
economically, and as this development is reflected in growing urbanization,
crime generally increases rapidly" (Clinard, 1978, p. 1). The key appears to
be the particular pattern of urban growth that emerges in response to in-
dustrialisation. In the general process of urbanisation, increased crime rates
are identified with the upheaveal that occurs as a substantial proportion of
the population shifts from rural to urban areas through migration and with
the creation of slums, that persist, within those urban areas. These effects are
compounded in the course of modernisation as people attempt to adjust to the
new values and new institutions that are encouraged in cities.
There is sufficient coherence in recent theoretical and empirical work
within the tradition to derive a set of basic tenets applicable to the Irish con-
text. In so doing, particular attention has been placed on the work of Clinard
(1942, 1964, and 1978), Clinard and Abbott (1973), Jacobson (1975), Webb
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(1972), and Krohn (1978); these represent, to me, the most sophisticated
modern exemplars of the social disorganisation tradition.
(1) In a modernising society, sustained and rapid increases in crime rates
emerge initially in urban areas. The resulting disparity in the incidence
of urban and rural crime has been accorded the status of universal law
by such writers as Clinard (1942) and Void (1958, p. 188).
(2) While crime directed at acquiring property is more prevalent in urban
than in rural areas, offences against persons tend to be either evenly
distributed or more prevalent in rural areas (Vold, 1941; Clinard,
1942; Henry and Short, 1954, pp. 90-94). Clinard (1942, p. 204) is the
standard reference: "the influence of functional changes in a society is
reflected far less in personal crimes than in property offences which in-
volve the acquisition of things and not necessarily any personal or for-
tuitous situation". Property crime is associated with structural change;
but murder, assault and other "person" crimes are assumed to be ran-
domly distributed among the population or are considered as the
product of a distinctive regional or subcultural normative system that
encourages and facilitates interpersonal violence.
Therefore:
(a) Urban-rural differences for property offences will exceed or be in the
opposite direction to those for assaultive crimes.
(b) The response of types of crime to structural change will show a clear
sequence in which alterations in the pattern of property offences will
precede those for person offences.
As specified by Jacobson (1975) for regional differences, this lag results
when industrialisation and urbanisation generate socio-economic and
demographic changes capable of shaping property crime patterns; the nor-
mative orientations that govern person crime rates, however, alter more slow-
ly and therefore the implications for behaviour take longer to emerge. Of four
recent tests of Durkheim’s anomie theory using crime data, three qacobson,
1975; McDonald, 1976; Krohn, 1978) found marked differences between
person and property offences in their relationship to socio-economic condi-
tions; such differences, however, were not evident in Webb’s (1972) study.
Other criminologists within the social disorganisation tradition, while
agreeing that assaultive crimes tend to be more prevalent in rural than in
urban areas, offer explanations that introduce considerations of structural dif-
ferences between urban and rural areas. Henry and Short (1954; pp. 90-97),
for example, argue that the greater strength of the "relational system"
(primary group ties) in rural areas acts to direct aggression externally in the
form of assaultive crimes that in urban areas would be directed internally and
result in attempts at suicide. More generally, a social structure engenders
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pressures in the form of stress and coping resources that are unevenly dis-
tributed among the extant demographic and class groupings (Henry and
Short, 1954; Bohannan, 1960; Wood, 1961). However, the most influential
view is that of Clinard (1942; 1964), which precludes a link between struc-
tural change and assaultive offences.
A third expectation can also be identified : (3) Ultimately a stage is reached
in which structural change extends beyond its urban base and permeates a
social structure. As this occurs, a convergence in magnitudes and
characteristics of crime ought to follow, erasing urban-rural and regional dif-
ferences.
Finally, given the diverse and often vague usages of the term "social dis-
organisation," it is important to state my own understanding of what the
term means. Social disorganisation refers to the absence of clear and agreed
rules - a breach in the constitutive order of human activity. As such, it is not
applicable to those situations in which one form of social organisation has
successfully supplanted another, nor is it synonomous with situations in
which there is a substantial level of deviant activity. Social disorganisation
can be thought of independently of rule breaking behaviour (Cohen, 1959).
The Structural Perspective The societal changes that are the focus of writers
within the structural perspective are as specific and commonplace as those of
the social disorganisation perspective are general and abstract. The manner
in which a society is organised, it is argued, shapes the major forms of in-
dividual and collective action available, including those that are regarded as
criminal. Considerable attention is placed on the abundance and the distribu-
tion of property and on the availability of safeguards against the appropria-
tion of property from its owners.
There are two recent instances in which this approach has been deployed
as an explanation for long-term changes in crime statistics, a focus that makes
them of considerable relevance to this paper. One study is part of an explicit
challenge by Charles Tilly and his associates to the claims made by social dis-
organisation and relative deprivation explanations of collective violence and
protest (Snyder and Tilly, 1972, Lodhi and Tilly, 1973; Shorter and Tilly,
1974; Snyder, 1975; Snyder, 1976; Snyder, 1978). However, in Lodhi and Til-
ly’s (1973) study of nineteenth century France the purview is expanded to in-
elude patterns of crime. The trends in property and person crimes in France
between 1831 and 1931 were used to compare the explanatory importance of
the rate of urbanisation (representing disorganisation) to that of the structure
of the urban setting itself. In Lodhi and Tilly’s (1973, p. 313), view, "the
geographic distributions of crime and collective violence do not correspond to
the pattern of urban growth,.., urban settings, not the process of urbanisa-
tion as such, are conducive to crimes against property." Moreover, in the
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period during which urbanisation was proceeding most rapidly, the national
crime trends show a decrease in the rate of property crime. Crimes against
persons were essentially unrelated to any discernible pattern. In common
with social disorgansiation theorists, Lodhi and Tilly (1973, p. 314) conclude
that assaultive offences are independent of structural influences; variation in
such offences is attributed instead to the "rules and expectations small groups
learn in regulating their differences."
Three main variables emerged from the French data as explanations of
variation in property crime rates:
(1) the relative ease with which individuals can remove property
from the control of other individuals and groups in one setting or
another (which will, to be sure, depend on the definitions of
"property" prevailing in the setting); (2) the ways in which dif-
ferent groups of poor people are drawn into the social organization
of the setting, especially with respect to the general relations es-
tablished between them and those in the same setting who control
more property; (3) the extent to which acquiring property makes it
possible for people to carry on their valued day-to-day activities
and to which not having property makes these activities impossible.
(Lodhi and Tilly, 1973, p. 315).
Essentially
, 
this is an explanation based on opportunity, with the motivation
to commit a crime being important only in terms of the legitimacy that is at-
tached to property ownership. The focus is on the amount and the availability
of property.
A second convincing and highly relevant application of the structural
perspective is found in Cohen and Felson’s (1979) study of recent American
crime trends. In their formulation, a social structure establishes a particular
patterning of "routine activities", and the distribution and level of crime fol-
lows the dictates of that pattern. It follows that a change in social structure
will be linked to predictable changes in criminal activity. The logic of the link
is summarised thus (Cohen and Felson, 1979, p. 589).
We argue that structural changes in routine activity patterns can
influence crime rates by affecting the convergence in space and
time of the three minimal elements of direct-contact predatory
violations: (1) motivated offenders, (2) suitable targets: and (3) the
absence of capable guardians against a violation. We further argue
that the lack of any one of these elements is sufficient to prevent the
successful completion of a direct-contact predatory crime, and that
the convergence in time and space of suitable targets and the
absence of capable guardians may even lead to large increases in
CRIME IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 23
crime rates without necessarily requiring any increase in the struc-
tural conditions that motivate individuals to engage in crime. That
is, if the proportion of motivated offenders or even suitable targets
were to remain stable in a community, changes in routine activities
could nonetheless alter the likelihood of their convergence in space.
and time, thereby creating more opportunities for crimes to occur.
Control therefore becomes critical. If controls through routine ac-
tivities were to decrease, illegal predatory activities could then be
likely to increase.
Explanation in such a perspective on crime trends is sought exclusively in
terms of changes in circumstances; the questions of why, particular in-
dividuals or which individuals will respond to those circumstances are not
considered. Nevertheless, the perspective can account to an impressive degree
for recent changes in both the level and pattern of crime in the United States.
The notion that the organisation of crime in a particular society (Gould,
1971), or in sub-areas of cities (Boggs, 1965) is a reflection of the social
organisation of the setting has also been made using the analogy to a market
place. In this view, variation in the prevalence of types of crime are to be un-
derstood as responses to a set of market mechanisms that are interconnected
with those of the larger economy: "crime rates (at least for property crime)
are not affected by individual criminality, but by variation in the supply of
stealable goods, as well as the demand for goods to be stolen" (Mansfield et
al., 1974). The market place for crime, so defined, is governed by long-term
changes in the abundance of property, which determines the profitability of
crime as an economic activity. The focus is on the mechanisms which es-
tablish the supply of property available to be stolen at a level of risk accep-
table to the participants in the marketplace - amateur and professional
juvenile and adult criminals - and on mechanisms which establish the de-
mand for stolen goods.
What unites the various studies cited, and justifies their treatment as a dis-
tinct perspective, is their focus on how changes in patterns of human activity
and in the distribution of property together shape the level and pattern of
crime. It is not change in itself that causes an increase in criminal activity, but
a new structure of opportunities. Indeed, the opportunity for crime - or at
least for property crime - is thoroughly rooted in the opportunity structure for
legitimate pursuits and activities (see particularly Cohen and Felson, 1979).
Therefore, the presence of crime, even substantial amounts of it, need not be
indicative of disorganisation; it is instead a reflection of a more complex and
more satisfying form of social organisation.
Generally speaking, those writing within the structural perspective are con-
cerned only with crimes against property. An exception to this is Lane’s
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(1979) study of violent death in nineteenth century Philadelphia, which
argues that industrial urbanisation had a beneficent impact on the level of
crimes against persons. This occurred as the discipline acquired in the in-
dustrial workplace and in the public school system expanded to all contexts of
urban life. The very changes in human activity effected by industrial employ-
ment inhibited violence by curbing the situations and opportunities in which
it might occur. Life became more predictable, more controlled. The result
was a diminishing rate of homicide.
While this fits unambiguously within the structural perspective, it remains
at a very high level of generality. It does, however, seem possible to derive a
set of expectations based on the nature of structural change for assaultive
crimes such as homicide. That will be attempted in Chapter 6, which con-
siders data on Irish homicide patterns.
The Implications of Change: What is Important? Social disorganisation and
structural perspectives on crime perhaps differ more in the explanations that
they offer than in their implications. Both attribute to cities certain
characteristics that lead to a departure from previous types and levels of
criminal activity. Therefore, both draw attention to differences in the pattern
of urbanisation in a society, one to the speed and timing of urban growth per
se, the other to the speed and timing of particular changes in the urban con-
text (such as the availability of property that can be readily stolen).
Where the perspectives differ most clearly is perhaps in what they were
devised to explain. Social disorganisation tends to be most relevant for the
level of crime, while changes in opportunities are likely to be most clearly
reflected in the pattern of criminal activity. Since this study is interested in
both topics, it is unnecessary, at least at this stage, to make a choice between
the two perspectives. The main advantage of the structural perspective is that
the societal changes that it emphasises can generally be expressed as
variables. Those given prominence in the social disorganisation approach are
less readily translated into specific variables; indeed, the level of crime is often
appropriated as a measure of social disorganisation, a dubious procedure that
in the present study would tend to lead to an obvious impasse.
Before examining some of the major features of Irish social change, two
points which emerged from the discussion of the perspectives need to be
elaborated. In both perspectives, the possibilities for variation in the depth
and the pace of social change as well as its sequencing can be seen, but little
guidance is provided on how that can be expressed. Also, there is an indica-
tion that the safeguarding of property from crime is at least partly dependent
on the extent to which people accept the legitimacy of the distribution of
property, but this argument is not developed.
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Gerth and Mills (1953, p. 379) propose a continuum of change, "ranging
from the relatively constant (for .nothing is ’absolutely’ static) through
gradualist drift, deliberately piecemeal and cumulative reform, through a
variety of breaks, discontinuities, and leaps, to total crises and revolutions". A
useful theory will distinguish carefully between change accomplished by ac-
cretion and that arising from disjuncture. The institutions that dominated the
social structure prior to the sequence of change at issue can be determined, as
can the realignment among institutional orders fostered by that change.
Secondary adjustments in the distribution of class boundaries, power, and
status can also be traced. These questions are pertinent whether crime is at-
tributed to the unsettling effects of change or tied to the nature of the
emergent social order.
The diversity of social change and its consequences for crime trends has
been most fully considered in the work of Clinard, and particularly in his
studies of crime in developing countries (1973) and in Switzerland (1978). In
contrasting the experience of those countries with that of the "typical" Euro-
pean and American model, Clinard cites the rate of urban growth (itself
dependent on the nature of industrialisation) as manifested in the migration
by rural youths to cities and the establishment of slums. In Switzerland, a
gradual and restrained process of urbanisation ensured stability in the society
generally and the absence of a substantial barrier between urban and rural
areas. A low level of crime is the result. This contrasts with the rapidity and
magnitude of urbanisation in the Third World, with consequent dislocations,
heterogeneity, and slums - and a rapidly rising crime rate.
As the case of Switzerland suggests, there is sufficient diversity among
Western "developed" nations to require a more detailed consideration of
types of advanced capitalist society and the various paths taken in reaching
that status. There is general agreement that the nature of urbanisation, as
well as the other phenomena mentioned in summarising the two perspectives,
are offshoots of industrial development. Now large-scale industrial expansion,
wherever it occurs, inevitably re-orders the social structure, but it lacks a
specific internal momentum. "In each country it takes place in specific social
and economic conditions and is subject to direct and indirect national and in-
ternational pressures" (Marceau, 1977, p. 4). When the focus is narrowed to
industrial capitalism, the diversity of pathways to an advanced society re-
mains considerable.
Comparative analyses by Moore (1966), Giddens (1973, pp. 139--155), and
Marceau (1977, pp. 14-17), suggest two variables that combine to determine
the path taken by particular societies. First, the class structure providing the
framework for the decisive period of industrial expansion shapes the conse-
quences that accrue: in England, the framework was a developed and stable
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bourgeois order; in Germany, industrial growth preceded the emergence of
such an order and was undertaken instead through the initiative of a state
controlled by the traditional land-owning elite. Second, societies differ in the
duration and intensity of the period of decisive industrialisation. England is
the archetype of gradual and early industrial growth, and France of a
protracted and uneven industrialisation that culminated in a post-Second
World War spurt of massive and rapid industrial expansion. Generally, the
more recently manufacturing became the predominant force in an economy,
the more swiftly that transformation was accomplished. It will be necessary to
locate Ireland among these alternatives.
A second issue that needs attention is the role played by the nature of
property. Since the bulk of the criminal law is devoted to activities that in-
volve the acquisition of property outside of the legally and morally sanctioned
market and inheritance arrangements, it is necessary to understand the
meaning and the legitimation of property within a social structure. It is not
merely the amount, distribution, and character of property that potentially
change but the extent of consensus on the validity of the concept of property
itself. Property, whether physical or otherwise, represents a specif’rcation
recognised in law and culture of certain rights constraining others to behave
in a particular manner toward an object.
If the level of acceptance afforded the definition of property on which the
criminal law is based changes over time, then an increase in the rate of
property crime seems likely. There is some evidence to suggest that such a
change is one concomitant of the general impact of industrialisation and ur-
banisation. In urban settings, it becomes increasingly difficult to perceive a
particular item of property as belonging to a specific individual; the associa-
tion specified in the law becomes more abstract. Though such a change can-
not be expressed as a variable, it is of considerable importance in under-
standing the high rate of property crime that seems characteristic of the ad-
vanced societies. Portable forms of property - cars, television sets, radios,
phonographs, and records - all become more available. At the same time, a
more instrumentalist view of the rights to such property is likely to develop.
This need not be associated with the more basic issue of the acceptance of the
right to privately owned capital. The most valuable property in any urban
setting is, of course, land and the legitimac~r of private ownership of property
in that sense can be unquestioned at the same time that other forms of
property, which are mass produced and lack any distinctive connection to the
owner or to his livelihood, become increasingly seen as valid targets for ac-
quisition without benefit of purchase.
In criminological theories, the meaning of property is generally considered
in the context of the extent of integration of young people into the larger
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society. The possibility that "subcultures" or "contracultures" will develop,
formed primarily of young males rejecting the norms obtaining generally
within a society, is stressed. Clinard (1978) in his study of Switzerland at-
taches considerable importance to the high level of conformity by Swiss youth
and the level of communication between adults and youths. Since in most
countries property crime is primarily accounted for by young people, Clinard
explains Switzerland’s low rate of such crime as largely a reflection of the
degree to which a distinctive youth culture, which opposes basic rules of adult
behaviour, has not developed.
The Irish Context
This section attempts to sketch the broad outlines of social change in
Ireland during the post-Second World War period. The two perspectives
summarised in the preceding section were the main guides in selecting topics
for discussion. First, the general nature of industrial growth in Ireland will be
considered, followed by the pattern of urbanisation that this fostered. Other
aspects of Ireland’s social structure will be treated that seem sufficiently dis-
tinctive to shape trends in the level and pattern of crime.
The Pattern of Industrial Development With the impetus of The First Programme
for Economic Expansion, which was launched in 1958, Ireland entered an un-
precedented period of rapid and sustained industrial development. By 1961,
the effect was clearly identifiable in the main economic trends in the form of
an acceleration in growth (Kennedy and Dowling, 1975, pp. 3-8). Between
1951 and 1971, industrial growth and a decline in agricultural employment
forged a substantial change in the Irish economy. From a male work force
that in 1951 was nearly one-half engaged in agriculture (46.7 per cent), and
roughly one-quarter in each of industry and services, the 1971 profile had
shifted to 30 per cent in agriculture, 32 per cent in industry and 31 per cent in
services (Hannah et al., 1980). (Those "out of work" form the remainder of
the labour force.) The expansion in the scale of industrial enterprises was also
marked: in 1948 the average manufacturing enterprise had 38 employees; the
comparable average for 1968 was 60.
Two disjunctures in particular combined to mark a break with preceding
trends in the relationship between societal characteristics and crime in
Ireland. The first disjuncture originated in the agricultural sector. During the
1940s Irish agriculture, which had been static in structure and output for
more than half a century (Crotty, 1966, p. 84), began to be transformed by
mechanisation and commercialisation. This marked the final stage in the
destruction of the tradition and insular rural world so distinctly described by
Arensberg and Kimball (1940). The processes of accommodation and adap-
tation to new economic and social realities during the 1950s were later inten-
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sified and redirected by a second disjuncture effected by the unprecedented
industrial growth of the 1960s. The 1960s, therefore, represent both the
culmination of the response of the breakdown of the traditional system and
the aftermath of sudden industrialisation. The 1950s and the 1960s, therefore,
can be singled out as periods of secondary social change during which institu-
tions and roles adjusted to major disjunctures in social structure.
There was considerable dislocation in both periods. For the 1950s, the
mass movements of population through emigration and internal migration
appear to suffice as justifications for putting forward the expectations of social
disorganisation theory. However, it is likely that the depth of social structural
change needed to support the arguments of structural theorists was not pre-
sent until the mid-1960s, when the clear commitment to fostering capitalist
industrial development as the mainspring to prosperity began to be reflected
in the occupational structure. Therefore, the sequencing of sustained move-
ments in the crime statistics, like urban/rural differences, can potentially
serve as guides to the plausibility of the alternative theoretical perspectives.
It must be stressed that the sequencing of trends and the urban/rural dif-
ferences found in the crime statistics can facilitate interpretation but cannot
definitively choose the more powerful approach.
Ireland represents a clear instance of late and sudden industrialisation. But
unlike France, where a stable and well-differentiated class system was in ex-
istence to engineer the final movement to an advanced capitalist society, there
was an essentially pre-industrial class structure at the point of critical growth.
The one group with the necessary entrepreneurial tradition and skills for con-
stituting an industrialising elite - the old Protestant business families - was
too intimately tied to the discredited colonial elite (Fogarty, 1973, p. 115).
Where industrial growth was evident, state sponsored enterprises were the
vehicles. In consequence, the post-1958 period of sustained economic develop-
ment forged a new class structure. In France, the redistributions accompany-
ing the comparable post-War growth amounted to minor variations on the ex-
tant class structure. Irish industrialisation, however, altered the composition
of classes and the degree of class structuration creating hitherto non-existent
boundaries. Change occurred not by accretion butby disjunctures in the total
social structure.
That the pattern of industrial development" was diffuse rather than con-
centrated in a few major urban centres also had important consequences. The
attraction of the cities as targets for migration was thereby lessened, as was
the level of internal migration generally. Also, the sequencing of secondary
adjustments to structural change was probably less clear and important than
it was in most European countries. The impact of social change was more
evenly felt throughout the society, and the filtering process by which change
CRIME IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 29
begins in major urban centres and only gradually spreads to other areas less
pronounced. This does not mean that every region and type of area shared
equivalently in the changes, but that rapidity and lack of concentration les-
sened the differences that emerged.
Urbanisalion and Emigration The impact of this pattern of industrial develop-
ment on urban growth is not difficult to document. Dublin, in contrast to
most capital cities, was not the magnet for a massive wave of rural migration,
and the growth of Dublin was gradual and largely from natural increase.
Certain aspects of Irish emigration patterns, and particularly their impact
on urbanisation, also east doubt on the applicability of social disorganisation
theories to Ireland. Of the characteristics of emigration in this century, one of
the most distinctive is that it was a movement of individuals more than of
families. Emigrants typically were young, unattached, and, at least before the
1950s, drawn from those without marketable skills (Meenan, 1970). Massive
emigration meant that Ireland became an urban nation by default - that is,
through rural depopulation rather than by the characteristic European
process of migration from rural areas into the towns and cities (Walsh, 1974).
Therefore, Dublin and other Irish cities did not share with other European
cities the catchment role of sheltering and socialising successive waves of rural
migrants. Evidence from the Dublin Social Mobility Study indicates how
striking a departure this was from the European pattern: non-Dublin born
Dublin residents were on average of higher social status and educational at-
tainment than native Dubliners (Hutchinson, 1969).
The relationship between internal migration and emigration to other
countries is certainly distinctive to Ireland. In the 1946-61 period, only eight
of every 100 migrants from outside of the capital had Dublin as their destina-
tion; this had increased for 1961-71 to 21 out of every 100 (Hughes and
Walsh, 1980, p. 54). It was only in the latter period, in which the level of
emigration declined markedly, that Dublin acted as a significant magnet, for
the rest of the country, and particularly for the young and well educated. In
both periods, however, the Dublin born were considerably less likely to
emigrate than were those born elsewhere. Taken together, the post-1961 at-
traction of Dublin for migrants, the high rate of natural increase in the Dublin
population, and the low emigration rate of Dubliners contributed to the
growth in the city’s population.
The growth of Dublin can be charted from the data in Table 1. While the
increase between 1926 and 1971 in both the size of Dublin’s population and in
the proportion of the national population living in the city was substantial, it
was spread fairly evenly over the period. In the years after 1961 the pace
quickens, for reasons noted above, but the trend of increase was spread over a
period of decades rather than concentrated over a short interval. Emigration
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Table 1: National, County Dublin, and Dublin urban area populations at each census
from 1926 to 1971"
Census Tear National County Dublin Dublin Urban AreaI
1926 2,971,992 505,654 (17.0%) 439,205 (14.8%)
1936 2,968,420 586,925 (19.8) 507,888 (17.1)
1946 2,955,107 636,193 (21.5) 550,725 (18.6)
1951 2,960,593 693,022 (23.4) 634,473 (21.4)
1956 2,989,264 705,781 (24.4) 649,338 (22.4)
1961 2,818,341 718,332 (25.5) 663,389 (23.5)
1966 2,884,002 795,047 (27.6) 734,967 (25.5)
1971 2,978,248 852,219 (28.6) 778,127 (26.1)
*Numbers in parentheses are percentages of national population.
IThe Dublin Urban Area in this table consists of Dublin County Borough and Dun Laoghaire
Borough with, from 1951, the Suburbs adjacent to them. The definitions of Borough and
Suburb are those used in each year’s Census, with one exception; to take account of’the crea-
tion of Dun Laoghaire Borough in 1930, as well as a major extension of the Dublin County
Borough, the figures for 1926 are based on the definitions of 1936.
was one factor underlying that pattern of urban growth. Though this changed
after 1961, the level of Irish internal migration, including that with Dublin as
its destination, remained low by European standards (Hughes and Walsh,
1980).
The 1960s and 1970s were periods of substantial dislocation for the Dublin
working class. Dublin Corporation’s housing policies created massive move-
ments of families from traditional working class neighbourhoods to new hous-
ing estates and blocks of flats away from the city centre. Taken together,
urban growth declining emigration, and working class dislocation did in the
1960s - probably for the first time since the foundation of the State - approx-
imate the image of social change that underlies the social disorganisation
perspective.
Another important consequence of emigration can be seen in the changing
age structure of the population. The proportion of the total accounted for by
those age groups most prone to involvement in crime was depleted: the size of
the group between ages 15 and 29 declined by 11.6 per cent between 1926 and
1971. Even during the last five years of that period, during which the numbers
in that age category increased, without emigration the increase would have
been 10 per cent higher (Central Statistics Office, 1973, pp. xvi-xvii). Dif-
ferences in the age structure of urban and rural areas are also noteworthy: in
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1971 24.8 per cent of the Dublin population was within the 15-29 age
category; outside of Dublin the corresponding figure was 20.9 per cent.
During the 1950s, the distinctive Irish pattern of rural to urban migration
blunted the impact on cities of rural change. Emigration overseas absorbed
the bulk of those dislocated in the course of farm mechanisation. When
migration to the capital became important in the 1960s, those migrating were
drawn primarily from the rural, well-educated middle class. In this way, the
consequences of the marginalisation of a substantial proportion of the labour
force was deferred at least for a time by the safety valve of emigration.
Between 1951 and 1971, 543,000 persons -a number equal to nearly one half
of the total labour force at the latter date (Walsh, 1974, p. 107) - emigrated.
Dublin was spared the role of absorbing massive numbers of rural migrants.
Emigration possibly supplemented its general role as a safety valve reduc-
ing pressure from the young with limited opportunities with a more
specialised form of emigration:
An Irishman with criminal aspirations almost invariably leaves this
country and goes to England, sometimes voluntarily, sometimes on
the advice of the police or even a District Justice (Russell, 1964, p.
146).
This specialised emigration may be tied to many of the same factors Walsh
(1968) identified for emigration generally, chiefly short-term fluctuations in
the supply of employment in Ireland and in England. In sum, the impact of
emigration in the 1950s, and probably earlier, was to limit rather than to
enhance the potential for deviance.
The Meaning of Property Property in the form of farm land traditionally car-
ried decisive weight in shaping the magnitude and nature of crime in Ireland.
During the nineteenth century, until the right of land tenure was ultimately
secured in the 1880s through the Land War, agrarian unrest was reflected in
high levels of"crime" in British government statistics (Broeker, 1970, p. 239).
Perhaps in conjunction with the advent of mass education, the achievement of
widespread land ownership appears to have effected a transformation to rates
of violent crime that approach the inconsequential. Subsequently, agrarian
unrest would recur, but only at brief and mild interludes. A decrease in the
traditional estrangement between the population and the imposed legal order
is also identifiable, though later events were to, at least temporarily, recreate
the breach. In Lynch’s interpretation (1966, p. 52), the 1880s marked
Ireland’s social revolution. Land ownership facilitated the development of a
peasant system, with a deep, emotional, attachment to property. The sym-
bolic importance of land was embedded in the conservatism of the rural social
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order. Given the proportion of the population with rural backgrounds, it is
probable that the symbolic meaning of property associated with subsistence
and semi-commercial farming areas persisted in the larger society until sup-
#anted in the course of industrialisation.
Property rights, therefore, existed in a context conducive to a high level of
legitimation. Legitimacy refers to a state in which compliance with a set of
rules derives not from force of habit or from an assessment of the benefits of so
doing but from "a conviction of the moral dutifulness of obedience" (Poggi,
1977, p. 321). Property still had a meaning in terms of a person’s livelihood.
With ’increasing access to mass media from other countries and declining
agricultural employment, such treatment of property could not be sustained.
This coincided in the 1960s with a transformation in the range and amount
of consumer goods available in Ireland, both urban and rural. The change in
the availability of property is perhaps most clearly shown through the growth
between 1951 and 1975 in the number of privately owned motor vehicles. In
1951 there were 96,714 licensed vehicles, a figure which by 1962 had in-
creased to 207,166, by 1968 to 336,615, and by 1975 to 511,827. The
1951-1975 increase is more than five-fold. In per capita terms, the increase was
from 3.3 per 100 in 1951 to 16.4 per 100 population in 1975. Information on
the number of television sets in the Republic are only meaningful for the
period since 1962, the year in which RTE started television broadcasting.
There were 93,000 licensed television sets in 1962, 377,000 by 1968, and
564,880 by 1975. This translates into an increase from 3.3 to 18.1 per 100
population. The 1962 to 1975 change in number of sets is six-fold comparable
to an increase for those years of 2.5 fold in the number of private motor vehi-
cles. (Statistical Abstract of Ireland, various issues and McCarthy and Ryan,
1976).
The l.~gitimation of British Law in Ireland The retention of English criminal
law by the newly independent Ireland negates a basic assumption of the
social disorganisation perspective. 1 To Durkheim, a society’s legal code is the
"visible symbol" of its social solidarity: "We can thus be certain of finding
reflected in law all the essential varieties of social solidarity" (Durkheim,
1933, pp. 64-65). The criminal law inherited from England, developed in the
~The retention of the institutional arrangements characteristic of nineteenth century British in-
dustrial capitalism as the framework for the traditional, rural, and Catholic Irish Free State is
an unresolved problem for Irish historians and sociologists (Lynch, 1966; Williams, 1966). It
also highlights ambiguities in the Weberian approach to the legitirnation of social structures: if
legitimation is accomplished by intrinsically moral principles that instil a sense that obedience
has a value, as Weber’s followers arg. ue (of. Blau, 1964, pp.-200; 254-255; Parsons, i949, pp.
670--677), how was it possible for the "value consensus" in Ireland during the 1920s and 1930s
to legitimate the institutions inherited from British rule?
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nineteenth century to contain disorder in the industrial cities of the most ad-
vanced of the capitalist societies, would seem to have little affinity to the con-
sensus constructed around Catholic values and principles that most observers
regard as the dominant force in independent Ireland. Such a gap makes less
plausible the social disorganisation argument that rapid increases in the level
of crime occur in response to a weakening of attachments to societal norms.
That attachment seems tenuous from the start.
The criminal law involves more than a set of rules and procedures for its en-
forcement; a particular concept of crime and of criminals is inherent to it.
Both the rules and the concept of crime they imply bore little obvious
relevance to Ireland prior to the 1960s. However, as Ireland changed in the
general direction of advanced capitalism, the inherited legal system became
more relevant. To me, this seems to reverse the basic argument that is made
in most social disorganisation approaches: rules are being institutionalised
instead of being erased.
Conclusion: The Applicability of Perspectives on Crime
The process of social change in Ireland, at least as I have described it, does
not conform to the main assumptions of the social disorganisation perspec-
tive. Like Switzerland (see Clinard, 1978), Ireland appears to be a distinct
case; unlike Switzerland, however, the distinctiveness does not necessarily
imply a low and invariant crime rate. What is most distinctive about Ireland
since the 1950s is the nature of urbanisation, which seems to me to preclude
an application of the major tenets of social disorganisation explanations of
crime trends. If such explanations are applied to Ireland, however, then it
seems plausible to anticipate upward trends in the crime rates commencing in
the 1950s not in the 1960s.
What deserves emphasis in recent Irish experience is the suddenness,
rapidity, and pervasiveness of change. Industrialisation, which is the primary
force, explicitly or implicity, in most attempts to explain the growth of crime,
occurred later and more quickly than in other countries. The gradual accom-
modation to change stressed by Clinard in his study of Switzerland is hardly
applicable to Ireland.
In terms of the likely timing of a change from fairly constant levels of crime
to rapid and sustained increases, it seems reasonable to focus on the early
1960s. If an increased crime rate is one of the secondary adjustments that fol-
low in the wake of concentrated industrial development, then certainly by the
mid-1960s the impact should be identifiable. Also, the rapidity and extent of
the structural changes ought to be reflected in a more diffuse distribution of
increasing levels of crime than was found in other countries. The sequencing
of increases in crime, with an initial impact on the largest urban centres that
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only gradually spreads to smaller cities and, after a considerable lag, to rural
areas, is unlikely.
The changes experienced in the 1960s are not irrelevant to the arguments
contained in the social disorganisation perspective. Rather, the timing and
the distribution of rising crime levels is likely to be different from that found in
other countries. Undoubtedly, the very complexity of life that emerged in the
aftermath of economic change acted to loosen, for many individuals, con-
straints that previously had acted as effective means of social control. Social
disorganisation was a factor in what occurred, but it was not as decisive
an influence as has been claimed for most western and developing nations; it
certainly is less easy to pinpoint.
What a social disorganisation perspective cannot hope to explain is the
change in the pattern of criminal activity. In particular, the possibility that
crime not only becomes more prevalent but more sophisticated is not readily
considered within that framework. However, it is the possibility that crime is
not only becoming more frequent but also more sinister, in terms of the
damage inflicted on life and property, that makes crime a topic of public con-
cern. The structural perspective is more amenable to answering issues related
to that concern. Changing opportunities, in the form of the portable goods
available to be stolen and the efficacy of the protection afforded such
property, necessarily exert considerable influence on the pattern of crime that
will obtain. The perception of the relevant forms of property is also likely to
change in a manner that reduces inhibitions toward theft.
The use of a structural perspective seems preferable in the Irish case for a
more basic reason. If change is sudden and diffuse, the plausibility of a social
disorganisation explanation for long-term changes in the level of crime seems
quite limited. If an entire society becomes sufficiently disorganised to
engender substantial changes in the level of crime, then the continuation of
routine human activities becomes questionable. In the absence of a specific
location for the disorganising impact of change - such as large urban areas
that absorb the main force - the applicability of the entire approach becomes
tenuous. A structural perspective, in which changing social organisation has
certain implications for the level and pattern of crime, appears to be more
useful if the changes of interest lack a specific locus.
For these reasons, the arguments put forward, by proponents of the struc-
tural perspective appear to be more convincing guides in interpreting the
crime trends that later chapters will describe and analyse. When the momen-
tum of economic change accumulated to a significant degree, re-ordering the
structure of work, family, and leisure, the activities that are defined by the
criminal law as punishable offences also experienced a transformation com-
parable in depth and permanency. This is not to deny that the changes
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Ireland experienced were often disruptive, requiring adjustments that posed
significant problems for many individuals. But I believe that the emphasis in
explaining what has happened should be placed on the distinctive social
changes of the past three decades. What may at times have seemed to be a
growing disorder can, I think, with hindsight be shown to have been the es-
tablishment of a new order.
Chapter 3
Data Sources: Availability and Adequacy
The perspectives outlined in Chapter 2 seek to explain trends in the level
and pattern of criminal activity. Crime statistics, however, as they change
over time, reflect many things, of which actions that violate the criminal law
statutes are but one. Public concern over crime and confidence in the police,
as well as the manner in which the police are organised and in which they coi-
lect and classify their information all potentially vary from year to year, thus
changing the crime statistics. This chapter undertakes the groundwork neces-
sary to use the Irish crime statistics between 1951 and 1975 as indicators of
changes that occurred in crime. It considers the sources of published informa-
tion and evaluates their relevance to the issues outlined in Chapter 2. This
leads to the selection of a set of meaningful indicators of changes in crime
from the published data and from supplementary information collected
specifically for this study. It is then possible to examine methods that can be
used to describe the relationship between the selected indicators and social
change.
Sources of Data on Irish Crime
Information on crime and law enforcement in Ireland is primarily to be
found in two documents. Since 1947, a Report on Crime has been published an-
nually’ by the Commissioner of the Garda Siochana. This report provides a
breakdown of the incidence, detection rate, and judicial disposal of eases for
approximately 125 specific offence categories. The report also details the age
and the sex of those persons convicted for each category of offence and
provides information on special garda programmes such as the Juvenile
Liaison Officer scheme. For certain broad summary classifications, the
numbers of known and detected offences are stated for individual garda divi-
sions and districts, and, where relevant, information is provided on the
resulting monetary losses during the twelve months. The second basic docu-
ment is the Annual Report on Prisons and Detention Centres, in which, for each year
since 1928, the numbers and the characteristics of those committed to the
prison system are tabulated.
Other relevant statistics can be found in the Section on Reformatories and
Industrial Schools (from 1970-71 onwards referred to as Special Schools and
Residential Homes) in the Annual Report of the Department of Education. Also, for
each financial year, detailed information is available on government expen-
ditures relevant to law enforcement and to the courts. These are included as
separate sections for the Office of the Minister for Justice, for the Garda
36
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Siochana, for the prisons, and for the courts in the Appropriation Accounts. For
all of these annual reports, the Statistical Abstract includes a summary of the
most important statistics. In the period preceding the publication of the an-
nual Report on Crime, the Abstract was the only source for crime statistics.
Irish crime statistics, like Irish criminal law, can best be described as a
British legacy. The basic format of the Report on Crime is an improved version
of nineteenth century reports on crime in England and Wales. This similarity
is a reflection of the extent to which compilation of crime statistics in Ireland
has been, and is, an annual ritual, with publication of the report the sole ob-
jective. With the exception of occasional references in D~iil debates, crime
statistics are rarely used. This does not preclude some use of the crime
statistics within the Garda Siochana in reaching decisions on manpower al-
locations. Also, the Conroy Commission in its report (Commission on the Garda
Siochana, 1970, p. 46) did make some use of offences-known figures and (1970,
p. 26) reviews the work of the Urwick, Orr and Partners consultancy report of
1957 in which criteria for allocating the force’s manpower to rural areas were
partly based on the number of indictable offences reported. There have been
two recent attempts of analysing crime trends in Ireland. Hillyard (1969) ex-
amined trends in crime and law enforcement over the 1901 to 1967 period,
with particular attention to 1955-1967. Bacon and O’Donoghue (1975) car-
ried out an economic analysis of crime covering the years 1952 to 1971.
The lack of a clear purpose to which crime statistics are applied has three
basic consequences. First, the format of the report is now anachronistic and in
need of revision. Second, inconsistencies and ambiguities have not always
been challenged and improvements have not been suggested. Third, with ease
of preparation a major criterion for selecting what is to be included, a gradual
reduction in the range and depth of the information contained in the report
has taken place.
Still, what is available for Ireland is impressive when compared to the
deficiencies found in crime statistics elsewhere. A continuous series can be as-
sembled of offences known to the gardai that commences in 1927. Moreover,
the statistics reflect a data collection process that, in contrast to those in the
United States and England, is undertaken at a national level, employing a
consistent set of definitions and rules for classifying and counting offences.
Crime statistics in Ireland are essentially compiled at the level of the 100 gar-
da districts. In contrast, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation merely col-
lates the returns submitted to it by thousands of state, county, and municipal
police departments; its control over the classification and counting processes
that underlie the statistics published is minimal. These virtues of the Irish
crime statistics are greatly enhanced by the detail of reporting. From 1927 to
1946 the annual Statistical Abstract used some 40 reporting categories, while
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the introduction of a report exclusively devoted to crime statistics in 1947 ex-
panded the coverage to 75 categories, a number that has since increased. The
flexibility this gives to users of the data is invaluable, as is the potential for en-
suring comparability among offence categories over the years even if some
categories become aggregated.
The merits of Irish crime statistics are offset, at least in part, by certain dis-
advantages. Many of these arise from sheer disuse: ambiguities are present in
the reporting practices simply because no system of annotation accompanies
the statistics, to publicise and update the definitions and procedures being
used. While even the incessantly used, some would say overused, American
crime statistics are apparently routinely misinterpreted (see Steffensmeier,
1978, pp. 580-581), there are formidable difficulties involved in treating the
Irish crime statistics as a time-series. The remainder of this section details
hazards specific to the Irish Crime Statistics, while the section that follows
evaluates those statistics in the light of problems inherent to all attempts at
measuring crime through police records.
News media coverage of the Garda Commissioner’s annual report tends to
be dominated by a single statistic: the total for all indictable offences.
Whatever its merits as a legal distinction, the contrast between indictable and
non-indictable offences fails to isolate a reasonable index of the level of crime:
indictable offences rangefrom murder to shoplifting. The emphasis given to
the total of indictable offences, and the four traditional subdivisions thereof,
limits the usefulness of much of the information published. Also, such con-
veniently packaged measures are irresistible temptations to those seeking a
simple answer to a very complex problem, that of determining how much
crime is present.
Since some reliance on the indictable/non-indictable distinction is un-
avoidable, it is useful to make clear its basis. Indictable offences are those that
can, or must be, tried before a jury, as defined primarily by statutes in 1849
and 1851 (Bartholomew, 1971, pp. 1-12). The "can or must" leads in prac-
tice to a diminution of any clear difference based on seriousness. Today,
many, perhaps most trials for indictable offences are held summarily before
the District Court, without a jury. In 1972, 91.6 per cent of all commitments
to prison were from summary proceedings in the District Court. The set of
categories that by the criteria of mid-nineteenth century legal thinking were
"serious", does not, for us, represent a cohesive or particularly important in-
dication of the level of crime. Even the four subdivisions for indictable offences
- offences against the person, offences against property with violence, offences
against property without violence, and "other" offences - subsume so diverse
a set of offences as to be meaningless.
Another legacy of the nineteenth century is the reversion in the 1958 Report
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on Crime to the use of a crime year in which the time period covered is the
twelve months commencing on the 1st October. This practice, which was
used in England during the 1850s (Tobias, 1972, p. 298), contrasts with the
1947-1957 and post-1974 practice of using the calendar year. As a time-series
in their own right, the crime statistics are rendered awkward by the shift in
the reporting period. The last three months of 1957 are included in both the
1957 and 1958 Report on Crime, and the last three months in 1974 are not in-
cluded as part of an annual tabulation, though the figures for those months
are appended separately to the 1974 report. Awkwardness can turn into con-
fusion if the crime data for the 1960s and 1970s are used in conjunction with
annual statistics on economic conditions. A study testing the hypothesis that
crime increases in periods of high unemployment will, unless corrections are
made, involve an assumption that unemployment in 1971 has some impact on
offences that occurred in 1970, since the 1971 Report on Crime includes data
from three months of the previous year. The introduction of a "lag", which
argues that economic conditions require an interval before exerting their ef-
fect, removes that anomaly but introduces its own disparities. In the 1960s
and the first half of the 1970s, the interval will be three months shorter than
for other periods.
Other changes accompanied the 1958 alteration of the reporting year. The
amount of information provided on the processing of juveniles through the
law enforcement system was curtailed and the dividing line between major
and minor larceny was changed from £5 to £50.
There is further ambiguity in the selection of counting units. The unit for
indictable crimes is the offence, but one offence can reflect the actions of any
number of individuals, and one person can be responsible for, or charged
with, any number of separate offences. It is, therefore, impossible, given the
absence of an enumeration of persons, to discover what proportion of those
charged with a criminal offence were convicted, sentenced to prison, tried
before the District Court, discharged, or otherwise treated. Further, since
only one entry is possible for each offence, where the result is mixed, with
some defendants being guilty and others not guilty, the entire offence is
entered as leading to a conviction. In such information as is provided for in-
dividuals on the number, age, and sex of those convicted - a person is only
entered for the most serious offence. In the 1974 report, non-indictable of-
fences, previously tabulated on the basis of individuals, are made comparable
to the reporting procedures for indictable offences. As a result, the pre-1974
figures on non-indictable offences cannot be reconciled with more recent in-
formation.
Another difficulty is that each report refers only to events within the 12
months covered. While all the offences listed as "known" will have taken
4O THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
place, or have been detected, within that 12-month period, the court actions
and the characteristics of those convicted can, in the 1947 to 1975 reports,
relate to offences that took place in previous years. It is, therefore, impossible
to determine precisely the detections and court proceedings resulting from a
given year’s offences. Furthermore, as the number of known offences has been
increasing from year to year, the lag between offences and detections can
result in a spuriously low detection rate.
A final limitation of the present Report on Crime is the absence of data per-
taining to individual counties or cities. As a result, comparisons between
types of areas cannot be made and socio-economic factors in the distribution
of crime cannot be analysed. The number of known and detected offences in
the four traditional aggregate categories of indictable offences is provided for
each of the 18 Garda Divisions and for the Garda Districts of four major
cities, but the boundaries of those jurisdictions are generally incompatible
with other administrative units and the categories used are comprised of of-
fences so diverse as to render the figures meaningless.
Evaluating Crime Statistics
An assessment of the meaningfulness of crime statistics can only be made
on the basis of the purpose for which they are to be used. As Hindess (1973)
argues, "different theoretical problematics must produce different and
sometimes contradictory evaluations of any given set of statistics." The
relevance of the conceptual categories used in generating the statistics, and
that of the rules and procedures employed in assigning individual cases to
those categories, takes precedence in the evaluation. For example, Hobs-
bawm and Rud6 (1969, pp. 54--60) convincingly use poaching as an index of
rural economic conditions and social tensions; it is unlikely that the offence of
embezzlement would in such a context prove as useful.2
For the present study, the primary requirement is that the indicators
selected be reasonable measures for the rate of change in the level and the pat-
tern of criminal activity. This is essential if changes in the crime statistics are
to be considered as responses to social change. The crime statistics, therefore,
2An exemplary use of crime statistics toward a clear theoretical purpose can be found in
George C. Lewis’s 1836 survey of agrarian disorder in Ireland. He divided serious offences
recorded during 1833 into two classes: those intended to create a general effect of deterring or
compelling others, and those in which the intent was limited to a specific purpose, such as ac-
quiring money. Lewis (1977, p. 78) observes: "Now the characteristic difference between the
crimes of Ireland, and of England, France, and indeed of almost every civilized country in the
world, is that in a large part of Ireland the former class appears to preponderate considerably
beyond the latter: whereas, in other countries, the former class of crimes is so small that at or-
dinary times it can scarcely be said to have any existence."
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must be an accurate measure of changes that have taken place in Ireland over
the past quarter century in both the magnitude and the nature of criminal ac-
tivity. In terms of magnitude, it is essential that trends reflect the pace of
change. But the indicators must also allow for the possibility that trends in
the level of offences will be accompanied by changes in the characteristics of
criminal acts, particularly in the degree of sophistication and organisation in-
volved and in the seriousness of the resulting damage. The offence categories
should be sensitive indices of the possibilities for substantial appropriation of
¯ property through law-breaking activities. Indicators of person offences that,
by definition, do not involve an attempt to appropriate property can then be
used for comparative purposes.
Within this broad specification of requirements, it is possible to begin con-
sidering the technical criteria that underlie the choice of crime indicators.
The use of police and judical statistics to quantify the extent of crime has a
history of nearly two centuries, and the controversy over the merits of that
practice is equally venerable. From the early nineteenth century, the debate
that centred on the possibility that the under-reporting of criminal offences to
the police, together with the selective recording of those cases by the police,
creates a "dark figure" of crime not included in the official statistics,a This
raises two issues: first, the possibility that the published figures seriously
under-represent the occurrence of major crime, and second, the possibility
that the process by which offences become "known" is so random that com-
parisons of crime rates between years are invalid.
The first issue may not be quite as serious as it seems. Chapman (1970, p.
82) argues, that "the complexity of administration in modern societies is such
that if all laws and police ordinances were to be universally enforced, all
citizens would be criminal." As was noted in Chapter 1, it is necessary to be
more precise in defining what is of interest. This will clarify the magnitude of
the problem involved in the "dark figure" by attributing to it degrees of im-
portance that vary between types of offence. The level of under-reporting is
high only for relatively minor offences, such as petty larceny (Ferdinand,
1967; Hindelang, 1974); the reporting of offences such as homicide and rob-
bery appears to be quite representative (Archer and Gartner, 1976;
Vigderhous, 1978; Messner, 1978, p. 5). The problem posed by limitations in
3In particular, great attention was given to statutory changes and changing court practices as
alternative explanations for observed changes in the crime statistics. Thus, Durkheim in Suicide
(1951, p. 338) comments: "No doubt, property crimes have decreased since 1854 while suicides
are increasing. But this decrease is in part fictitious; it is due merely to the fact that at about
that time judges began to send certain crimes before the courts of summary jurisdiction"; for Karl
Marx’s observation on this same "artificial" decrease, see Taylor, et al. (1973, pp. 216-217).
Tobias (1972) devotes a chapter to a description and evaluation of the crime statistics of that
era.
42 THE.ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
the range of offences that are reflected in the official statistics also varies
greatly by country. Strong evidence suggests that under-reporting is far less
prevalent in most countries than in the United States (Verkko, 1953; Presi-
dent’s Commission of Law Enforcement and the Administration of Criminal
Justice, 1967, p. 20; Clinard, 1978, pp. 57-60).
Thus for many categories of crime, and perhaps for the most important
categories, the "dark figure" is less menacing than is sometimes thought. A
series of British studies has recently considerably increased our under-
standing of the process through which offences become "known". Bottomley
and Coleman (1976), for example, examined police files in a medium-sized
north of England city and found that only 13 per cent of known indictable of-
fences were discovered by police, the remaining offences coming to light either
through the initiative of the victims or of other members of the public. In the
absence of evidence that witnesses or victims are unduly reluctant to report
offences through fear, or through a conviction that police inefficiency makes it
pointless to do so, it may be concluded that much of the "dark figure" con-
sists of acts considered trivial or private by most people. To the extent that the
public is indeed the major arbiter of what becomes known and therefore in-
cluded in the crime statistics, a basis exists for considering offences known to
the police as a relatively sensitive measure of crime. A substantial research
literature attests to the primary role of offence seriousness in determining
whether an incident is reported to the police (see especially Skogan, 1976 and
" Hindelang, 1976).
The second technical issue is the possibility that systematic changes over
time in the propensity of the public to report crimes, or in the police practices
in processing those reports, invalidate comparisons between years in the
number of known offences. Quetelet, the nineteenth century Belgian statisti-
cian who produced the seminal work on crime statistics, adopted an assump-
tion that the amount of "known" crime bears a constant relationship to the
amount of crime that remains unrecorded. The validity of that assumption is
likely to vary among types of offence and among countries in accordance with
the seriousness of under-reporting, as noted above. As Cohen and Felson
(1979, p. 588) observe, an upward trend in the crime statistics reflects both an
increasing number of offences and an overall increase in offence seriousness.
The difficulties in establishing the representativeness of police crime data
are exacerbated by a necessary reliance on criminal law categories. Enact-
ment of new statutes can render the revised classification system irrecon-
cilable with that which previously obtained. Even if stability in legal defini-
tions can be assumed, there is an inherent ambiguity in the failure of
statutory offences to be mutually exclusive - a marked increase in, say, indic-
table assaults might merely reflect a change in the convention by which a
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police force distinguishes between indictable and non-indictable assaults. An
important principle for making such distinctions in the criminal law is inten-
tion; as a criterion for classifying behaviours into offence categories, this poses
obvious difficulties. Motivation, however, is not generally used in defining
statutes, and this precludes consideration of differences among incidents in
that regard, say, that between robberies with a political and those with a non-
political motivation.
New statutes often appear to be attempts at removing ambiguities in ex-
isting criminal law. For example, the 7961 Road Traffic Act created a new of_
fence: "taking a motor powered vehicle without authorisation," to deal with
instances in which no clear intention to permanently deprive the owner of his
or her property was present. Under the provisions of the Larceny Act of 1916
such intention was required, and where it was absent recourse had to be
taken to a charge of larceny of the petrol consumed in the journey, for which
intention could be established. In this instance, the impact on the validity of
trends in motor vehicle larceny was minor, but in other cases a new statute
might artificially change the level of pre-existing categories.
To the extent that uniform classification and counting procedures are fol-
lowed by a police force, the possibility of bias being introduced into com-
parisons of annual crime data is reduced. In England and Wales, it was not
until after the Second World War that a systematic recording procedure for
offence and arrest data was established and distributed to all police
authorities (Downes, 1965). Inconsistencies remained, however, and in the
mid-1960s the Perks Committee reviewed the data collection process underly-
ing the criminal statistics. Three basic problems were identified (Departmen-
tal Committee on Criminal Statistics, 1967, p. 18):
(a) Some types of offence consist of more or less continuous, or repetitive,
activity, which cannot without some arbitrary convention be counted
as a definite number of distinct occurrences.
(b) Several different people may be the victims of the same criminal act.
(c) Some criminal acts involve the infringement of a number of distinct
parts of the criminal law, but an element of unreality would be in-
troduced into the statistics if each infringement were counted as a
separate offence.
The solution adopted for these problems, or the failure to mandate a solu-
tion, will have a considerable impact on the apparent magnitude of the crime
problem in a police jurisdiction. For example, if the number of larcenies in
one country is established on the basis of victims, counting each series of of-
fences directed at an individual or an institution as one offence, it is pointless
to compare that figure with that from another country that counts each ap-
propriation of property as a separate offence. One final complication deserves
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mention: the classifying and counting conventions employed for offences that
are "detected" can differ from those for which no suspect is found
(Departmental Committee on Crime Statistics, 1967, p. 18). If a suspect has
been identified, the choice of offence categories will be made in terms of
strategy for future court proceedings. The general tendency is to specify more
but less serious offences when suspects are available than when they are not.
In Ireland, clear rules for classifying and counting are set down in the
Garda Siochana Code. For purposes of interpreting the number of known of-
fences, and for comparison with other countries, the two most important rules
are:
1 A larceny, fraud or forgery directed in a continuous series against one
person or institution will count as a single offence.
2 A forcible entry into a block of offices or flats will be counted according
to the number of separate offices or flats entered. If, however, one flat or
office is entered and property taken from several individuals, there was
only one forcible entry but as many larcenies as there were individuals
who lost property.
The implementation of these rules on a national basis substantially in-
creases the confidence that can be placed in the Irish crime statistics.
However, it remains useful to bear in mind the possible deficiences of all such
statistics when used in time-series analysis. The following check-list is a
guideline for interpreting trends in known and detected offences:
1 Changes instatutes
2 Changes in public attitudes
(a) tolerance of particular types of crime
(b) approval of and confidence in the police
(c) ease of reporting offences to the police
(d) inducements to report offences - insurance or other forms of com-
pensation for injury or loss that require a police report
3 Changes within the police
(a) classification rules
(b) counting rules
(c) resources (size of the force and its budget)
(d) method of patrolling
(e) detection rate
(f) tolerance of particular types of crime
(g) activities of"private" police - security firms, etc.
(h) changes in police chief or commissioner
In summary, the under-reporting of crime is of great or little moment in es-
tablishing the validity of official crime statistics depending first, on one’s pur-
pose, second, on the types of offences involved, and third, on the location of
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the study. By focusing on the major offence categories most implicated in the
transformation of property and other structural relationships, it appears pos-
sible to minimise the problems inherent in official statistics.
Alternative Data Sources
Dissatisfaction with police crime statistics in recent years prompted the
development of two alternative data collection techniques by criminologists -
victimisation and self-report surveys. Both have been used extensively to com-
plement or supplant official crime data. Victimisation studies employ the ap-
proach of public opinion sample surveys, requesting a randomly selected
group of households or individuals to list all incidents in which they felt
themselves to be victims of a crime, regardless of whether the incident was
reported to the police. Such surveys pose serious problems of designing sam-
ples and of constructing items that respondents can meaningfully answer:
where the questions are phrased so that people can understand and therefore
give reliable answers, the responses often cannot be reconciled with’the legal
definition of the offence (Hood and Sparks, 1970, pp. 25-32; Gibbs and
Erickson, 1975; OECD, 1976).4
Self-report studies use surveys of selected groups - typically school children
- to find the assessment individuals make of how often they have committed a
crime. Establishing the comparability of the resulting answers to the official
crime data is also a problem here, though reservation about the accuracy of
the responses given, both in terms of exaggeration and concealment, is the
main reason for scepticism (see Hood and Sparks, 1970, pp. 66-70 for a
detailed discussion). Certainly the use of polygraphs to verify the "confes-
sions" made in self-report studies was inconclusive (Clark and Tifft, 1966). It
is also necessary to consider the likely restriction of such surveys to
schoolchildren: who else can be induced to co-operate in such a venture? But
the most compelling arguments for caution are perhaps ethical, not
methodological.
While the above assessment is perhaps too severe - after all, both techni-
ques are more representative than police crime statistics - the successful ap-
plication of either victimisation or self-report studies is limited to appropriate
research questions. Hirschi’s (1972) use of a self-report survey to assess
theories of delinquency causation and Clinard’s use of victimisation surveys
4Victimisation surveys, which were initiated and popularised in the United States, present dif-
ficulties if applied in other contexts. Where a phenomenon whose incidence we wish to es-
timate is very sparsely distributed over a national population - and property crime victimisa-
tion in Ireland, even if seriously understated in police statistics, is infrequent - the standard er-
rors will be such as to make the results unilluminating. Essentially such a survey can confirm
that victimisation is low, but the estimates will be too imprecise and unreliable to be of use as a
series of annual statistics.
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to study crime in Switzerland are examples. However, for the present study,
in which the central question is the nature of changes over the past few
decades, neither technique can be very revealing; the official crime statistics
are the only relevant data. A continuous series of annual data is required that
goes back at least to the mid-1960s.5
Crime Indicators
Three main options exist for obtaining a more precise basis for assessing
the trend in reported crime than that forthcoming from the total number of
indictable offences. An index comparable to the US Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s Crime Index can be prepared, summing the incidence of a few
selected serious offences.6 Such indices, along with a deceptive air of preci-
sion, have the disadvantage of accurately describing trends only in periods
when the component offences are either all increasing or all decreasing at a
uniform rate; where some offences are changing more rapidly than others, an
index obscures far more than it reveals (Blumstein, 1974).7 A second, more
flexible, approach is to establish categories, where the criterion is the
homogeneity of the behaviour involved in the offences rather than any legal
distinctions. Where even such categories appear to be too broad in what they
include, a third option is to remain faithful to a single statutory definition of
an offence.
The approach adopted here is a combination of the second and the third
option. For property offences, the selected offence categories are burglary
(subdivided into housebreaking and shopbreaking),s larceny of motor vehi-
sOther sources of data on property crime trends include theft and burglary insurance claims
and premiums (Clinard, 1978) and consumer expenditure on btirglar alarms and other
security equipment. Attempts to compile such data for Ireland proved unsuccessful.
6The FBI crime index is computed as the unweighted sum of seven "index crimes": criminal
homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, auto-theft, and larceny over
$50. The first four offences constitute the index of "personal crime", with the remaining three
representing the property offence rate.
7"The point is applicable to any set of indicators composed of heterogeneous components.
When the set of phenomena comprising the index move together, then virtually all indexes are
equally useful, since the results are insensitive to the particular form of the index. On the other
hand, when there is internal diversity in the movement of the components comprising the index
and unless there is some ’natural’ commensuration measure (like price, with which the
economists are blessed), then the internal variation among the components will be reflected
one way in some indexes and in another way in other indexes" (Blumstein, 1974, p. 864).
SThat distinction was eliminated by the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act, 1976 which also
created a new offence of aggravated burglary (in which a real or imitation firearm or explosives
are used). The 1977Report on Crime reflects that change.
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cles, larceny from unattended motor vehicles, receiving stolen property, and
robbery. These will be complemented by the use of indictable assaults as an
indicator of offences against persons. The value of property stolen in
burglaries will be used as an index of the seriousness of that offence. The
Report on Crime gives a figure that represents an estimated value for all
property stolen through burglary in that year. This yields two measures of the
changes that occur in "seriousness" for that offence category. The total es-
timate can serve as an indication of the magnitude of the financial loss
sustained. A second indicator can be derived when the total loss is divided by
the number of burglaries in which property was stolen. What results is the
average financial loss, a figure which can rise or decline independently of the
total value - if the total value increases but the number of burglaries expands
by a greater proportion, the net result is a declining average loss from
burglaries.
The nine main indicators and the comparable reporting categories as given
in the 1972 Report on Crime are:
1. Assault ("wounding and other acts endangering life, felonies", "assault,
wounding and other like offences, misdemeanours").
2. Housebreaking ("burglary"; "housebreaking, dwelling houses").
3. Shopbreaking ("breaking into shops, warehouses, etc. ")
4. Larceny from vehicles ("larceny from unattended vehicles")
5. Robbery ("robbery with arms"; "robbery and assaults~ with intent to
rob"; "demand or robbery of arms").
6. Receiving ("receiving stolen goods").
7. Larceny of vehicles ("larceny of motor cars"; "larceny of motor cycles,
scooters, etc."; "larceny of motor lorries"; "larceny of other mechanically
propelled vehicles").
8. Pedal cycle larceny ("larceny of pedal cycles").
9. Average property value (the total value of property stolen through "of-
fences against property with violence" divided by the number of cases in
which property was stolen).
These specific indicators were selected to represent the diversity of property
offences, and some contrasting offences against persons, while retaining the
most reasonable claims to representativeness and to providing levels for which
differences between years reflect actual changes in prevalence. It is to be stres-
sed that the most important feature of the indicators is that the trends reflect
changes in levels and patterns of crime, not that the levels shown are precise
enumerations of all instances in which a particular law is broken.
For all of the offences except homicide, the most serious threat to such an
assumption is the possibility that increases in police resources, both in man-
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power and in equipment, between 1951 and 1975 contributed to the observed
trends in the crime indicators. That possibility will be considered in Chapters
4 and 5, in which the trends are described and interpreted.
Two main time-series were compiled from the annual totals of known and
detected offences in the chosen categories. The first series is derived from the
national level data contained in the Reports on Crime covering the years 1951 to
1975. Complementary data on economic and social conditions and on law en-
forcement resources and activities are available.
Through unpublished data abstracted from garda records, it proved possi-
ble to disaggregate the national totals into areas, making possible urban and
rural trends for the 1964 to 1975 period. Comparisons can be made of the
level and trend of recorded crime in three types of areas: the Dublin
Metropolitan Area; the next four largest urban centres - Cork, Limerick,
Waterford, and Galway -combined; and the remainder of the country, which
is labelled non-urban. Boundary changes in 1963 made earlier disaggrega-
tions impossible.
The three "areas" used are based on the reporting units for which informa-
tion could be obtained. Garda Districts, while constructed out of District
Electoral Divisions, do not coincide with those of other basic administrative
units. Broadly speaking, the boundaries of each of the five urban areas
selected for particular attention encompass the city proper, the contiguous
built up areas of dense population, and a substantial part of the rural
hinterland oriented towards the city. The Dublin Metropolitan Area, so
defined, included an estimated 990,160 persons in 1977, representing 31.3 per
cent of the national population. The other four cities together housed an es-
timated 353,700 persons in that year, equivalent to 11.2 per cent of the total
population. The 1,818,200 individuals included in the residual category of
non-urban areas are therefore diversely situated. The residents of 11 towns
which in the 1971 Census were each over 10,000 in population fall within that
area-type, as do residents of isolated farm houses. Despite the heterogeneity
of the non-urban category, the three-fold division of areas approximates the
important urban/rural differences.
In presenting offence levels, the convention of computing per capita crime
rates is generally ignored. For the national trends between 1951 and 1975, the
population variation is too slight to make a noticeable difference in the trends.
In the case of the disaggregated data, the necessary population base is un-
available for the denominator. Virtue, however, partly overshadows necessity.
Gibbs and Erickson (1976) and others have expressed serious misgivings on
the use of per capita crime rates. Unless a jurisdiction constitutes a self-
contained, "ecological", community, its population understates the pool of
potential victims and offenders. The ease of movement and communication
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across most internal boundaries largely invalidates the size of the local pop-
ulation as an important explanatory factor in the study of crime.
The published statistics on homicide were supplemented specifically for
this study by obtaining full descriptions of all homicides recorded in the years
1951 to 1960 and 1970 to 1974. In this way, it will be possible in Chapter 6 to
examine the actual events that for all other offence categories are reduced to a
single increment in the annual total. Information was compiled from the
Garda Siochana files on the characteristics of the victims and the offenders,
on the location of the offence, and on the relationship between victim and of-
fender. With that information, a far more ambitious analysis of changes in
homicide patterns can be undertaken than for the other offence categories.
In analysing these time-series the primary objectives are to discern the
nature of the trend underlying the recent increase in Irish crime rates and to
determine the extent to which that trend is responding to social change or to
cyclical factors such as the unemployment rate. Social disorganisation and
structural approaches make claims as to the nature of crime trends and the
relationship between crime rates and other socio-economic variables that to
some degree conflict.
Statistically, crime trends tend to assume one of three major forms. One is
that of a constant growth trend throughout the post-Second World War
period, with the crime rate increasing by an absolute amount or a percentage
rate of change that is invariant. Growth can also be achieved by a curvilinear
trend in which the rate of increase rises in the course of the series. A third pos-
sibility is that no one trend can be isolated - an abrupt and irreversable shift
in the trend itself and/or in the relationship between the trend and other
forces occurs at some point in the course of the series. Such a transformation
(in the statisticans’ terminology a "structural change", a phrase this paper
has already overburdened with nuances of meaning), requires that a series of
trends or relationships be identified. The discontinuity is too great for one
trend line or one set of parameters to be considered.
In the Irish situation over the quarter century being examined, a trend of
growth, either constant or curvilinear, seems most appropriate to the argu-
ments contained within the social disorganisation perspective. The alter-
native of a structural change, a statistical watershed in the series, corresponds
to the basic assumptions of the structural perspective. That one type of trend
can be identified as characteristic of the period does not, of course, confirm
that the perspective with which I have identified it is the most useful. Rather,
the contrast between types of trend will hopefully be useful in making sense of
the crime trends that will be found in Chapters 4 and 5.
Chapter 4
National Level Crime Trends: Description and Analysis
This chapter begins the attempt to characterise and to interpret the
changes that have taken place in the level and pattern of crime in Ireland over
the last quarter century. Using the nine indicators described in the preceding
chapter, national level trends in the level and pattern of criminal activity are
described and then analysed. The first task is to determine the magnitude of
the change in the indicators: to what extent has crime become more prevalent
and more serious over recent years ? In terms of explaining what occurred and
of predicting what is likely to happen in the 1980s, however, the amount of
change is of perhaps secondary importance to the nature of the trends.
Several possible specifications of upward trends in the crime statistics have
already been given. The main contrast will be between increases ac-
complished by accretion and those that occur through a clear structural break
in the series. In addition, the sequencing of sustained and rapid annual incre-
ments in the statistics can be compared for various types of offences. Both the
overall assessment of the nature of the increases registered and the com-
parison of types of offences can then be examined in the light of the two
perspectives on crime trends discussed in Chapter 2.
The examination of national crime trends unfolds in the following order. In
the section that follows, the overall trends for the nine indicators will be ex-
amined, first graphically and then statistically through regression and cor-
relation analysis. An assessment can be made at that point as to the
magnitude and nature of the increases that in fact occurred over the 1951 to
1975 period. In a separate section, the relationship between trends for
property crime and the availability of property will be considered, a
relationship of direct relevance to the structural perspective on crime. The
relationship between economic conditions and crime will then be examined
for all nine indicators, reflecting the possibility that either the trend itself, or
the departures from trend of levels in those indicators is a response to
economic forces. Such a relationship is one hypothesis that has been derived
from the social disorganisation perspective (e.g., Pierce, 1967). As a result of
the data analysis, it will be possible in a concluding section to make an assess-
ment of both the dimension and the meaning of the changes in the crime
statistics that have become so important a public issue.
The Growth of Crime: 7957-7975
The examination of the nine national level indicators begins with con-
sideration of the trends created by changes in levels of incidence over the 25
years at issue. This will provide a rough measure of the magnitude of the
change we are trying to understand and a description of the manner in which
5o
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it has come about. The focus will be on the contrast between two periods:
1951-1963 and 19.64-1975. The pace of change in each period will be asses-
sed, as will be the sequencing of sustained series of annual increases or
decreases. This will first be done by charts, with the visual appraisal
augmented by index numbers that summarise the amount of increase for
three periods: the 13 years prior to 1964, the 12 years in the post-1964 period,
and the full 25 year time span. The graphic presentations will be followed by
a statistical comparison of 1951-1963 trends with the trends prevailing in the
1964-1975 period.
There are nine indicators. Eight separate offence categories were selected
on the basis of their meaningfulness as time-series indicators and as represen-
tatives of the major types of property that are targets for criminal activity:
housebreaking, shopbreaking, larceny of motor vehicles, larceny from unat-
tended motor vehicles, pedal cycle larceny, receiving stolen property, rob-
bery, and indictable assault. In addition, the value of property stolen each
year through burglary (housebreaking and shopbreaking combined) will be
used as an indicator of the seriousness of that form of property crime.
Graphic Presentation of Crirne Trends Figure 1 charts the changes in the levels of
housebreaking and shopbreaking offences recorded by the Garda Siochana
between 1951 and 1975. The post-1964 increase for both offence categories is
striking, particularly when contrasted with the cyclical fluctuation in the pre-
1964 pattern. When the increases are translated into index numbers, the com-
parison between periods is more precise, though the increase is so
pronounced as to render the numbers almost superfluous. When 1951 is set at
100.0, the level of offences for housebreaking in 1963 is 134.3 and for
shopbreaking 154.5; if post-1964 offence levels are standardised to the first
year of that series, the housebreaking index in 1975 is 426.7 and that for
shopbreaking is 316.6. The break that occurs in the mid-1960s emerges un-
ambiguously in the figure: it is decisive and permanent. Until about 1964,
there was only slight upward movement in either series. While there is some
suggestion in Figure 1 that the trend over the full 25 years is curvilinear, time-
series analysis that will be presented in a later section reinforces the stronger
indications of the presence of two distinct trends.
That the watershed for both offences occurred in the mid-1960s strengthens
the argument that associates the immediate aftermath of industrial develop-
ment and economic expansion with a powerful effect on Irish crime patterns.
Similarly, the possibility that a fundamental transformation occurred at that
point in the link between socio-economic conditions and crime is made more
plausible by the consistency between the two indicators. But it cannot be
denied that it is the magnitude of the upward trend that demands the most at-
tention: over the 25 years a six-fold (an index number of 610.9) increase in
FIGURE I. NATIONAL TRENDS FOR HOUSEBREAKING AND FOR SHOPBREAKING,    1951-1975
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housebreakings and a five-fold increase (index number of 507.0) in
shopbreakings are registered. For both shopbreaking and housebreaking, the
increase is highly concentrated in the post-1964 period. Prior to that, there is
no discernible pattern to the changes from year to year.
In all 25 years, the number of shopbreakings exceeds that of recorded
housebreakings, with particularly marked differentials in the 1960s. However,
given the more pronounced upward trend, after 1964, in burglaries which
have houses as their targets, by the early 1970s the differential has narrowed.
Still, the consistency over the 25 years is remarkable, especially given the fluc-
tuations recorded for both offences in the 1950s.
The availability of annual data on the total value of property stolen through
burglary allows a comparison of the increase in recorded levels of offences
with an indicator of the seriousness of the damage sustained. Such a measure
can also, but less directly, reflect the degree of organisation and sophistication
that characterise burglaries. Figure 2 is, therefore, of particular interest. It
shows for the 25 years the average value of property stolen, with the value
deflated for all years into constant (1953) prices. What emerges is a somewhat
blurred image of the trends found for recorded levels of offences. The lack of
focus stems from the disordered fluctuation during the 1950s and from the
absence of a clear break in the early 1960s. That a break occurs is evident in
Figure 2. However, the seriousness of the loss accompanying the average
burglary tended to decline during the 1950s, and while this ended when a
sustained upward trend began around 1963, it is difficult to locate the precise
point of the break. The upward trend, once commenced, continued, with a
slight tapering offin the late 1960s, to 1975.
The contrast between the trend for the average value of property stolen in
burglaries and the trends for housebreaking and shopbreaking incidence is
perhaps best expressed in the index numbers. With 1951 set as 100.0, the level
in 1963 is 74.1 and that in 1975 is 148.6. Even in the 1964-75 period, where a
clear upward trend can be identified, the increase results in an index number
of 181.9.
This contrasts sharply with the six-fold and five-fold increases registered
for the offences through which the property was misappropriated. Therefore,
while the financial loss inflicted through burglary has increased, particularly
in the last dozen years, and while this can be interpreted as a consequence of
a shift toward "professional" burglars, the rate of increased incidence has
outspaced any changes in the nature of the offences. It is also possible that the
change in the am6unt of property stolen merely reflects the greater
availability of property in the more typical targets of the burglar. A later sec-
tion will return to that possibility.
Figure 3 provides further evidence on the change in the degree of financial
FIGURE 2. AVERAGE VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN IN BURGLARIES (IN CONSTANT,    1953 PRICES),    1951-1975
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loss experienced annually through burglaries. It charts the change in the total
value of property stolen both in current prices and in constant prices (again
expressed by deflating to 1953 prices.) However measured, the magnitude of
the increase over the 25 years is dramatic, though it is naturally more for-
midable in the case of the undeflated figures. Both measures also evince an
almost unvarying level throughout the 1950s and the early 1960s. In the mid-
1960s, this changes through a sustained series of substantial annual increases,
the largest of which occurs between 1969 and 1970. It was in those years that
the incidence of both housebreaking and shopbreaking registered one of their
sharpest increases. Evidence to be presented later will suggest that the turn of
the decade was marked by very considerable changes in the operations or
procedures of the Garda Siochana, and the increase in burglary offences will
be returned to in that context.
The major finding in Figure 3 is that trends in the total value of stolen
property reiterate those found for offence levels. The break in the mid-1960s is
unmistakable, and the post-1964 increase substantial indeed. The index
number for 1975 describing the increases since 1964 is 839.8, while that for
1963 expressing the change over the previous 13 years is 102.9. For the full 25
years, the final index number is 694.1. If "seriousness" is defined in terms of
the total value of stolen property, then obviously burglary is substantially
more seriousa problem than was the case in the early 1950s or even the mid-
1960s. However, given the increase in the number of burglaries that con-
tribute to that total value, the change in the seriousness of the average
burglary has not been particularly marked. In 1953 prices, the average loss
sustained in a burglary was £33 in 1951, £27 in 1964, and £49 in 1975.9
9The stolen property for which the Report on Crime provides an estimated value, includes cash,
luxury items such as jewellery, electric appliances, and ordinary household goods, including
food and clothing. For cash, the most reasonable base by which to take inflation into account
when comparing value over time is the Consumer Price Index (CPI). However, since the prices
for certain goods of considerable interest to burglars, such as electric appliances, have risen less
rapidly than the CPI, the average values shown in Figure 2 understate somewhat the increase
in "seriousness". That possibility is best expressed by a comparison of the CPI with a price in-
dex based on household durable goods (electric and gas appliances, furniture, linen, etc.).
Over the full 25 years, and for the two sub-periods of 1951-63 and 1964-75, the prices of
household durables rose less rapidly than the CPI. For the most important period, 1964-75,
the CPI rose by 3.09 and an index based on durable goods only by 2.68. Thus, the use of the
CPI does understate the real increase that has taken place in the average value of stolen
property, but only slightly, as a substantial proportion of the property involved should be
deflated by the CPI. The effect of my choice of the CPI as the most appropriate basis for
deflating the average values can be seen in the results of substituting a price index based only
on household durable goods: the average values in constant (1953) prices in 1964 and
1975 would be £31.11 and £53.22. (The price indices are adapted from Central Bank of
Ireland, 1977.)
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Thus, though burglary may have become a more substantial problem,
costing far more in real money terms with each passing year since the mid-
1960s, it is not the case that burglaries have become more serious as criminal
incidents. If changes had occurred in the nature of property crime, bringing
to its accomplishment enhanced sophistication and organisation, then surely
the average value of the loss would have risen substantially. It did not, and it
therefore seems reasonable to conclude that though there is undoubtedly
more crime today than before, the evidence suggests that it is more of the
same; unlike many occupations, burglary apparently has emerged from the
1960s and 1970s relatively unchanged. This refers, of course, to the average
burglary, a statistical artifact that given the large numbers involved may
mask the presence of a few burglaries displaying a sophistication and gaining
a profit hitherto unknown in Ireland.
Overall, for burglary, it can be concluded that the total value of stolen
property increased at a rate during the 25 years that was slightly faster than
for the number of recorded burglaries. The result is an average value that in-
creases in the post-1964 period, but at a moderate pace.
The trends for the two offences involving motor vehicles - larceny of vehi-
cles and larceny from vehicles - can be gauged by examining Figures 4 and 5
(while the offence indicators are grouped two to a figure, the grouping must
be based on matching comparable ranges of levels). Neither pattern departs
substantially from that revealed by the burglary indicators. Cyclical variation
in larceny from vehicles before 1964 results in no real increase in the level
recorded. That pattern is reversed in the years after 1964, with especially
sharp increases registered in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For larceny of
motor vehicles, a form of property not readily available in the 1950s (there
were 43.7 private motor vehicles per 1,000 population in 1955 and 132.0 per
1,000 population in 1970), the trend in the first period differs from that for
larceny from vehicles. Though the number of stolen motor vehicles is small
throughout the 1950s, a trend toward increase is clear. However, like the of-
fence of stealing from an unattended vehicle, the rise after the mid-1960s is
very rapid indeed, particularly after 1967. In both indicators, a level of satura-
tion appears to have been reached, at least temporarily, in 1972. This con-
sistency is remarkable, for though both offences have motor vehicles as their
target, the offences are not similar in what they involve, and they differ par-
ticularly in the value of the property stolen.
When the increases are expressed as index numbers, these observations are
made more concrete. Between 1951 and 1963, the increases result in index
numbers of 419.1 for larceny of vehicles and of 115.4 for larceny from vehicles.
If the 1964 totals are set equal to 100, by 1975 the index number for the
former offence is 744.7 and for the latter offence 490.9. Thus, for both
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FIGURE 5. NATIONAL TRENDS FOR LARCENY FROM MOTOR VEHICLES AND FOR PEDAL CYCLE LARCENY,    1951-1975
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indicators the increase after 1964 was considerably greater than that regis-
tered previously.
The levels both of burglaries and of larcenies involving vehicles are poten-
tially responsive to changes in the distribution of property. Where an offence
category specifies that a motor vehicle must be the target, however, it is likely
that variation in levels recorded will be sensitive to a set of supply and de-
mand factors that depart from those operative for other forms of property.
Comparison of the five indicators examined thus far suggests this is indeed
the case. Where a vehicle is involved, though the break in the data on
burglary is replicated, the trends after 1964 are in many respects distinct, par-
ticularly in the magnitude of the early increases and the establishment of a
plateau in the early 1970s. If the vehicle itself is the target, the distinctiveness
is also identifiable in the early period: while other indicators fluctuate,
larceny of vehicles experiences a four-fold increase.
Larceny of pedal cycles, the trend of which is shown in Figure 5, provides
data on another specific form of property. Like motor vehicles, pedal cycles
offer the convenience for those wishing to steal them of a valuable object com-
bined with a form of transportation. Throughout the 25 years, the level of
recorded larcenies of pedal cycles fluctuates quite systematically, at first
rather expansively in five-year intervals and later in more controlled move-
ments of shorter intervals. As a result, the level recorded in 1975 falls below
that typically found in the 1950s. Indexing the changes by setting 1951 levels
equal to 100.0, the 1963 level is found to be 98.6. When 1964 figures are used
to gauge the change, the 1975 level stands at 123.1. In both periods the
changes in pedal cycle larceny do not resemble those found for the other in-
dicators of property crime. The offence appears to be governed by considera-
tions different from those obtaining for major property crimes.
Returning to Figure 4, the trend in receiving stolen property offences can
be examined. The main outlines of the pre-1964 fluctuation and the rapid in-
crease thereafter are readily detected for this offence. By 1974, however, the
recorded level had peaked, and the direction of the trend marked by the last
two years of the series is that of decrease. The trend for receiving offences is of
interest, first, because it conforms to what was identified for other property of-
fences and, second; because of what it suggests about the changes taking
place in the organsiation of property crime. Like the other indicator of the
degree of organisation - the average value of stolen property - the trend for
receiving is more modest than that for levels of property offences. The index
numbers for the first period result in~t 1963 index number of 84.7 and for the
later period a 1975 index number of. 169.3. Over the full 25 years, the level
recorded has less than doubled. If it is true that a thriving market in stolen
goods requires a network of middlemen, then the limited increase since 1964
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in the number of such individuals arrested (as will be seen in Table 3 that of-
fence is rarely recorded in the absence of a "detection") supports the impres-
sion that the nature of crime has not greatly changed.
This cannot be said for the offence of robbery. Figure 6 traces the long
period of essential stability in that indicator up to 1964, that yields to in-
creases, at first gradual, and then to a six-year sequence of rapid increases.
Perhaps the nature of the change is best described in this way: there were 24
robberies recorded in 1951, 42 in 1963 and 704 in 1975. Translated into index
numbers, the 1951 to 1963 increase can be stated as 175.0, and the 1964 to
1975 increase as 1,135.5. The precise point at which the break in the series oc-
curred, however, is difficult to determine; certainly it lacks the clarity that
characterises the trends for other property offences. Another feature of the
trend is more recognisable: a tapering off in the early 1970s of the pattern of
increase. In sum, robbery, like larceny of vehicles, seems to be governed by
considerations that are in some respects distinct from those obtaining for less
specialised forms of property crime.
The preceding eight indicators all described offences directed at acquiring
property. Assault, the final indicator to be examined, is used to represent the
incidence of offences directed against persons. Though levels of homicide and
assault correlate at .87 for the 1951 to 1975 period, this can be attributed en-
tirely to the strength of the relationship after 1964; the correlation between
1951 and 1963 is .01. Caution is therefore necessary in generalising the
findings for trends in assault to the entire category of interpersonal violence,
however, it does provide a useful contrast to the property crime indicators ex-
amined thus far.
Figure 6 indicates that the increases in indictable assaults have been consis-
tent throughout the 25 years, the only exceptions being two brief stable
periods, one in the early 1950s and the other in the mid-1960s. When expres-
sed as an index number, the increase over the first 13 years of the series is
293.3. The increase after 1964 is slightly less: if the 1964 level is set to 100.0,
the index for 1975 is 229.8. However, over the full 25 years, the level of assault
increases seven-fold (indexed as 682.3). In 1951, a total of 164 indictable as-
saults were recorded nationally; by 1963 this had risen to 481 and by 1975 to
1,119. At least on the basis of the trend shown in Figure 6, it is not possible to
assert that the break identified in all the other series took place for assault.
It is also clear from Figure 6 that the upward movement in assault levels
preceded comparable periods of sustained increases in property crime. Even
the level of motor vehicle larceny did not definitively depart from a cyclical
pattern until the early 1960s, nearly ten years after that had occurred for as-
sault. Therefore, the only offence that began its ascent in the 1950s is the one
not directed at obtaining property. Assault is also the only indicator with a
FIGURE 6. NATIONAL TRENDS FOR ASSAULT AND FOR ROBBERY, 1951-1975
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trend for which a structural break is not clearly identifiable.
The change in the level of incidence for assault, though not the sequencing
of periods of substantial increase, is similar to that found for homicide, the
other indicator of crimes against persons. Homicide includes both murder,
where there is a presumed intention to kill and manslaughter, in which death
need not have been intended. There were, on average, 7.2 such offences in the
1951 to 1963 period (standard deviation of 3.4) and 16.4 in the post-1964
years (standard deviation of 5.4). This contrasts with average numbers of as-
sault of 286.2 and 807 in the two periods, respectively (with standard devia-
tions of 92 and 228.7). This consistency between two indicators enhances the
confidence with which we can evaluate the increase that occurred in the level
of violent crimes against persons. Of all offence categories, that of homicide is
least subject to the problems of under-reporting or classification error. As will
be seen in Chapter 6, while the published Irish data on homicide require ex-
tensive re-working to form a consistent series, the adjustments are feasible; for
all other offence categories, such changes cannot even be attempted.
If the nine crime indicators on which I have focused are accurate guides to
what has taken place between 1951 and 1975, then a substantial increase in
the level of crime cannot be gainsaid. For most offences directed at acquiring
property, the magnitude of that increase makes depressing reading:in 1975,
there were six times as many housebreakings, five times as many burglaries,
27 times as many larcenies of motor vehicles, seven times as many larcenies
from motor vehicles and 29 times as many robberies recorded as were
recorded in 1951. Moreover, for all those offences, the bulk of the increase was
crowded into a ten-year period. A watershed clearly did occur in the mid-
1960s, marking what will, undoubtedly, prove to be a permanent departure
from the previous low levels of crime. Crime has become a more acute social
problem.
But what is most ominous is that crime occurs more frequently. There is no
basis for asserting that an equally dramatic change occurred in the pattern of
crime, as represented by its seriousness. Over the 25 years, the average value
of stolen property in burglaries has only slightly increased, at least if inflation
is taken into account. Though the increase in the number of robberies sug-
gests that a change in the most common types of crime may be occurring, the
evidence is inconclusive. Certainly, the relatively small increase registered in
the level of receiving stolen property offences argues against the image of
crime being pursued today in a manner that is far more sophisticated, more
efficient, or more organised than hitherto.
Trends in Garda Resources and Operations The trends in the nifie indicators ex-
amined through the preceding charts are all based on the offences that are
"known" to the gardai and that were subsequently entered into the official
64 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
statistics. It was argued in Chapter 3 that for purposes of this study the extent
to which those totals underestimate the actual frequency with which the eight
offences occur is not a crucial problem. Unreported or unrecorded offences
are of importance only to the extent that they vary systematically so that
"each year we dip deeper into the well of criminal behaviour to fill the tank of
criminal statistics a little higher" (Morris and Hawkins, 1970, p. 34). If that
is the case, then the trends that have been described are largely spurious. The
evidence from other countries suggests that, at least for the indicators
selected, such concern is overstated. Data are available on the two most im-
portant .potential systematic biases in the crime statistics - changes in the
resources and the procedures of the Garda Siochana - and it is useful to pause
here and consider the extent to which the trends we examined reflect such a
bias. Did police resources and police organisation vary over time in a manner
likely to have artifically induced the mid-1960s break in the crime series and
the levelling off observed for some indicators in the early 1970s ?
Changes in police resources and in police efficiency are readily gauged. In
Table 2 the trends in annual strength and budget of the Garda Siochana are
traced. The size of the force declined between 1951 and 1961, though only
slightly, and remained constant thereafter until about 1971. Over the next
five years the force expanded from 6,612 gardai at all ranks to 8,419, an in-
crease of 27.3 per cent (Statistical Abstract of Ireland, various issues). This
pattern is mirrored in the data on police expenditure. On balance, the
evidence linking offence levels to the availability of resources is weak: over
periods of sustained increases in the mid-1960s, garda resources did not vary.
The overall correlation between the number of gardai and linear trend is .46.
It is possible to question the extent to which the growing garda manpower
and budget shown in Table 2 actually translated into a greater garda
presence in the terms likely to be relevant to this study. By the early 1970s,
security duties associated with Northern Ireland represented a substantial
burden on the force, one that expanded in later years. The information with
which it would be possible to assess the size of the diversion of resources that
took place is not available. However, it is highly unlikely that after 1970 there
were substantial increases in the number of gardai assigned to individual sta-
tions, particularly in Dublin.
The impact of changes in the organisation of the Garda Siochana, unlike
those in resources, were concentrated in the mid-1960s. During those years
the Templemore Training Centre was opened, and many of the smaller rural
stations disappeared in the course of consolidation. Motorised patrols in the
cities replaced gardai on foot, the technical and communication supports of
modern policing were imported, all within a policy of upgrading the force. It
was also a period in which a concerted effort began to enlist public support for
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Table 2: Personnel and budget of the Garda Siochana, 7957-75
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Expenditure*
Garda Garda At constant
stations strength Actual (7967) prices
1951 810
1961 758
1962 754
1963 749
1964 746
1965 745
1966 742
1967 741
1968 740
1969 719
1970 703
1971 697
1972 697
1973 700
1974 700
1975 700
6,904
6,612
6,531
6 401
6 452
6 568
6 545
6 536
6 546
6 543
6 532
6,612
6,961
7,794
7,990
8,419
£3,032,031 £4,176,926
5,639,610 5,639,610
6,135,409 5,888,108
7,568,430 7,086,545
6,323,925 5,547,303
8,441,530 7,052,239
8,671,320 7,032,701
9,763,572 7,675,764
9,702,591 7,284,227
9,970,858 6,967,755
11,816,902 7,633,658
14,723,924 8,727,874
16,941,994 9,247,813
22,620,279 11,079,697
29,451,953 12,355,453
52,135,676 18,065,030
Source: Statistical Abstract of Ireland and Appropriation Accounts
* From 1961 to 1974 expenditure data are for the fiscal year ending on 31 March of the year
listed. Data for 1975 are for the calendar year. The £28,319,134 expended between 1 April 1974
and 31 December 1974 is not included in the table.
the gardai, with "Garda Patrol" becoming a regular programme on RTE in
1965. This emphasis emerges for the first time in the 1966 Report on Crime,
which includes a section "Summary of Crime Prevention Activity" reporting
on programmes aimed specifically at breaking and entering offences such as
burglary. Given such a change in emphasis within the force and the growing
technical competence of the gardai during the mid-1960s, it is certainly possi-
ble that despite the failure to effectively increase garda strength in those years
the average garda became more efficient. That efficiency could plausibly have
translated into a greater success in rooting out crime, both directly and in-
directly through an increase in public confidence in the gardai. If so, it was a
success that was rewarded by an increase in the crime statistics.
Changes in garda procedures or in garda efficiency would most likely be
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manifest in an improving detection rate. A detection occurs whenever the gar-
dai are convinced that they have either apprehended or identified the in-
dividual(s) responsible for an offence. Table 3 provides the national-level
detection rates for the eight offences being considered. Overall, there is little
evidence that a substantial change occurred in the rates prior to 1970.
Between 1969 and 1970 the detection rate declined precipitously for
housebreaking, shopbreaking, larceny from vehicles, and robbery. Assault
and receiving maintain stable levels of detections throughout, while for
larceny of vehicles and for pedal cycle larceny a basic shift can be identified
some years prior to the equivalent change in the other property offences.
Therefore, given that major changes in detection rates do not coincide with
those for offence levels, neither changing police methods nor resources are
persuasive alternative explanations for the trends observed in Figures 1
through 6.
Changes in the liberality of public co-operation with the gardai or in the in-
centives to the public for reporting crimes are less easily measured. Certainly,
the use made of the "999" emergency service has dramatically increased:
there were 66,000 emergency telephone calls to the gardai in Dublin during
1967 and 115,000 such calls in 1975 (Report of the Commissioner of the
Garda Siochana on crime, 1967; 1975). Also, as the seriousness of burglary
has increased (though only slightly), so has the incentive to report offences to
the gardai, if only to satisfy the requirements of insurance companies. The
average value of stolen property in burglaries was £171.50 in 1975. But what
evidence is available suggests that the trends in burglary have throughout
reflected the incidents in which more than a token loss was sustained. Indeed,
it was largely for this reason that housebreaking and shopbreaking were in-
cluded as indicators. It does not seem to me reasonable to conclude that the
post-1964 increase reflects a greater willingness to report breaking and enter-
ing offences. For assault, and for the minor property offences, the possibility is
more real: McClintock (1963) attributes a substantial part of the increase in
the number of known violent crimes in London between 1950 and 1960 to a
diminishing public tolerance of interpersonal violence. Similarly, the
tolerance by business firms of petty larceny declines as the losses involved
come to be seen as a threat to profits. It is generally the case that efforts at
"crime prevention" increase the crime rate. To ;he extent that shops under-
take to provide their own security staff, for example, more offences will
become known: petty larceny and like offences only become "known" if
someone takes an interest in securing an arrest. If places of business become
more vigilant and more likely to seek a prosecution, a crime wave can result.
It is for that reason that petty larceny is excluded from the consideration of
crime trends.
Table 3: National detection rates 1951-1975
Year Assault Housebreaking
Offence category
Larceny
Shopbreaking    from vehicles Robbery Receiving
Larceny
o/vehicles
Pedal cycle
larceny
per cent per cent per cent per cent
1951 94.5 74.6 68.4 30.0
1952 97.0 69.4 63.3 32.0
1953 97.8 71.4 67.4 36.0
1954 96.9 76.0 72.7 44.4
1955 96.1 83.6 72.5 40.1
1956 98.1 78.5 75.1 37.2
1957 98.2 79.0 71.0 35.3
1958 97.8 77.7 69.5 31.5
1959 97.1 73.7 66.5 35.2
1960 97.3 81.7 71.9 43.1
1961 97.8 80.0 73.9 48.7
1962 96.7 76.1 72.9 49.9
1963 98.8 78.9 72.2 45.5
1964 95.9 75.7 69.2 50.4
1965 96.8 78.9 71.4 54.2
1966 94.9 75.7 69.7 47.0
1967 95.5 71.4 66.7 46.6
1968 94.9 66.9 66.3 45.3
1969 95.5 63.0 64.7 48.1
1970 93.7 51.4 52.5 29.4
1971 93.0 50.5 48.1 25.9
1972 92.5 46.8 45.1 25.3
1973 93.1 47.5 47.7 29.1
1974 91.5 49.7 50.3 34.1
1975 92.0 42.8 49.0 27.9
per cent per cent per cent per cent
62.5 100.0 76.2 24.1
56.5 100.0 68.2 18.5
52.8 100.0 44.1 20.7
58.3 100.0 40.7 26.6
78.0 100.0 44.8 20.7
66.7 99.5 50.0 24.1
69.7 99.4 44.7 16.8
70.5 99.5 56.7 15.9
69.5 98.6 75.0 14.4
74.6 99.6 73.3 22.5
73.8 98.9 63.8 31.1
76.9 99.6 54.8 28.0
73.8 100.0 59.1 27.8
85.5 98.6 50.0 17.8
75.3 99.7 48.8 25.9
83.6 99.6 41.4 22.2
75.6 100.0 42.0 21.5
76.2 99.7 37.4 14.9
79.6 99.7 28.7 13.0
64.7 99.7 27.8 11.0
47.5 100.0 22.8 7.6
47.9 100.0 26.6 7.2
56.5 100.0 28.3 9.4
49.5 100.0 29.9 5.2
45.3 100.0 26.3 5.4
O
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In sum, while the possibility remains that trends in known offences are in-
fluenced by factors extraneous to the level of crime in the community, I do not
regard it as a barrier to drawing conclusions based on the nine indicators
selected for this study.
A Statistical Analysis of National Crime Trends Graphic presentation of the
relationships between variables is a necessary first step for most analyses - it
provides a convenient overview of the relationships at issue and limits the pos-
sibility that the statistical approximations of the relationships will be mis-
interpreted. The second contribution is particularly important for the trends
being examined here. It is clear from the preceding figures that it will be ex-
tremely difficult to obtain a single trend that can adequately describe the
variation in levels of offences over the full 25 years. The difficulty is most
pronounced for larceny of pedal cycles, which has a cyclical pattern, but it
will be present for all nine indicators. In itself, the difficulty of deriving ade-
quate mathematical representations of the relationship between offence levels
and time for years of interest suggests that, in fact, we are confronted with
several rather than one series.
Table 4 directly addresses that possibility. The trend identified for the
years 1951 to 1963 is contrasted for each of the nine indicators with the trend
obtained for the years 1964 to 1975. When the graphs of the trends were ex-
amined, it appeared that the mid-1960s marked a watershed for all the of-
fence categories and for the value of property stolen in burglaries. Indeed, the
differences observed between the trends before and after that point suggested
structural changes in the series. The regression results reported in Table 4
represent a more precise assessment of the transformation that occurred.
Two sets of regression results are given. The first was derived from regress-
ing each indicator on linear trend (a variable created by numbering the years
from 1 to 25 in sequence), the standard expression of change through annual
increases that remain at a constant amount. A second specification regressing
the natural logarithm of each offence indicator on linear trend, was also used
to allow for the possibility of a non-linear relationship. This is termed a semi-
log model. The alternative specification of a double-log model did not prove
useful and the results so obtained are not reported.
Table 4 permits three comparisons for each specification of trend. The
strength of the trend is given by the R2 measure of the amount of the variance
explained by trend alone. (Given the small number of observations, the coef-
ficients used are R2s adjusted for degrees of freedom). From the metric
coefficients (unstandardised regression coefficients) the direction and nature
of the relationship with trend is shown. Finally, the table also gives the
Durbin-Watson test statistic measuring the presence of autocorrelation
Table 4: Variance in crime indicators attributable to trend: Linear and semi-logarithmic regressions.
1951-1963                                                                        1964-1975
Linear Semi-logarithm Linear Semi-logarithm
Constant b ~ D. W. Constant b ~ D. W. Constant b ~ D. IV.    Constant b ~ D. W.
Assault 124.2 23.2 .877 (1.2) 5.0 .08 .908 (1.7)
Housebreaking 958.6 26.5 .303 (1.4) 6.9 .02 .301 (1.3)
Shopbreaking 1,187.0 59.1 .470 (I.5) 7.1 .04 .443 (1.5)
Larceny from vehicles 1,220.4 15.1" .000 (1.7) 7.1 .01 * .000 (1.7)
Robbery 24.3 2.1 .317 (1.4) 3.2 .06 .398 (1.7)
Receiving 189.5 3.7 .032 (1.0) 5.2 .02* .034 (I.1)
Larceny of vehicles 11.3" 3.8 .583 (0.9) 2.9 .09 .679 (1.6)
Pedal cycle larceny 2,441.6 -9.9 .000 (1.0) 7.8 .00" .000 (0.9)
Property value 28.9 -0.6 .140 (1.7) 3.4 -.02* .130 (1.7)
400.7 62.5 .879 (1.3) 6.2 .08 .921 (1.7)
501.6 434.0 .956 (1.0) 7.1 .14 .983 (1.2)
1,366.9 410.1 .919 (I.5) 7.6 .10 .955 (1.6)
333.0 718~2 .877 (1.3) 7.3 .16 .910 (1.0)
-126.7 65.6 .841. (0.9) 3.6 .26 .933 (0.9)
221.1 25.6 .808 (1.6) 5.5 .07 .844 (1.8)
-19.5 58.9 .666 (1.0) 4.2 .21 .816 (0.8)
1,819.9 75.0 .344 (1.7) 7.5 .03 .328 (1.7)
26.7 1.9 .678 (1.9) 0.1" .05 .716 (1.6)
*Denotes coefficients that are less than twice their standard error.
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among disturbances. If such autocorrelation is present, the assumption made
in ordinary least squares regression of error terms that are uncorrelated ran-
dom. variables is not fulfilled. In time-series analysis, it is frequently found
that the value for one observation (year) is affected by the error term from the
preceding year. Such positive autocorrelation is a warning that factors other
than the relationship between the variables specifically included in the equa-
tion may be sufficiently active to make a satisfactory expression of the
relationship of interest impossible.
Table 4 highlights the difference between the two time-periods. Prior to
1964, a clear upward trend is evident only for assault, while for two indicators
- larceny of pedal cycles and value of stolen property - the tendency is
towards a decrease. This contrasts sharply with the pattern between 1964 and
1975. Strong upward trends are evident in that period for all indicators except
pedal cycle larceny. In the early period, trend explains 30.2 per cent of the
variance in housebreaking levels and 47.0 per cent of the variance in
shopbreaking. The comparable R2s for the later period are 98.3 and 95.5 per
cent (the coefficients noted for these offences are the ones with the most ade-
quate Durbin-Watson results). In both periods, the importance of trend is
less pronounced for indicators of the sophistication of property offences. But
the differences within each period are insubstantial in comparison with the
differences between periods. It is clear that for property offences the sustained
series of increases commenced in 1964. The one anomaly is larceny of vehi-
cles, which is influenced by trend in the 1950s nearly as much as in the 1970s.
This suggests that a pattern similar to that identified by Mansfield et al.
(1974) in Norway and the United States is operative in Ireland- substantial
increases in offence levels are recorded in the initial period of scarcity of
automobiles, followed after a saturation point is reached by a second upsurge,
corresponding to an increase in larcenies by juveniles in periods of mass
availability of automobiles.
Most of the Durbin-Watson statistics fall within or exceed the lower and
upper bounds for rejecting the null hypothesis of positive autocorrelation. At
the five per cent level, those bounds are 1.08 and 1.36 with 15 observations
(Theil, 1971, p. 724). For the numbers of observations used in Table 4, the
appropriate bounds will be slightly lower. For the most part~ the tests for
autocorrelation do not suggest that log-linear relationships are more ade-
quate than are the standard linear specifications. However, in the 1951-1963
period, the logarithm approach is preferable for assault, robbery, and larceny
of motor vehicles; in the later period this is true only for assault.
In sum, the regression results shown in Table 4 support the existence of a
break in the nine statistical series being examined. As will be seen in Table 7,
even for assault it is not possible to use a single trend measure to represent the
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full 25-year period. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that it is necessary
to treat the mid-1960s as the crucial point in the transformation of Irish crime
patterns.
The divergence of the post-1964 movements in the crime indicators from
that which obtained in the earlier period is so striking for most offences as to
be self-evident from the charts. A formal statistical test is available, however,
by which the acuteness of our vision can be confirmed. The Chow test (1960)
allows us to compare the null hypothesis of a stable relationship over the full
25 years between the indicator and time (in other words, the trend) for each
offence with the hypothesised 1963/64 break in the series. To carry out the
test, the time-period was subdivided into 1951-63 and 1964-75, and the sum
of squares of the residuals from regression estimates in the two sub-periods
compared with that found for the full 25-year period. When applied to the
nine indicators, the null hypothesis was rejected at the .001 level for all in-
dicators except pedal cycle larceny (and when the logarithms of the indicators
were used, at the .05 level for all but pedal cycle larceny and assault).
Therefore, the appropriate statistical expression of the crime indicator trends
from 1951 to 1975 is that of a structural change (or shift in some texts) that
can plausibly be located in 1963/64. There is no single overarching trend for
those 25 years.l°
This discrepancy between the trends found for 1951-1963 and those found
for the post-1964 period has important implications. A strong upward linear
trend, if equally present in all the indicators of crime, will produce a cohesive
pattern of change to characterise that time-period. This is true of the
1964-1975 period. Such a pattern implies, but does not establish, that the
various indicators are responding in a roughly comparable manner to a com-
mon set of socio-economic forces. The diversity of trends in the pre-1964
period and the homogeneity that obtains subsequently, therefore, sharply dif-
ferentiates the two periods. But it must be stressed that the assertion of a com-
mon pattern of change cannot rest only on the presence of a shared linear
trend. That trend must be supplemented by evidence that the indicators also
share a pattern of movement around the trend line: when one indicator ex-
ceeds the level anticipated by trend, so should the other offence indicators.
Table 5 examines separately the intercorrelations among indicators for the
two periods. The table presents for each period zero-order correlations based
on offence levels which are contrasted with correlations between residuals.
1°Tests are available for estimating the point at which a structural shift occurs without making
any a priori decisions as to its location (see Goldfield and Quandt, 1973), but the issue here is
the merits of a specific point in time.
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Table 5: Intercorrelations among crime indicators, by time period*
7957 to 7975
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Assault 1.0 .93 .93 .89 .88 .94 .85 .05 .80
2 Housebreaking -.19 1.0 .99 .98 .96 .92 .91 .23 .84
3 Shopbreaking -.37 .89 1.0 .98 .92 .90 .90 .22 .86
4 Larceny from vehicles
-.24 .94 .87 1.0 .95 .90 .96 .21 .84
5 Robbery -.07 .86 .62 .82 .0 .90 .90 .19 .75
6 Receiving .00 .49 .47 .50 .37 1.0 .88 .04 .81
7 Larceny of vehicles -.08 .69 .65 .78 .54 .35 1.0 .11 .78
8 Pedal cycle larceny -.45 .52 .55 .44 .46 -.00 .07 1.0 .06
9 Property value -.05 .66 .63 .69 .40 .44 .66 .01 1.0
1957 to 7963
1 2 3 4    5    6 7 8 9
1 Assault 1.0 .54 .66 .18 .48
2 Housebreaking -.21 1.0 .88 .76 .72
3 Shopbreaking -.34 .79 1.0 .69 .50
4 Larceny from vehicles -.26 .78 .72 1.0 .52
5 Robbery -.07 .54 .06 .44 1.0
6 Receiving -.11 .12 .31 .16-.32
7 Larcenyofvehicles .28 .26 .38 -.16 -.33
8 Pedal cycle larceny -.39 .77 .54 .66 .71
9 Property value .12 .21 .25 .27 -.25
7964 to 7975
1 2 3 4    5
.38
.23
.36
.16 .30
-.00 .24
1.0 .28
-.11 1.0
-.12 -.12
.28 .66
.87 -.21 -.33
.59 .58 -.14
.75 .33 -.17
.67 .06
.58 -.49
-.20 .17
-.20 -.01
1.0 -.22
-.29 1.0
6 7 8 9
1 Assault 1.0 .93 .87 .84 .92 .94 .72 .53 .69
2 Housebreaking -.53 1.0 .99 .96 .95 .89 .83 .68 .80
3 Shopbreaking -.85 .81 1.0 .97 .91 .82 .82 .72 .84
4 Larceny from vehicles -.60 .88 .75 1.0 .92 .85 .93 .63 .78
5 Robbery .15 .39 -.00 .47 1.0 .92 .84 .52 .67
6 Receiving .41 .03 -.40 .09 .56 1.0 .81 .45 .67
7 Larceny of vehicles -.39 .67 .42 .87 .42 .23 1.0 .44 .65
8 Pedal cycle larceny -.56 .29 .55 .15 -.30 -.31 -.13 1.0 .60
9 Propertyvalue -.56 .24 .48 .22-.31 -.37 .17 .19 1.0
*Coefficients above the diagonal in each matrix are zero-order correlations based on levels of
known offences; coefficients below the diagonal are correlations based on the residuals derived
from regressing each offence category against trend, with trend represented by a log curve.
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The correlations based on levels, which are presented above the diagonal in
each matrix, can be readily predicted from the results given in Table 4.
However, the correlations between residuals, representing the strength of
relationships after de-trending, are not straightforward. They are a more
stringent test for the extent of cohesiveness. In all instances, the trend
removed was that specified by a log curve. That specification was not equally
satisfactory for all indicators, but if the results of the de-trending are to be in-
terpretable, it is necessary to apply the same procedure throughout.
The de-trending of the relationships between crime indicators is ac-
complished by regressing each crime indicator on time (the trend). By taking
the residual, which is the difference between.what the trend predicts and
what was recorded in the garda statistics, a measure is obtained of that in-
dicator’s movement around its trend line. When the residuals of two in-
dicators, say, housebreaking and robbery, are correlated, the resulting coef-
ficient expresses the strength of their de-trended relationship: whether the
fluctuations around the linear trend are similar for the two indicators. An ex-
ample may help explain the nature of the de-trending. If over a 25-year period
the number of robberies increases from 1,000 to 3,500, the linear trend will as-
sume that each annual increase over the period was about 100 additional
robberies, with a prediction that the number of robberies in the second year
was I,I00. If the actual number recorded was 1,230, the residual would be
+130, meaning that there were 130 more robberies in that year than would be
predicted on the basis of the 25-year trend.
As anticipated, the intercorrelations in Table 5 are weak in the 1951-1963
period and strongin the 1964-1975 period. In the earlier period, I0 of the 36
coefficients are negative; there are no negative correlations for the post-1964
years. Further, in all but three instances, the correlation for the later period
exceeds the equivalent coefficient from the years 1951-1963. The basic dif-
ference conceals several interesting features of the two periods. When the in-
tercorrelations among indicators of sophistication and among major property
offences are examined, the cohesiveness in the later period and the dis-
jointedness of the early period are highlighted. The level of receiving offences
and the value of stolen property, which correlate at .17 in the period before
1964, have a correlation of .67 in the second period. Both indicators in the
first period have either negative or weak positive relationships to other crime
variables.
Examining the de-trended relationship, however, makes the contrast
between the periods less emphatic. By the more stringent standard of com-
mon movement around trend, the major property offences evince substantial
covariation in both periods, while the relationship between those offences and
the indicators of sophistication and organisation is tentative both for
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1951-1963 and for 1964-1975. This blurs the distinctions that emerge when
trend is retained in the relationships. But distinctions remain. In particular,
the forms of larceny dependent on motor vehicles have in the post-1964 period
a stronger interrelationship with each other and stronger connections to other
major property offences than in the preceding years.
Taken together, Tables 4 and 5, along with the Chow tests, demonstrate
that the offence indicators except pedal cycle larceny underwent a structural
change in about 1964; it is, therefore, not particularly meaningful to analyse
the trend over the full 25 years as if it were one series. The results in Table 5
limit the interpretations that can be placed on the implications of those
breaks: in neither period were the intercorrelations employing de-trended in-
dicators such as to suggest a common movement in response to socio-
economic conditions. However, evidence was found that in the later years ma-
jor property offences, and especially those involving motor vehicles, were
closely linked. This finding directs our attention to changes in the availability
and nature of property that occurred in the mid-1960s, a theme that will be
pursued in the next section of this chapter.
The Abundance of Property and the Crime Rate
Over the quarter century being studied here, both the level of recorded
crime and the amount of property have grown considerably. This section at-
tempts to systematically examine the relationship between opportunity in the
form of property and the degree to which individuals avail of that opportunity
through illegal means.
The first approach to quantifying that relationship establishes a surrogate
for the value of all stealable property. Annual figures on the, total value of per-
sonal expenditure on consumers’ goods and services are used as a base by
which the real growth in property loss from burglary can be tracked. Table 6
reports the results of this effort. The main indicator is the ratio of the value of
stolen property to the total value of consumer expenditure. To facilitate the
evaluation of the changes in that ratio, the 1951 ratio has been set equal to
100.0 and the ratios for all other years expressed as index numbers.
Table 6 confirms that the seriousness of property crime has increased since
the mid-1960s. As a proportion of all property purchased that year in Ireland,
the amount stolen through burglary has increased nearly five-fold over the 25
years included in the table. Until 1966, however, no increase at all in the ratio
is registered: there is considerable variability in the ratio, but nowhere does it
rise to a level greater than the 1951 figure. This changes dramatically in 1966,
and the upward movement continues through 1970. Thereafter, with the ex-
ception of 1975, a new level of about three times the 1951 one has been es-
tablished.
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Index numbers are also used to plot separately the increases registered for
the two components of the ratio. At constant prices, the value of stolen
property in 1975 is 33 times as great as the value present at the start of the
series. Given this huge increase in the amount of property taken through
burglary, the approximately seven-fold increase in the total value of con-
sumers’ expenditure results in a substantially greater proportion of all
property being removed through means that violate the criminal law. As
would be expected, consumers’ expenditure grows steadily across the 25
years; the rate of increase, however, itself rises in the mid-1960s and after. A
very different pattern is present for the value of stolen property. For that in-
dex, the changes closely resemble those found for the levels of the two types of
burglary. A permanent change takes place in the mid-1960s, with little in-
crease in the property value prior to that point and very rapid increases after
it.
Table 6 suggests that about 196.4 a basic transformation occurred in the
seriousness of loss sustained through property crime. Before 1964 there is no
evidence that property crime is increasing systematically in response to the
opportunities available. This is reversed in the years after 1964, where the an-
nual increases are so large as to more than merely compensate for the growing
opportunities - more advantage is being taken of all available opportunities.
This also probably reflects a limitation in the approximation being used for
opportunity. The use of annual data on consumer spending does not ade-
quately represent the increases that are taking place in the stock of stealable
objects and of cash. Consumers’ expenditure is a flow that is not a firm indica-
tion in the accumulation of a stock of goods, and it is the stock present in a year
that is the real indicator of opportunity. Still, consumers’ expenditure does
supply a useful yardstick with which the growth over time of property crime
can be measured.
A more precise measure of the relationship between property availability
and crime levels can be obtained if the focus is narrowed to the offence of
motor vehicle larceny. For that offence, it is possible to trace changes in abun-
dance, changes that Gould (1971) and Mansfield et al (1974) argue govern the
market conditions to which amateur and professional car thieves respond.
They argue, and produce data from the United States and Norway which
confirms that laws of supply and demand act to establish a clear sequencing
in the trends for the level of motor vehicle larceny. As the per capita rate of car
ownership first begins to rise from a level of scarcity toward nearly universal
car ownership, there is a corresponding rapid and sustained increase in the
level of larceny, the vehicles being supplied by "professional" car thieves. De-
mand expressed through the illicit market rises until a saturation point is
reached, with most households being car owners, creating a sequence in
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Table 6: Change indices for 1957-75: personal expenditure on consumer goods, value of
property stolen in burglary, and the ratio of property value to personal expenditure.
Property Personal
Tear Ratio stolen expenditure
1951 100.0 : 100.0 100.0
1952 88.6 92.1 103.9
1953 95.6 107.5 112.4
1954 56.8 65.2 114.8
1955 64.9 80.3 123.8
1956 62.3 77.3 124.0
1957 73.3 93.0 126.8
1958 79.1 107.0 135.3
1959 89.0 122.2 137.3
1960 50.1 72.9 145.5
1961 59.5 91.3 153.4
1962 98.1 162.0 165 .’1
1963 85.9 151.5 176.2
1964 96.5 189.7 196.5
1965 99.6 206.1 206.9
1966 118.2 259.1 219.1
1967 144.9 339.1 234.0
1968 187.7 501.1 267.0
1969 204.2 619.3 303.2
1970 338.6 1,113.5 328.9
1971 279.9 1,036.4 370.3
1972 288.3 1,233.2 477.7
1973 301.3 1,522.0 505.2
1974 312.6 1,864.2 596.4
1975 472.9 3,333.1 704.9
Sources: .National Income and Expenditure, 1976 and earlier editions, and the
Report on Crime, various issues.
which the level of larceny first peaks and then declines. Ultimately, a second
upward trend in motor vehicle larcenies emerges, this time in response to the
entry into the market of "amateur" car thieves, mainly juveniles, who become
the dominant force in the illicit market.
Figure 7 replicates with Irish data covering the years 1951 to 1975 the plot
of the relationship specified by Mansfield et al. (1974, p. 469) between motor
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vehicle larcenies per 100,000 population and motor vehicle registrations per
1,000 population. The outlines of the first "peak" they anticipate and find in
Norwegian data for the 1965 to 1967 period is also clearly present in the Irish
data, though for Ireland the initial response to increased availability is more
deliberate than was the case in Norway. At the highest level of availability in
Norway (230 vehicles per 1,000 population) the larceny level is at a point
parallelled in Figure 7 at about 140 vehicles per 1,000 population. Data from
the United States, however, reporting substantially higher per capita vehicle
registrations, continues the downward trend and then produces a sustained
upward movement that is continuing at levels of 460 vehicles per 1,000 pop-
ulation.
The plausibility of the replication is enhanced by the extent to which the
levels of abundance at which the initial upward trend commenced, coincide
for the two countries. This occurred for both Norway and Ireland when there
were about 100 vehicles per 1,000 population. However, though the com-
parison may be plausible, it remains inexact.
The transformation in Irish crime patterns that has been identified appears
to have coincided with the accumulation of a stock of valuable property. That
build-up was completed around the mid-1960s, and it is from that point that
the trends for crime in Ireland depart from their traditional pattern. This is in
accord with an explanation based on changing opportunities and does
provide a link between general structural change and the level and pattern of
crime. It must be stressed, however, that such an explanation leaves un-
answered a vital question: why do people take advantage of the new oppor-
tunities for criminal activity?
Economic Conditions and Crime
Given the configurations found for changes in offence levels between 1951
and 1975, it is unlikely that economic cycles had a major role in shaping the
observed trends. In particular, it is not possible for changes in unemployment
levels or like variables to have engineered the break evident in most series,
nor can they be held responsible for the rapid growth in the late 1960s. But it
remains possible that there is a relationship between economic conditions and
crime that merits elucidation, one that is relevant to the claims of the social
disorganisation perspective.
There is a further reason for examining that relationship. The time-series
analyses thus far have not satisfactorily represented the trend for the offence
indicators. When the 25 years are examined, the Durbin-Watson statistics
lead to the rejection of every specification used for the changes in offence
levels. The auto-correlation for all equations is severe, with error terms
strongly interdependent, and both regression coefficients and significance
tests are therefore unreliable. Auto-correlated disturbances generally stern
FIGURE 7. AVAILABILITY OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND MOTOR VEHICLE LARCENIES,    i951-1975
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either from mis-specification of the relationship between variables or the
omission from the equation of certain factors systematically related to the
dependent variable. Since alternative specifications of the relationship
between time and offence level have proved unrewarding, it is possible that in-
cluding economic conditions may produce more satisfactory expressions of
the trend in crime over the full time-period.
Table 7 regresses each of the nine indicators on two economic variables: the
non-agricultural unemployment rate (as given in The Trend of Employment and
Unemployment, various issues), and the ratio of actual Gross National Product
to the level of GNP expected from its trend (taken from Walsh, 1978), a
measure of economic growth. Both economic variables are lagged in all equa-
tions, a procedure that uses economic conditions in, say, 1974 to predict the
level of crime in 1975. The standard justification for introducing a lag into a
relationship is that an interval is necessary before the impact of macro-
economic changes filters down to the living circumstances of individuals. In
the present study, lagged variables have an additional virtue: because of the
use by the gardai between 1958 and 1974 of crime reporting years that com-
menced on 1 October, in the absence of a lag I would, in effect, be predicting
crime levels from the subsequent economic climate.
Three equations are reported for each crime indicator. The first equation
regresses offence level on trend, the second equation adds unemployment rate
to trend, and the third equation includes trend and both economic variables.
Unemployment data did not become available as a consistent time-series un-
til 1954 and this, along with the need to drop one year to allow for the lag,
results in the years 1955 to 1975 forming the observations for the analysis.
For assault and for receiving, the straightforward time-offence level
relationship is acceptable. The Durbin-Watson statistics are unsatisfactory
for all other indicators. However, for those seven indicators, the addition of
economic variables into the equation raises the Durbin-Watson statistic to ac-
ceptable levels and generally increases the amount of variance explained.
Unemployment alone increases the explained variance in housebreaking by
6.5 per cent, in larceny from vehicles by 5.7 per cent, in robbery by 12.6 per
cent, and in pedal cycle larceny by 48.6 per cent. The effects from change in
GNP for these indicators are minor on explained variance, but that variable’s
addition to the equation is beneficial in terms of raising the Durbin-Watson.
All of the relationships between unemployment and offence levels are
positive: high levels of known offences tend to occur in periods of high un-
employment. Growth in GNP, where the coefficient is statistically significant,
is generally positive, except in the case of larceny of pedal cycles where the
ratio increases the explained variance by 10 per cent through a negative
relationship. It is intriguing, but probably inexplicable, that it should be the
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Table 7: T/~ regression of offeme-indicators on economic conditions and trend, 1955--75. *
l~gol
offent¢ Uner~loyraent GNP
catctery Intercept Trend rat*s ratio DW
I.I
1.2
1.3
Assault 5.35 .084
(138.1) (27.1)
5.57 .083 -.030
(41.7) (28.2) (I .7)
5.11 .081 -.035
(12.6) (26.2) (2.0)
.OO5
(1.2)
.971 1.54
.973 1.77
.973 1.84
2.1
2.2
2.3
Housebreaking 6.56 .094
(83.9) (15.1)
5.47
.098 .149
(37.3) (30.6) (7.8)
4.09 .094 .134
(12.4) (37.0) (9,4)
.015
(4.4)
,911
.33
.976 1.04
.987 1.64
3.1
3.2
3.3
S&~Breaklng 6.99 .082,
(116.1) (17.0)
6.42 :084 .076
(35.3) (20.9) (3,2)
5.97 .082 .071
(10.7) (19.1) (2.9)
.OO5
(0.9)
.929 I.OO
.949 1.71
.948 1.78
4.1
4.2
4.3
Larc,,ny/,~
veh~les
6.63 .I12
(55.8) (11.9)
5.34
.117 .176
(16.4) (16.4) (4.1)
2.81 .109 .149
(3,4) (17.0) (4.1)
.028
(3.2)
.863 .47
.920 1.15
.943 1.65
5.1
5.2
5.3
2.91
.158
(15.4) (10.5)
.230 .169 .365
(0.7) (22.4) (8.1)
--2.83 .159 .332
(3.5) (25.7) (9.6)
.O34
(4.0)
.831 .41
.957 1.16
.974 1,62
6.1
6.2
6.3
Recdvin&
stolen goods
5.06 ’.057
(100.3) (14.2)
4.97 .057 .012
(26.9) (14.2) (0.5)
4.99 .057 .013
(8.6) (13.0) (0.5)
.OOO
(0.0)
SOl 2.05
.897 2.13
.890 2.13
7.1
7.2
7.3
Larceny of~.~h~ 2.75
.185
(19.6) (16.5)
2.32 .187 .058
(4.5) (16.7) (0.9)
-.80 .176 .025
(0.6) (16.2) (0.4)
.035
(2.3)
.925 .93
.924 .99
.936 1.34
8.1 Pedal cycle
larceny
8.2
8.3
7.65 .007
(71.9) (0.80)
6.42
.011 .168
(23.3) (1.9) (4.7)
8.34 .018 .189
(11.3) (3.1) (5.9)
-.021
(2.8)
.OOO .86
.468 1.34
.586 1.97
9.1 Pr~’y
valu~
9.2
9.3
2.93 .045
(42.6) (8.2)
2.90 .045 .OO5
(11.4) (8.1) (0.2)
1.00 .039
-.015
(1.5) (7.7) (.5)
.021
(3.0)
.749 1.33
.736 1,33
.806 2.09
*Parentheses contain t.ratios for coefficients.
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offence of pedal cycle larceny that evinces no relationship with linear trend
and is the indicator with the clearest relationship to economic conditions.
Change in GNP produces statistically significant coefficients for larceny of
motor vehicles and for the value of stolen property. Both relationships are
positive. The addition of GNP growth into the equation increases the variance
explained in property value by 6.5 per cent. That is, when the economy is ex-
panding at a rate in excess of its trend, the value of stolen property tends also
to be higher than would be the case otherwise.
For three offences - assault, receiving, and shopbreaking - neither
economic variable appreciably improves the variance explained by trend on
its own. It is worth noting, however, that unemployment has a negative
relationship with assault.
Table 7 establishes a pattern linking economic conditions to crime. It is the
pattern that would be anticipated: property crime is more prevalent in
periods of high unemployment. The regression results are for the most part
very encouraging, particularly given the improvements made to R2 (explained
variance) and the Durbin-Watson statistics that are in excess of the upper
bound for rejecting the null hypothesis of autocorrelation (at the five per cent
level). But it is necessary to retain perspective by emphasising the dominance
throughout the table of the effect from trend, a movement toward higher
levels that is not explained by the economic or social variables considered
thus far. Unemployment and GNP change do not reduce the impact of trend,
they merely augment the 80 per cent and higher levels of variance that trend
"explains" for all indicators except pedal cycle larceny.
Finally, it should be noted that multicollinearity does not appear to be a
problem in Table 7. Trend has a correlation of-. 17 with unemployment and
of .37 with the GNP ratio. The two economic variables correlate at. 15.
Conclusions and Interpretation
Analysis of data on Irish crime trends supports, by and large, the assertion
that increased crime rates are most usefully understood within the context of
a society’s social structural change. This emerged when three comparisons
were made of trends between 1951 and 1975: property crimes involving quite
different types of property were compared, person offences were compared
with property offences, and indicators of change in prevalence were compared
with indicators of offence seriousness.
Those comparisons were used to address two questions. First, it was neces-
sary to ascertain if the trends present in the crime indicators responded to the
main outlines of social structural change in an interpretable manner. In par-
ticular, the consistency in the trends was examined. The sequencing of crime
trends was sufficiently consistent to justify a conclusion that in Ireland a
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"structural change" in criminal activity was one concomitant of the general
break with Ireland’s economic past that occurred in the early 1960s. That is,
a watershed was reached, one that cannot be understood in terms of a process
of gradual accommodation to change.
From the graphic and statistical analyses of the crime trends, the amount of
increase, the nature of the trends, and the timing of the "take off" point all
emerge clearly. The only reasonable description to give the changes recorded
in the crime statistics over the 25 years is that of a structural break that occur-
red in the mid-1960s. There is little continuity between pre-1964 crime
statistics and what occurred subsequently; a watershed was reached.
The increases recorded in the crime statistics, therefore, are in basic accord
with a structural explanation of linking social change to crime. A social dis-
organisation approach to that link suggests, in my view, either a pattern of
constant growth, and probably one that commenced in the 1950s, or in some
formulations, cyclical fluctuation in response to changing economic fortunes.
Neither description is applicable to the trends in property crime. For assault,
however, a growth curve beginning in the early 1950s could be identified.
Having identified the basic consistencies in the data and suggested that
they support the general approach taken by the structural perspective, it re-
mains t~o identify components of social structural change that were active in
shaping the observed trends. While we cannot expect to establish causal
relationships, some of the analyses presented in this chapter are certainly sug-
gestive. For two types of property crime, burglary and larceny of motor vehi-
cles, a connection can be shown between changes in the availability of the
relevant types of property and the incidence of offences.
Chapter 5
Urban-Rural Differences in Crime Trends
Introduction
In our imagery of crime, dangerous places are urban places. Certain
metropolitan milieus have become, in literature and in the visual arts, stan-
dard representations of menace and lawlessness. It is perhaps inevitable,
therefore, that the substantial increases sustained in the level of recorded
crime since the mid-1960s will be attributed to the cities and particularly to
Dublin.
The accuracy of that perception is important in terms of what it can reveal
about the nature of the growth in crime and what it suggests can, or ought, to
be done as a matter of public policy. In both instances, the potential contribu-
tion comes from insight into the applicability to Ireland of experiences and
lessons from elsewhere. The two main explanations for the impact of social
change on crime, social disorganisation and structural theories, lead to con-
trasting expectations for Ireland as to the contributions urban and rural areas
will make to national crime trends. That contrast can help us to identify the
societal changes that were responsible for the substantial increases in the level
of crime over the past quarter century. Further, geographic distribution is one
aspect of the pattern of crime in Ireland, and if urban and rural trends were
indeed dissimilar over those years, then that pattern inevitably altered. But
the practical implications of urban-rural differences are sufficiently straight-
forward to require no elaboration. If something is to be done about a
problem, it is a prerequisite to know where it is concentrated.
At present, it is reasonable to assume that our beliefs about the distribution
of crime in Ireland primarily reflect what we know about the situation in
other countries. The published garda crime statistics are not very informative
about the location of offences. In the annual reports, there is a clear focus on
the national picture. However, trends in the four traditional categories of in-
dictable offences can be calculated separately for each garda division, (one of
which is the Dublin Metropolitan Area) and for the city districts of Cork,
Galway, Limerick and Waterford. It was necessary to supplement this
published information, with data disaggregated into the nine specific in-
dicators being used for this study, a process that proved feasible only for the
1964 to 1975 period. Therefore, this chapter compares the trends since 1964
that occurred in three types of areas: Dublin, the next four largest cities
(Cork, Galway, Limerick, and Waterford combined), and the remainder of
the country. Though crude, the comparisons so permitted do approximate
the distinctions at issue when the impact of urbanism or urbanisation on
crime is being discussed.
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The link between this chapter and Chapter 2 derives from the contrasting
roles that social disorganisation and structural perspectives attribute to the
city. If the post-1964 substantial increases in the level of crime are viewed as
the response to disorganisation, and, if as in other countries, that disorganisa-
tion is expressed most acutely in cities, then a disproportionate share of the
rise in crime should have occurred in urban places. It was noted, however,
that the relevance of the urbanisation experience in other countries to the
Irish situation is questionable. When the social disorganisation approach is
applied to Ireland in the 1951-1975 period the conditions that are highlighted
as conducive to rising crime rates appear in rural rather than in urban areas.
The severe dislocations experienced in the course of emigration during the
1950s were concentrated in small rural communities, while Dublin, like the
Swiss cities studied by Clinard (1978), did not act as a magnet for the dis-
placed rural poor. Though that role is more applicable to Dublin in the 1960s,
perhaps supplemented by dislocations in some of the city’s neighbourhoods,
the force of the disorganisation argument is not impressive.
By departing from the urbanisation model implicit in the social dis-
organisation approach, Ireland is unlikely to have experienced the typical se-
quencing in which the post-1964 increases would commence in Dublin, only
gradually being augmented by increasing crime rates in smaller urban places
and then still later in rural districts. The concentration of crime in Dublin
would in such a scenario have become more pronounced after the mid-1960s.
That might have ultimately reversed, as conditions reached a "take off" point
in other areas, but in the 1964-1975 period the predominance of Dublin in
shaping the national trends seems inevitable.
It is inevitable, however, only to the extent that social change in Ireland
conformed to the expectations of the social disorganisation approach. The
departure from those expectations is significant, as is the distinctiveness of
Ireland from the other atypical case, Switzerland (as described by Clinard,
1978). Certainly, Switzerland cannot provide a precedent for the suddenness
and rapidity with which economic change intruded into and transformed
Irish society.
A structural perspective seems preferable if the problem is so defined. It is
likely that certain forms of structural change will tend to promote trends in
crime that are indeed city-based, while other forms will create a truly national
impact. Once the most important aspects of structural change in a period are
identified, the susceptibility of various types of areas should become clear.
And assistance in determining what those aspects are is more likely to be
forthcoming from the writers I have labelled structural than from those in the
social disorganisation tradition.
The distribution of "mobile" property, objects that are both valued and
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readily appropriated, is one factor that can be readily identified. The
abruptness of the shift in crime trends found in the last chapter suggests that
such changes might easily have overshot city boundaries and been manifested
nationally. Certainly the idea of a gradual sequencing of adjustments to
change, first in Dublin, then in other cities, and finally in the countryside
seems implausible given the rapidity with which the changes occurred.
If that is the case, then the distribution of stealable property ought to have
been fairly equitable in geographic terms. But simple availability is not suf-
ficient. The response made to such property should also have been general, as
opposed to contrasting urban and rural views.
It is possible to examine, albeit imprecisely, the distribution of some types
of property. There is evidence that by the late 1960s car ownership rates for
counties had substantially converged, though this was less true in the distribu-
tion of television sets (McCarthy and Ryan, 1976, pp. 271-272). In the course
of the data analysis, account will be taken, where possible, of the availability
of the relevant property. Changing beliefs about property, however, cannot be
measured. What can be examined are the trends for the three area-types. To
the extent that property crime is increasing at a similar pace across the three
types, then the weight of evidence for a structural break in the level and pat-
tern of crime becomes stronger. The effect of change was so great as to have
been pervasive to the entire society. Or, put more precisely, that is the in-
terpretation that seems most reasonable to me.
As in the preceding chapter, the interpretation of the trends for the nine in-
dicators will be on comparing offences involving different types of property
and on comparing property offences generally with assault. Such com-
parisons are complicated in the present chapter by the need to, at the same
time, compare the trends for the three types of areas. The next section under-
takes a detailed examination of the data on the distribution of property crime,
deriving conclusions of the degree to which the incidence and organisation of
such crimes have changed between 1964 and 1975 in the three area types.
Each indicator will be taken separately and an assessment made; the same
ground will be covered for offences against persons in a separate secti6n. As-
sistance in the task of synthesising the various trends will be sought in a sec-
tion using statistical analysis, while an attempt to reconcile the trends using
the two perspectives will be left to a concluding section.
Offences Against Property
Burglary, subdivided into housebreaking and shopbreaking, once again
begins the examination of trends in the eight crime indicators representing of-
fences directed at the acquisition of property. Between 1964 and 1975, the
number of housebreakings increased four-fold and the number of shopbreak-
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ings three-fold nationally. Figure 8 shows the trends in those 12 years
separately for Dublin, the next four largest cities, and the non-urban areas.
All three types of areas essentially replicate the national trends, registering
substantial increases. Where 1964 levels are set equal to 100 and index
numbers computed to represent the extent of increases, the 1975 housebreak-
ing level stands at 487.0 in Dublin, 535.7 in the four-cities, and 325.2 in the
non-urban areas. The corresponding index numbers for shopbreaking are
352.5, 305.3, and 274.9. Thus, the greatest increases were found in the urban
areas, particularly for housebreaking.
The use of the actual numbers of known offences provides some useful
perspective on what the trends in Figure 8 represent: 736 housebreakings and
1,089 shopbreakings were recorded in Dublin during 1964; 3,584 housebreak-
ings and 3,839 shopbreakings in 1975. In the four-cities, the corresponding
1964 figures were 157 and 337; those for 1975 were 841 and 1,029. The
remainder of the country was the location of 606 housebreakings and 846
shopbreakings in 1964 and in 1975 of 1,971 housebreakings and 2,326
shopbreakings.
A shift in the distribution of burglary, enhancing its predominantly urban
emphasis, occurred between 1964 and 1975. This should not obsc.ure the sub-
stantial increases registered in non-urban areas, or the basic consistency
among area-types in the relationship between shopbreakings and
housebreakings. It does, however, clarify the relative contribution to the
national trends from different area-types. The impact by 1975 was to create
marked differentials in the per capita incidence of burglary. Though the pop-
ulation bases being used are estimates, the following, rates per I0,000 popula-
tion can be offered. For housebreaking, the 1975 rates are 36.2 in Dublin, 23.8
in the four cities, and 10.8 in the non-urban areas. The corresponding rates
for shopbreaking are 38.8, 29. I, and 12.8.
Given the diversity among burglary incidents, it is possible that the trends
in each area-type represent increases in offences of quite different seriousness
of loss and degree of organisation. As in the previous chapter, information on
changes in the average value of property stolen in burglaries can be con-
trasted with the trends for offence levels. Table 8 shows the changing average
value, expressed as constant (1964) prices. The comparisons between the
three areas are interesting, though it is necessary to allow for greater suscep-
t ibility of the four-cities data to extreme scores. Indeed, the average fluctuates
considerably for all areas, with a trend being most pronounced in the non-
urban areas, in which the most substantial increase was recorded over the 12
years. In all areas, the losses are far from trivial. At current prices, the average
losses in 1975 were £180.13 for Dublin, £124.24 for the four-cities, and
£176.46 for the non-urban areas.
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When the average loss is used as an indicator of the degree of organisation
and effort involved in the burglaries, the greatest change clearly is in the non-
urban areas. Only there has the average financial loss increased at the same
pace as did the number of offences. The absence of a clear trend for urban
areas suggests, perhaps, a greater diversity in participants and targets. One
interpretation of the trend for non-urban areas is that there, over time,
burglary has become more an enterprise of adults, and indeed has become
more vocational than avocational, resulting in a sharp increase in the
seriousn, ess of the loss sustained. In 1964, the average loss in non-urban areas
is one-half that in urban areas; there is no difference in 1975.
Table 8: Average value of property stolen in burglaries
(in constant- 7964-prices)
Tear Dublin Four-cities Non-urban
1964 £43.80 £57.08 £22.56
1965 48.97 43.65 24.89
1966 48.63 26.71 29.77
1967 58.07 22.40 27.11
1968 65.90 43.94 38.91
1969 63.73 38.02 40.76
1970 87.65 28.19 57.42
1971 67.65 37.75 38.35
1972 64.81 33.97 50.36
1973 65.15 34.22 66.26
1974 65.39 27.38 61.36"
1975 71.14 49.07 69.69
*The £5,000,000 represented by the Beit Collection is omitted from the calculation.
Figure 8 and Table 8 present contradictory information on where to al-
locate the predominant weight in shaping the national trends. Urban areas
clearly provided the major contribution to the growth since 1964 in the level
of burglary, but the increase in the average loss appears to owe far more to the
non-urban areas. The latter change is probably the more remarkable. All
three area-types have clear upward trends in levels of offences; that con-
sistency deserves as much, or more, attention as is given to the greater rate of
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increase in urban than in rural areas. Whatever factors drove those trends
were apparently operative throughout the country. In all areas, the con-
sistency in housebreaking and shopbreaking trends further suggests that
specialisation in targets does not differentiate the changes recorded. This
similarity is not present for the changes in the seriousness of burglary, at least
as I have measured it. An upward trend is clearly identifiable only outside of
the urban areas.
The trends in detection rates for burglary can also be used to examine the
differences between urban and rural areas. Since the problems of identifying
and apprehending suspects are presumably greater in urban areas, and given
the lower levels of incidence in rural areas, it is reasonable to assume that the
urban gardai would be less successful in obtaining detections. Also, the
burden of the more substantial increases in offence levels found in cities might
well in itself lead to a rapidly declining detection rate that would not be
paralleled in non-urban areas.
Table 9 provides the relevant information. In all three areas, during the
mid-1960s approximately three-fourths of housebreakings and over two-
thirds of shopbreakings met the garda criteria for being considered solved.
While the rate of detection begins to fall earlier in Dublin than elsewhere, at
most points in time the rates are roughly equivalent across areas. Two years,
however, require emphasis. Though the differences between areas in 1974
and 1975 are no larger than is typically the case, the ordering is contrary to
expectations of experience in other countries or of common sense: in those
two years, the detection rates in Dublin for both forms of burglary exceed
those found in the other two areas.
The trends in detection rates for burglary are primarily noteworthy for the
rough equivalence present among the types of areas. To the extent that dif-
ferences do exist, they run contrary to the expectation of high rates in non-
urban areas and low rates in urban areas. A partial explanation is the grow-
ing mobility of the population, making the transient as much, or more, a
feature of the small city, town, or village as of the metropolis. A burglary com-
mitted by someone outside of their own locality is less likely to be detected.
Together, the low detection rate and high average loss for burglaries in non-
urban areas suggest, but do not establish, that many such offences are indeed
committed by individuals visiting an area with that specific intention.
While not strictly a monotonic decrease, the trend in detection rates over
time is clearly one of decline. It is a decline, however, effected not by gradual
diminution but by a clear break in each series. The abruptness of that break,
which occurred at the close of the decade, is marked: 74.2 per cent of all
housebreakings reported in the non-urban areas during 1969 were detected;
in 1970 only 58.7 per cent were so regarded. Re-examining Figure 8 suggests
0Table 9: Detection rates for burglaries
Housebreaking Shopbreaking
Tear Dublin Four-cities Non-urban Dublin Four-cities Non-urban
per cent per cent per cent
1964 73.4 80.3 77.2
1965 80.4 75.3 77.9
1966 71.0 76.3 83.2
1967 64.0 77.6 82.5
1968 64.6 63.6 72.6
1969 55.0 76.3 74.2
1970 47.8 54.0 58.7
1971 50.1 47.5 52.5
1972 46.1 54.3 45.6
1973 50.1 46.3 41.9
1974 53.1 44.4 45.0
1975 45.5 40.8 38.7
t~
0
0
z0
per cent per cent per cent
69.7 71.5 67.6"~
73.4 64.7 70.9 n
68.1 63.7 75.8
64.8 61.6 72.8 r~
66.4 63.4 67.6
64.4 59.5 67.8
50.4 52.3 56.2 ,~
50.3 47.9 45.3
45.0 48.2 44.1 ~:
49.5 50.3 44.9
54.0 47.3 45.9
56.3 40.1 40.8
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a connection between the sharp increases in levels of incidence and the rapid-
1~/ diminishing detection rate: the number detected remains constant while
the number known increases. For Dublin, this occurred both in 1968/1969
and in 1969/1970 for housebreakings. In the other areas, only the latter
change is evident.
This pattern of an abrupt decline in the detection rate at the close of the
1960s was noted in discussing the national trends. The considerable diversion
of garda resources to security duties at that time was doubtlessly a con-
tributory factor. Though the amount of resources available to the gardai in-
creased significantly during the 1970s, the real weight of that increase was not
felt until after 1972. Assuming that in a given area-type there is a quota of an-
nual detections that is more or less standard for a garda, the removal of a sub-
stantial number of gardai from their ordinary duties could result in fewer
detections overall. But such an explanation is unsatisfactory. As Reiss and
Bordua (1967 p. 47) note: "No police department can know more crime than
its resources make possible for it to know in that given period of time nor solve
more than its resources make possible." If their argument is correct, then the
impact of the declining resources for deployment to ordinary police work
ought also to have been felt in the number of known offences. The number of
gardai available obviously affects the probability that offences will be
"discovered" in the course of patrolling; however, for less serious incidents
the diminished availability of gardai to receive reports of crime from the
public should also be reflected in the statistics. This does not appear to have
been the case. On balance, though the role of increased security duties in the
detection rates’ abrupt decline was probably substantial, and particularly so
in the limits imposed on investigatory work leading to a large number of of-
fences being "solved" simultaneously, the decline also probably reflects
movement within the force toward standardisation of procedures: the defini-
tion of "detection" ceased to differ between urban and rural areas.
The evidence from burglary trends does not, by and large, support an as-
sociation of the national trends primarily with urban areas. This is more a
result of the ambiguity in the data than from a clear picture of equivalence
between urban and rural areas. Over the 12 years, the distribution of
burglary offences does shift toward a greater urban presence, but the trends
in the average value of property stolen and in detections balance that
tendency, precluding an association of the national trends with changes con-
centrated within urban settings.
Another pair of offences, larceny of motor vehicles and larceny from unat-
tended motor vehicles, can provide a basis for establishing the extent to which
urban/rural differences in incidence of property crime trends are sensitive to
the availability of property. Figure 9 gives the trends by type of area for
FIGURE 9. NUMBER OF RECORDED LARCENIES FROM UN^TTENDED VEHICLES, BY AREA-TYPE. 1964-1975
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larceny from unattended vehicles. The trends for all areas are of substantial
increases. If the 1964 totals are taken as equal to 100, the magnitude of the in-
crease over the time-period is evident from the 1975 index numbers: 536.1 for
Dublin, 616.8 for the four-cities, and 353.3 for the non-urban areas. When
1975 rates based on the resident population, are computed for each area, the
distribution of reported larcenies from vehicles even more strikingly differen-
tiates urban and non-urban: the rates are 64.1 per 10,000 population in
Dublin, 33~3 per 10;000 population in the four cities, and 10.9 per 10,000 pop-
ulation in the remainder of the country.
The differences in trends and inthe ~ capita distribution of offencesamong
types of areas do not have a straightforward association with levels of oppor-
tunity. The increase in the number of available vehicles proceeded at a
roughly equivalent rate across the areas; the number of vehicles in 1975 was
double the 1964 figure, the ratios being 1.95 for Dublin and 2.03 in both the
four cities and the non-urban areas. As a result, the distribution of private
motor vehicles among the area types remains stable throughout the 12 years,
with about 29 per cent of all such vehicles in Dublin, just under 25 per cent in
the counties in which the four cities are located, and nearly 47 per cent in
what are termed here the non-urban areas.
Figure 10 formally introduces the availability of property as a basis for
calculating property crime rates. For example, in 1975 the 6,347 reported
larcenies from 148,718 private motor vehicles registered to residents of
County Dublin, result in a rate of 42.7 larcenies per 1,000 vehicles. Rates are
derived on the basis of vehicles registered to residents of the counties in which
the cities of interest are located. The denominator for the non-urban areas,
therefore, is the number of vehicles registered in the remaining 21 counties.
By erring in the direction of being more inclusive for cities, some compensa-
tion is introduced for the discrepancy between the number of vehicles likely to
be physically present in a city on a- given day and the number of vehicles
registered to residents of that city. Still, for Dublin and the four-cities, the
denominators used in the rates probably understate the total number of vehi-
cles physically present and thus available to enter the statistics as crime
scenes.
Urban/non-urban differences are also clearly evident in the detection rates.
Whatever year in Table 10 is examined, the lowest level of detections is in
Dublin. While this is perhaps the most striking aspect of the detection rates,
the sharply decreasing rates in the four-cities and in the non-urban areas are
also noteworthy. So is the abrupt decline in detection rates between 1969 and
1970. In Dublin, the abrupt decline was associated with a marked increase in
the number of known offences; this relationship was not evident for the four-
cities or the non-urban areas.
oo
FIGURE 10. LARCENIES FROM UNATTENDED VEHICLES.PER ]000 REGISTERED VEHICLES, BY AREA-TYPE,    ]964-]975
CRIME IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 95
Despite some differences in the amount of the increase recorded over the 12
years, the consistency in the trends merits attention. The overall increase in
the levels of larceny from vehicles is everywhere very substantial, with the
four-cities experiencing the greatest change, followed by Dublin and then the
non-urban areas. This ordering holds whether the number of recorded of-
fences or rates per 1,000 vehicles are used. However, the extent of the increase
is tess awesome if the supply of vehicles is taken into account; when the 1964
rate is set to 100, the 1975 index numbers are 275.5 in Dublin, 306.5 in the
four-cities, and 172.9 in the non-urban areas. The net impact of the upward
trends, therefore, is to accentuate urban/rural differences. Simultaneously,
differences between Dublin and the four-cities in levels of incidence narrow.
Table 10: Detection rates for larcenies from motor vehicles
Tear Dublin Four-cities Non-urban
per cent per cent per cent
1964 33.6 63.4 81.2
1965 35.5 65.7 84.7
1966 29.4 72.9 82.2
1967 30.1 69.7 80.7
1968 30.4 72.1 74.4
1969 34.9 77.3 69.5
1970 18.2 54.1 61.0
1971 18.5 42.2 50.7
1972 17.9 38.1 48.4
1973 22.7 35.1 44.9
1974 31.7 29.0 42.8
1975 26.4 24.6 34.6
The trends for larceny of motor vehicles, shown in Figure 11, approximate
those found for larceny from unattended vehicles. Disparities between Dublin
and other areas persist and indeed increase over the 12 years, though the
trends are less clearly linear than those found in Figure 10. There is a clear
break in each series, with levels in the mid-1970s exceeding those registered
during the mid-1960s through an abrupt shift that occurs between 1970 and
1971. In the two types of urban areas, the highest offence levels are recorded
in 1972; in the non-urban areas, the peak occurs in 1973. Thereafter, the des-
cent is rapid, with 1975 levels for the urban areas in particular substantially
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lower than those prevailing earlier in the decade. Table 11 examines the same
¯ trends using rates per I0,000 private motor vehicles registered in each type of
area. The use of rates rather than offence levels does not alter the generalisa-
tions given above. With the 1964 levels set to 100, the 1975 index numbers
are: Dublin, 790.6; four-cities, 412.5; and non-urban 760.0.
The trends in detection rates for motor vehicle larceny shown in Table 12
establish greater differences between Dublin and other areas than did com-
parable data for larcenies from vehicles. Also, the movement toward lower
detection rates is less consistent than was the case for other property offences.
Over time, motor vehicle larceny in Dublin becomes more prevalent and less
susceptible to detection than in other areas.
The marked differentials between urban and rural trends and the apparent
existence of a saturation point in the level of offences, which can be identified
in all three areas, makes the offence of larceny of vehicles distinctive. The
property sought through burglary is non-specific; the range of portable and
marketable property delimits the possibilities. Similarly, though larcenies
from motor vehicles perforce require that a supply of vehicles be present, the
property sought is indeterminate. Where the vehicle itself is the target, the
levels of theft are likely to correspond to the laws of supply and demand
(Mansfield et al., 1974). Though the levels of motor vehicle larceny are far
higher in Dublin, the trends in all three types of area conform to the basic out-
line suggested by Mansfield and his colleagues: as per capita car ownership
rises toward abundance, offence levels are initially a direct reflection of in-
creasing availability. Eventually, however, a level is reached which the de-
mand for vehicles through the illegal market declines sufficiently to create a
downward trend. To that extent, the trends across the three area-types are
similar.
The influence of the form of property on trends in offence levels and detec-
tion rates is evident in the data describing pedal cycle larceny. At least until
the recent introduction of expensive racing models, pedal cycle larceny was
unlikely, in a period of substantial availability of motor vehicles, to fluctuate
in response to a well-defined illicit market. Figure 12 reveals a sharp contrast
between Dublin and other areas in trends for 1964 to 1975. The difference in
levels recorded is very substantial and is greatest toward the end of the series.
No linear trends emerge in the non-urban or four-city data, and the trend in
Dublin is curvilinear. The starkness of the contrast between Dublin and the
other areas is duplicated in the detection rates shown in Table 13. In Dublin,
only a small fraction of pedal cycle larcenies result in a suspect being iden-
tified, while in the four cities and in non-urban areas detection rates frequent-
ly exceeded 90 per cent. The detection rates in the latter two areas are essen-
tially unchanged over the 12 years considered.
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Table 11: Larceny of motor vehicles per 10,000 registered vehicles
Area
Tear Dublin Four.cities Non- Urban
1964 6.9 1.3 " 1,3
1965 7.6 1.3 0.7
1966 9.7 1.0 1.2
1967 13.8 1.7 2.2
1968 12.1 1.4 1.4
1969 23.9 0.8 1.6
1970 26.4 2.7 2.1
1971 43.3 5.9 5.3
1972 44.7 5.8 6.2
1973 29.2 1.3 6.6
1974 19.4 4.4 5.2
1975 28.2 2.7 4.8
Table 12: Detection rates for larcenies of motor vehicles
Area
Tear Dublin Four-cities Non-urban
per cent per cent per cent
1964 35.8 62.5 93.3
1965 40.6 55.6 100.0
1966 31.0 42.9 94.1
1967 32.3 69.2 71.0
1968 25.2 72.7 90.5
1969 24.2 57.1 65.4
1970 23.4 32.0 62.1
1971 18.2 22.0 68.5
1972 19.6 27.4 61.5
1973 20.8 53.3 47.9
1974 24.0 17.3 50.0
1975 19.6 51.5 43.9
FIGURE 12. NUHBER OF RECORDED LARCENIES OF PEDAL CYCLES, BY AREA-TYPE.    1964 -1975
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Table 13: Detection rates for larcenies of pedal cycles
Area
Year Dublin Four-cities aVon-urban
per cent per cent per cent
1964 7.9 61.1 90.7
1965 13.7 63.0 96.8
1966 10.9 73.1 96.4
1967 12.8 73.5 94.2
1968 8.6 76.9 72.1
1969 6.2 76.5 98.7
1970 3.4 93.1 94.0
1971 2.4 93.8 90.8
1972 1.9 53.3 93.5
1973 2.6 56.8 88.0
1974 1.2 62.9 95.9
1975 1.1 91.8 57.9
Pedal cycle larceny is representative of property offences that tend to be less
amenable to shifts in supply and less likely to be practised as an organised ac-
tivity. That the potential for doing so is greater in a metropolitan centre such
as Dublin may explain the discrepancy in trends present in Figure 12. But the
magnitude of the discrepancy, and the absence of any upward trend outside
of Dublin, reinforces the argument that the type of property interacts with
other influences on changes in offence levds. There are, of course, difficulties
in interpreting differences that emerge between types of offences. Unlike the
other categories of property crime considered in this chapter, it can be as-
sumed that pedal cycle larceny will tend to be committed by individuals living
within the locality. It is therefore the category most susceptible to the dif-
ferences between urban and non-urban law enforcement, though the
similarity of trends in the four-cities and the non-urban areas suggests that
other factors are operative.
The magnitude of the downward trend in the four-cities and in the non-
urban areas is apparent when index numbers are examined. Taking the 1.964
level of known offences as 100, the index numbers for Dublin, the four cities,
and the non-urban areas are, respectively, 132.4, 54.5 and 75.8. Computing
rates per 10,000 population for the 1975 levels similarly clarifies the differen-
tial between Dublin and other areas. There were 28.6 pedal cycle larcenies
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per 10,000 Dublin population; for the four cities and non-urban areas the
comparable rates are 1.4 and 1.0.
Robbery, spans the boundaries between personal and property crime. It has
a clear economic motivation, but involves confrontation: a robbery perforce
includes an assault. Indeed, the ambiguity is such that robbery is perhaps the
offence category most susceptible to classification error (Jacobson, 1975 p.
241). When urban/rural differences are studied using crime statistics drawn
from a national police force, as in Ireland, the potential for that ambiguity to
jeopardise the comparability of the trends is minimised. It is reasonable to as-
sume that the same criteria are used in all areas to determine what comprises
a robbery.
The trends by area shown in Figure 13 are all of substantial increase over
the 12 years, though that for Dublin is the most striking. Despite the in-
creases, it is useful to note the very low levels present in 1964, levels that are
roughly equivalent in the three areas. When the 1964 totals are set to 100, the
1975 index numbers for Dublin, the four-cities, and the non-urban areas
stand at 1,417.1, 875.0, and 726.3, respectively. As was the case for all the
property offences considered, the highest levels are found in Dublin, followed
by the non-urban areas. The rates per 10,000 population in 1975 were 5.0 in
Dublin, 1.98 in the four-cities, and 0.76 in the non-urban areas. Despite the
increase, robbery remains one of the least common property offences.
The robberies in the crime statistics vary from 10 pence taken by one child
from another to a meticulously planned robbery of thousands of pounds. To
the extent that the more careful the preparations and the more "rational" the
target the lower the probability of detection, the detection rates in Table 14
provide some indication of the nature of the recorded robberies. Once again,
there exists a clear and abrupt shift between two years in the detection rate.
For Dublin, this shift is found in comparing the 1969 rate with the 1970 rate;
for the four-cities and the non-urban areas, the relevant years are 1970 and
1971. As was the case for larceny from vehicles, the fall in the detection rate
coincides with a sharp increase in incidence for both Dublin and the four-
cities, but not for the non-urban areas. The most reasonable interpretation
would allow for the pressures upon, and changes within, the gardai, over
those years, though some of the decline doubtlessly reflects changes in the fre-
quency and the nature of the robberies occurring.
The use of a real or imitation firearm in the course of a robbery - whether
successful or attempted - results in the entry of an offence into the sub-
category of armed robbery. Two such entries were recorded in 1964. TwelVe
years later, the number recorded had risen to 153. Those 153 offences,
representing 21.7 per cent of all recorded robberies in the year 1975, were ap-
portioned such that 53.6 per cent were in Dublin, 9.2 per cent in the four-
F]GURE 13. NUMBER OF RECORDED ROBBER|ES, BY AREA-TYPE,    1964-1975
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cities, and 37.3 per cent in the non-urban areas. That distribution is roughly
equivalent to that obtaining for 1973 and 1974. The 1964-1975 levels of
known armed robberies by area-types are given in Table 15.
Table 14: Detection rates for robberies
Dublin Four-cities Non-urban
per cent per cent per cent
1964 74.3 100.0 100.0
1965 74.5 75.0 77.8
1966 87.2 85.7 73.7
1967 70.7 83.3 87.5
1968 75.4 84.6 73.7
1969 72.9 86.4 90.0
1970 57.2 73.3 80.9
1971 49.3 56.7 39.0
1972 51.1 60.0 33.8
1973 56.0 64.5 53.3
1974 47.3 58.3 51.3
1975 42.7 61.4 46.4
Table 15: Incidence of armed robberies: 1964-1975"
Year Dublin Four.cities Non-urban National
1964 2 0 0 2
1965 2 1 0 3
1966 1 1 0 2
1967 3 0 0 3
1968 2 0 1 3
1969 6 2 4 12
1970 12 1 4 17
1971 10 1 19 30
1972 57 7 68 132
1973 68 10 45 123
1974 72 5 50 127
1975 82 14 57 153
*An armed robbery is one in which a firearm- real or imitation- is alleged to have been used.
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Burglary, larceny from motor vehicles, robbery, and like offences, all have a
potential for being conducted on a rational, organised basis, but embrace a
wide range of behaviour. The incidence of the offence of receiving stolen
property is perhaps the most direct measure of the extent to which crime is
pursued as a business enterprise. For a market in illicitly obtained goods to
flourish, middlemen linking suppliers with purchasers are a prerequisite. The
trends in Figure 14 are therefore of considerable interest. While the number of
known receiving offences remains low for Dublin, but not for the other area-
types, the trend in increase is clear. In the non-urban areas, the increase is
erratic, and is ultimately reversed. This is the only offence in which the
hierarchical ranking of incidence by area fails to remain consistent across the
12 years, with the levels in non-urban areas often exceeding those in Dublin.
The 1975 index numbers are 365.0 in Dublin, 104.3 in the four-cities, and
122:2 in the non-urban areas.
The detection rates here cannot illuminate differences between the three
areas. Nowhere during the 12 years does that rate fall below 97.4 per cent.
Receiving offences can only become "known" during the course ofa garda in-
vestigation; where gardai are aware of the existence of such an offence they
will almost inevitably be aware of the individual they consider responsible.
When rates are calculated per 10,000 population in each type of area, the
ordering among the areas changes. In 1975 the incidence of receiving offences
per 10,000 population was 2.2 in Dublin, 2.06 in the four-cities, and 1.0 in the
non-urban areas.
Where other property offences registered three-fold and greater increases
over the 12 years, the number of known receiving offences remained essential-
ly unchanged. Moreover, receiving offences were less prone than other
~vroperty offences to be concentrated in Dublin. This suggests a lack of
sophistication in the execution and exploitation of property offences general-
ly, and, less firmly, that the bulk of the increase in recorded property offences
can be attributed to new recruits entering this area of enterprise rather than
to an inc.reased efficiency on the part of long-standing practitioners. If conclu-
sions here are particularly elusive, it is because the total of known receiving
offences for any given year is highly sensitive to the amount of resources
devoted to special investigations during the year.
Off~es Against Perso~
The status of offences against persons, such as assault, is uncertain within
both the social disorganisation and the structural perspectives. Both perspec-
tives are intended primarily as explanations of changes in property crime.
Therefore, the inclusion of person offences is often merely as a point of com-
parison to the property crimes that form the major interest. Where an ex-
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planation for the level of assault or homicide is attempted, the standard treat-
ment is to argue that such offences are influenced by normative considera-
tions. A subculture of violence is identified - specific to groups defined by
some combination of regional location, ethnicity, and age - in which the
dominant values and beliefs, in contrast to those found in the population at
large, encourage and facilitate violence. As described by Wolfgang and Fer-
racuti (1967), the members of such groups are disproportionately the victims
and the perpetrators of homicides and assaults. The over-representation of
young men from particular minority groups is therefore to be explained by
their adherence to a normative system that rejects the conventional inhibi-
tions on resorting to violence. The use of violence is instead considered
honourable, and indeed it many situations, a required response to the actions
of others.
If this argument is adopted, there is no clear basis for anticipating ur-
ban/rural differences in offences against persons, or for predicting the trends
that will accompany social change. However, Jacobson (1975) provides a
point of reference through the results of his comparison of crime rates in
southern and non-southern American cities: a convergence between the
regions began with changes in the property crime rate, followed after an inter-
val by changes in the rate of crimes against persons. This lag was interpreted
as the result of industrialisation and urbanisation first creating socio-
economic and demographic change that ultimately generated the normative
transformation to which violent crimes responded.
The national trend in assault, shown in Chapter 4, did indeed depart sub-
stantially from trends in property crime. An upward trend in the level of in-
dictable assault began in the 1950s and continued unabated over the 25 years,
forming a gradual growth curve. The structural break, so evident for other of-
fences, was nowhere present in the case of assault. Thus, it can be concluded
that if social structural change is influencing the trend in offences against
persons, it is doing so in a manner that differs significantly from what occur-
red for property offences. The possibility of establishing a link between struc-
tural change and person offences will be the topic of a separate chapter -
Chapter 6 - and for the present the trends in assault will be used as a
counterweight to those found for property offences.
The extent to which urban/non-urban differe.nces in levels of assault ex-
isted and persist in Ireland can be gauged from Figure 15. The number of
known indictable assaults is consistently highest in the non-urban areas
throughout the 12 years, the next highest levels being found in Dublin. An
overall linear trend is present for all three area-types, though the increase is
not continuous, and the patterns vary considerably among the areas. For
Dublin, when the offences known in 1964 are set equal to 100, the index for
FIGURE 15. NUMBER OF RECORDED INDICTABLE ^,~-~^ULT~, BY AREA-TYPE. 1964-1975oo
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1975 stands at 173.7. The 1975 index numbers for the four-cities and the non-
urban areas are 395.3 and 235.4 respectively. The clearest difference between
the areas is that while in Dublin and the four-cities the number of assaults
was stable during the last six years, assaults in the non-urban areas evinced
an almost precisely linear increase.
The use of crime rates reflecting the population at risk is perhaps most
meaningful when examining assault statistics. For 1975, the rates so derived
for Dublin, the four-cities, and non-urban areas are, respectively, 2.7, 4.8 and
3.7. This does not conform to the order among area-types found for property
offences, and does not replicate the pattern of other countries in which violent
crime is often a strongly non-urban phenomenon. Further, the pattern of con-
vergence of regional crime rates identified by Jacobson (1975) was not
replicated in the data for Ireland. Trends for assaults were distributed among
the regions in much the same manner as were those for property offences. The
only major difference present reverses the pattern found in the United States:
in the Irish data the largest increases in assaults occurred in the initial years
of the time-period for urban areas, while those for property offences were con-
centrated somewhat later.
When the detection rates in Table 16 are examined, a clear divergence is
evident between Dublin and the other areas. For the four-cities and non-
urban areas, no trend is discernible; the detection rates throughout approach
100 per cent. The rates for Dublin, while still high, are consistently and sub-
stantially lower. Given that the higher the detection rate for such offences, the
greater the likelihood that the participants in the assaults knew one another, a
qualitative, as well as quantitative, difference appears to exist between the
areas. When adjusted for population, the four-cities have a high rate of in-
cidence and a high rate of detection; in contrast, the non-urban areas have a
moderate level of incidence and a high rate of detection, and Dublin a low
level of incidence and a comparatively low detection rate.
What most clearly differentiates assaults in the Dublin Metropolitan Area
from those occurring elsewhere is the proportion in which gardai are the vic-
tims. In 1975, gardai were the victims in 8.5 per cent of all assaults in Dublin,
32.5 per cent in the four-cities, and 41.5 per cent in the non-urban areas. For
1972, the earliest year for which comparable data are available, 10.7 per cent
of Dublin assaults had gardai as the victimS; this was true in 32.9 per cent of
assaults in the four-cities, and 39.7 per cent of non-urban assaults. Therefore,
though the bulk of assaults consistently occurs outside of Dublin, if only as-
saults on "civilians" are used as the basis for comparison, the differences nar-
row substantially.
How reliable is the number of known assaults as an indicator of the extent
of interpersonal violence? That even in Dublin 75 per cent of all assaults were
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detected in 1975 suggests that randomly directed violence is infrequent.
While this speaks to the nature of assaults in Ireland, and to the difference in
that regard between Dublin and the rest of the country, it may still be the case
that police intervention occurs only in the most serious assaults. McClintock
(1963) argues that the number of recorded assaults is very sensitive to chang-
ing public and police tolerance of violence. This suggests both the possibility
of a substantial quantity of unrecorded assaults- the ominously named "dark
figure" of crime - and that a linear trend of increasing assault statistics partly
reflects changing attitudes, with a growing intolerance of violence leading to
an increasing proportion of assaults becoming "known". It is unlikely,
however, that the trends in Figure 15 merely outline the iceberg’s tip. A high
level of interpersonal violence implies a substantial homicide rate (see
Walker, 1968 p. 21; Zimring 1972). The correlation between annual levels of
known homicides and known indictable assaults in Ireland for the 1964 to
1975 period is 0.86 reflecting the common upward trend in the two series.
Thus, though indictable assault covers a wide range of interpersonal violence
- roughly all those inflicting or intending clear physical or mental harm - it
does seem a reasonable indicator for this study.
Table 16: Detection rates for indictable assaults
Tear Dublin Four-dties Non-urban
per cent per cent per cent
1964 88.5 100.0 99.3
1965 93.4 100.0 98.5
1966 86.1 100.0 99.7
1967 88.8 99.1 98.4
1968 88.9 95.9 98.5
1969 87.9 100.0 98.3
1970 85.2 97.7 97.6
1971 83.1 98.4 97.6
1972 80.9 96.4 92.3
1973 84.2 98.3 98.2
1974 78.1 98.1 97.9
1975 74.9 98.8 97.1
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A Comparison of Trends in Known Offences
Thus far, the assessment of urban/rural differences in trends has relied on
inspection of tables and figures. The sheer number of trend lines, percentages,
and rates has overburdened what is at best an imprecise mode of analysis.
This section uses correlations to formalise the comparisons. First, the inter-
correlations among offence categories are examined separately for each type
of area. The correlation coefficients will indicate the extent to which a type of
area has a clear pattern of change, common to all offence categories, and the
extent to which those patterns are distinctive to Dublin, the four-cities, and
non-urban areas..A second table of correlations measures the strength of
relationship between the trends in the three types of areas, examining each of.
fence category separately.
.The most appropriate mathematical representation of the trends in known
offences found in the preceding figures is one of growth by a constant absolute
change per unit of time - a standard linear trend. Perhaps because of the
limited time span, this basic form appears to characterise the trends for all of-
fence categories and all types of areas. However, it remains possible to ques-
tion the degree of covariation that is present among the series. A common
linear trend over the 12 years assures high correlations, but it is equally im-
portant to establish whether there is also a common pattern of movement
around the trend lines. For example, in those years in which housebreaking
exceeds the level anticipated on the basis of the linear trend, is the same true
of shopbreaking or of assault? To obtain answers to such questions it is neces-
sary to employ variables that have been de-trended.
De-trending is accomplished here, as in Chapter 4, by obtaining..the cor-
relations among residuals, the residuals being derived by regressing each of-
fence category on time. The coefficients in Table 17 provide the intercorrela-
tions among nine indicators used in the two previous sections. Coefficients
above the diagonal in each matrix are the standard zero-order correlations,
calculated on the basis of the number of known offences. The contrasting set
of coefficients among residuals, representing the relationships after de-
trending, are found in the lower triangle.
Table 17 is useful because it summarises the extent to which indicators i~
each area-type are acting consistently. Generally speaking, there is a strong
consistency in the non-urban areas, moderate consistency in Dublin, and lit-
tle evident consistency in the four-cities. This difference is clearest in the case
of the offence level property crime indicators. In the non-urban areas, if pedal
cycle larceny is excluded, the intercorrelations are substantial, even when the
relationships have been de-trended. This is also true for Dublin, though the
relationships are less substantial. The correlations present among those in-
dicators in the four-cities, however, are weak. For example, though larceny
Table 17: Intercorrelations among offence indicators, 196d--1975"
Dublin metropolitan area
1.         2.         3.         4.         5.         6.         7.         8.         9.
1. Assault 1.0 .71 .52 .53 .72
.86 .44 .30 .31
2. Housebreaking
-.13 1.0 .94 .94 .95 .89 .82 .70 .65
3. Shopbreaking
-.76 .25 1.0 .89 .85 .76 .71 .80 .70
4. Larceny from vehicles
-.50 .64 .25 1.0 .88 .77 .94 .67 .65
5. Robbery .15 .57
-.14 .24 1.0 .89 .76 .58 .44
6. Receiving .69 -.31 -.74
-.41 .28 1.0 .67 .62 .467. Larceny ofvehicles
-.34 .40 -.16 .85 .13 -.22 1.0 .48 .58
8. Pedal cycle larceny
-.45 .06 .56 .08
-.26 -.09
-.18 1.0 .53
9. Property value
-.36 -.17 .28 .12 -.67
-.53 .10 .10 1.0
Four.cities
I. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
1. Assault 1.0 .88 .82 .81 .89 .24 .60 -.64
-.38
2. Housebreaking
-.32 1.0 .94 .96 .88 .15 .54 -.47 .00
3. Shopbreaking
-.54 .51 1.0 .94 .82 -.01 .68 -.55" -.03
4. Larceny from vehicles
-.48 .77 .57 1.0 .90 .07 .60
-.33 .08
5. Robbery .08 .03 -.31 .39 1.0 .17 .63 -.38
-.12
6. Receiving .34 .05
-.38 -.16 .10 1.0 -.28
-.18 -.36
7. Larceny of vehicles
-.15 -.44 .22 -.03 .05
-.51 1.0 ¯-.55
-.18
8. Pedal cycle larceny
-.16 .58 .13 .81 .70 -.12
-.22 1.0 .58
9. Property value
-.67 .63 .40 .64 .15 -.35
-.07 .60 1.0
dYon-urban areas
I. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
1. Assault 1.0 .96 .93 .97 .92 .58 .89 -.77 .88
2. Housebreaking .68 1.0 .95 .97 .89 .63 .85 -.67 .85
3. Shopbreaking .36 .64 1.0 .98 .94 .78 .93 -.75 .89
4. Larceny from vehicles .62 .79 .82 1.0 .94 .67 .91 -.81 .91
5. Robbery .48 .36 .63 .66 1.0 .71 .95 -.80 .82
6. Receiving .05 .25 .84 .51 .49 1.0 .77
-.46 .60
7. Larceny of vehicles .27 .12 .60 .36 .75 .67 1.0
-.82 .79
8. Pedal cycle larceny .19 .54 .29 .20
-.18 .10 -.27 1.0 -.68
9. Property value
-.05 -.08 .06 -.06
-.12 .16 -.28 .56 1.0
*Coefficients above the diagonal in each matrix are zero-order correlations based on the level of known offences; coefficients below
the diagonal in each matrix are zero-order correlations based on the residuals derived from regressing each offence variable against
time.
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from vehicles has a correlation of .94 with the level of larceny of vehicles in
Dublin and .91 in the non-urban areas, the correlation in the four-cities data
is .60. Similarly, the correlations linking larceny of vehicles to receiving of-
fences are .67 and .77 in Dublin and the non-urban areas, respectively, and
-.28 in the four-cities.
Larceny of pedal cycles and the average value of property stolen in
burglaries are the anomalies to the basic consistency present in Table 17
among the property crime indicators. Pedal cycle larceny levels, with the ex-
ception of the consistently negative relationships found in the non-urban
areas, are not systematically related to other property crimes. For the average
value of stolen property, again with the exception of the non-urban areas, the
correlations with the levels of burglary are insubstantial. So again it is the
cohesiveness of the indicators outside of the cities that is most interesting.
The use of correlations based on residuals essentially reinforces what the
relationships based on levels indicated. Overall, those correlations are weak
or negative in Dublin and in the four-cities, and comparatively stronger in the
non-urban areas. This occurs despite the diversity of the areas subsumed in
the latter category. The trends for the non-urban parts of the country are con-
sistent for all the offence categories, though the de-trended relationships of
property offences to the average value of stolen property are negligible. With
that exception, the indicators share both a common linear trend and a com-
mon pattern of movement around that trend.
The reverse of that finding can describe the relationships among the in-
dicators in the four-cities. Perhaps because of differences among the cities, no
pattern emerges. The indicators appear to be moving without reference to
each other.
The three indicators for burglary - housebreaking, shopbreaking, and
property value - are less strongly correlated once the upward linear trend is
removed. Housebreaking and shopbreaking have residual correlations of .25
in Dublin, .51 in the four-cities, and .64 in non-urban areas. Small or negative
correlations associate those offences with property value in Dublin and the
non-urban areas, while moderately positive relationships occur in the four-
cities. The significance of the four-cities relationships, however, can be over-
stated - the linear trend in that area for average value of stolen property is
slight and deviations from that trend do not have the importance of those
found in the other two areas.
The examination of correlations based on residuals reinforces the distinc-
tiveness of the non-urban areas previously found using standard correlations.
It also suggests that in urban areas the offence categories respond to economic
or social conditions in a manner less monolithic than might be judged from
the charts used previously; fluctuations around the trend line differ con-
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siderably among the offences. In Dublin, for example, the zero-order
relationship between receiving stolen goods and shopbreaking is .76, but the
correlation with the linear component removed is -.74. The use of correla-
tions among residuals imposes a more stringent test for the presence and
strength of a relationship.
Table 18 provides a further basis for comparing the three types of areas.
The correlations between areas are given separately for each offence category,
again adopting the convention of contrasting correlations derived from levels
of known offences with those based on residuals.
When the recorded offence level is used, the coefficients reinforce the
impression of a high degree of consistency among major property crimes:
housebreaking, shopbreaking, and robbery. For those offences, correlations of
.90 or greater link the three types of areas. The indicators of the level of
sophistication in property crime - receiving stolen property and average value
of stolen property - show a different pattern, with correlations of .73 and .53,
respectively, relating Dublin and the non-urban areas, and slight or negative
correlations relating the four-cities to other areas. Overall, trends in Dublin
and non-urban areas evince the greatest similarity, though there does appear
to be a pattern of movement in levels of known offences that is national rather
than peculiar to types of areas. Both that pattern and the close connection
between Dublin and non-urban trends are reflected in the correlations based
on residuals. Consistency across areas is most evident for the offence of rob-
bery: even after de-trending, correlations between areas exceed .83 (the cor-
relations based on numbers of offences exceeded .97). Generally, the highest
correlations are for the major forms of property crime and the weakest
relationships are for the minor property offences of larceny from vehicles and
pedal cycle larceny. The correlations linking the two urban areas are not
systematically stronger than urban/non-urban relationships. For average
values of stolen property, the highest correlation is the .37 between Dublin
and the non-urban areas. The other measure of sophistication used for
property crime, receiving stolen property, does not provide evidence of com-
mon movement around the trends. Assaults, whether correlated through
levels or residuals, do not have the consistency across areas found for most
property crimes.
The correlations found in Tables 17 and 18 complement the conclusions
drawn earlier in the chapter from the inspection of figures and tables. Trends
over the 12 years act to homogenise far more than to differentiate areas. The
more dependent an offence category is on a specific form of property, the
stronger the relationship between areas proves to be, and often the most
forceful the link is between Dublin and the non-urban areas. It is in those two
areas that property crime can be seen to become both more prevalent and
Table 18: Correlations among area offence levels: 1964-1975
0
Offence levels Residuals
Dublin/ Dublin/ Four-cities/ Dublin/ Dublin/ Four-cities~
four-cities    non-urban    non-urban    four-cities    non-urban    non-urban
Assault .82 .74 .88 .56 .20 -.13
Housebreaking .97 .95 .97 .48 .67 .74 >
Shopbreaking .99 .90 ’ .92 .93 .11 .34
~
Larceny from vehicles .87 .94 .96 .24 .60 .76 ~
t~
Robbery .98 .98 .97 .86 .88 .83         >
Receiving .18 .53 .27 .13 -.07 .23 ~
Larceny of vehicles .81 .84 .72 .62 .49 .38
Pedal cycles -.39 -.45 .73 .10 .38 .47 ~
Property value -.29 .73 -.14 -.23 .37 .10
i
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more successfully practised as an organised and profitable enterprise.
Conclusion
The 1964 to 1975 trends for the nine crime indicators have been examined
separately for three types of areas selected to approximate urban/rural dif-
ferences. Though the contribution made by increases in the urban areas, and
particularly in Dublin, to the national level trends discussed in Chapter 4 was
clearly greater than that made by changes in the non-urban areas, the dif-
ferential is not dramatic. The predominance of urban trends in shaping the
upward movement in the crime statistics is obvious only for housebreaking,
and larceny from vehicles. In all other instances, the non-urban areas
recorded increases equivalent to those in the two urban areas or in excess of
those found in the four-cities. And in one indicator, the average value of
property stolen in burglaries, the increase in non-urban areas is nearly twice
as great as that in Dublin and more than three times as great as that in the
four-cities.
Overall, therefore, the evidence assembled in this chapter argues for
the essential similarity across types of areas. Urban and rural differences do
exist, and did become somewhat accentuated over the 12 years, but the up-
ward pattern is clear in all areas. Moreover, the sequencing of large incre-
ments over that period is quite similar.
The possible influence of differences in police procedures and activities in
urban and non-urban areas on the trends was considered. Though detection
rates for several offence categories were substantially lower in Dublin than
elsewhere, such differences do not appear to threaten the meaningfulness of
comparing the trends for the three types of areas. Further, the abrupt shift at
the start of the new decade to lower detection levels was apparently a truly
national phenomenon. While that shift cannot be fully explained, its presence
in all three areas largely precludes any distortion of the changes recorded in
offence levels that could affect the comparisons I made.
If the evidence presented in this chapter on the extent of urban and rural
differences in the 1964-75 trends is apportioned between the two perspec-
tives, the weight added to the structural perspective is the more substantial.
The increases in crime levels were, by and large, reflected everywhere. There
was no consistency among the eight property crime indicators in which area
recorded the greatest increase. Dublin was the location for the greatest in-
creases in shopbreaking, larceny of motor vehicles, pedal cycle larceny, rob-
bery, and receiving stolen property. The four-cities had the most substantial
increases in housebreaking and larceny from vehicles, while the average value
of stolen property changed most dramatically in the non-urban areas. Both
the charts and the statistical analysis indicated that the Dublin trends often
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shared more characteristics with those in the non-urban areas than with what
occurred in the four-cities.
The trends for indictable assault do not produce a clearer differentiation
among the areas. In Dublin and the non-urban areas, the level of assault was
about two times greater in 1975; the increase in the four-cities was about four-
fold. The sequencing of those increases, however, does differ between urban
and non-urban areas, with the non-urban increases concentrated in the last
six years of the period and those in the urban areas evenly distributed. As in
the national trends, the urban/rural comparisons suggest that property crime
and person offences are responding to rather different influences. This
emerged quite clearly in the correlational analysis.
As a social problem, increasing crime rates cannot be isolated as urban-
based or even as Dublin-based. The consistency in trends, whether gauged
from charts or from correlations, is impressive, particularly for the major
forms of property crime, such as burglary and motor vehicle larceny.
Problems of law enforcement also do not appear to be markedly greater in
urban contexts. If the percentage of detections achieved is used to measure
success, then for most offences gardai outside of urban areas do not appear to
be at an advantage. Such differences as do exist, in which Dublin gardai ap-
pear at a disadvantage compared to their counterparts elsewhere, generally
have been diminishing since the mid-1960s. This has occurred through a
i
general lowering of the detection rate. However, it should be stressed that for
most offences it is a rate which remains quite high. The changes reflected in
the trends for detection rates, like those for offence levels, stress the common
experience since the mid-1960s in all areas, not the differences.
The stability over the 12 years in the distribution of known offences sug-
gests, but does not establish, that the geographical impact of economic and
social change on crime statistics in Ireland was diffuse rather than con-
centrated in cities. In other Western countries, crime statistics tended to in-
crease gradually through a lengthy series of annual increases and with a clear
sequence of first registering an impact in urban areas, an impact that was felt
considerably later in rural areas. The magnitude of the increases in Ireland
between 1964 and 1975 may be explicable on this basis. A transformation in
the extent and nature of officially recorded crime that in the United States
and in much of Europe was accomplished by gradual accretion, was in
Ireland crowded into little more than a decade. It was a transformation not
by stages but by one rapid step.
Chapter 6
Homicide and Social Change
Introduction
This chapter adapts the data on homicide, by far the most detailed and ac-
curate information available on crime in Ireland, to serve several purposes.
First, since garda statistics on the number of homicides that occurred in par-
ticular years and in particular areas are not susceptible to major problems of
under-reporting, it will be possible to measure more precisely than previously
the changes that have occurred in the level and location of violent crimes
against persons. Precision is further enhanced by the detail of the information
available on homicide: a full transformation of the homicide statistics into a
consistent series is possible. Such adjustments are not possible for other of-
fences, and as will be seen, the resulting changes in annual figures are sub-
stantial. Second, the wealth of information on the participants in, and the cir-
cumstances of, homicide incidents allows me to express the impact of social
change in terms of specific types of people and relationships. Hitherto the
analysis has been depersonalised, examining changes in aggregate statistics.
For homicide, it is possible to portray crime as an aspect of human behaviour.
This ability to move beyond aggregate levels and to cast off therestraints
imposed by the classifications and definitions used in producing the Report on
Crime derives from access to the complete files for all homicides recorded in
the 1950s and the 1970s. It was, therefore, possible to reconstruct the incident
itself and to select the information to be used for its description.
That freedom to reconstruct events has made police homicide files a major
resource for social historians. Violent death - in nineteenth-century
Philadelphia (Lane, 1979) or in Paris under the Directory (Cobb, 1978)- has
been used as a window on a particular era, a portrait of a social order. As
Lane (1979, p. 1) expresses the possibilities:
¯ . . the real subject is life, the living behaviour of thousands of
largely anonymous Philadelphians... Of many of these people, the
only record that remains is the.final entry: perhaps a story in the
paper, more surely a brief notation by some agent of the state of in-
formation incident to the way in which they died. The manner of
dying is, however, often a reflection of the manner of living, and
these largely unexplored records may provide much new informa-
tion about the changing conditions of ordinary life.
The use to be made of homicide data here is more modest. Characteristics of
individuals, both victims and offenders, will be used to link the social struc-
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tural changes outlined in Chapter 2 with the distribution of interpersonal
violence.
Though homicide is not being used in this study as a metaphor for a par-
ticular social structure, a claim is made that the level and the distribution of
homicide reflects those of violent assaultive crimes generally. It has been
shown in other countries that the demarcation between murder and assault is
highly fluid: motivation, intention, and action do not differ substantially in
most fatal incidents from those in which less serious injuries are inflicted
(Walker, 1968, p. 21 ; Zimring, 1972). A homicide is often an assault that suc-
ceeds. Where violence is widespread, a proportion of all incidents will result
in a death, and, therefore, in the recording of a murder or manslaughter in the
official crime statistics. The pattern of homicide in Ireland during the periods
of interest can be treated as a surrogate for interpersonal violence.
The first section of this chapter describes the data that have been collected
on homicide and the resulting trends in offence levels for the 1951 to 1975
period. In the second section, I return to some unfinished business from
Chapter 2: the development of an explanation of changes in levels and pat-
terns of crimes against persons that builds on the basic premise of the struc-
tural perspective. It is argued that the most important link between structural
change and interpersonal violence is the changes that occur in mechanisms
for conflict regulation. Various positions within a social structure - as defined
by occupations, regions, and age - can be anticipated to be conducive to
violence. Such positions have a potential for conflict in particular
relationships together with a set of resources and mechanisms to cope with it.
That perspective is applied in the third section of the chapter to conditions in
Ireland during the 1950s and 1970s, and the resulting expectations as to the
extent and nature of homicide are tested in the fourth section. In doing so, the
focus is on changes in the nature of homicide, particularly as expressed in the
age differences between victim and offender. The typology of homicide used
ranges from inter-generational to intra-generational.
Data on Homicide
On the first consideration, homicide seems a particularly tractable form of
crime, the finality of the victim’s death lending it to a definition absent from
other offence categories. This is not entirely true. The boundaries of the legal
offence of homicide are made ambiguous by the necessity of excluding in-
stances in which death was the result of negligence, and of making dis-
tinctions in terms of intention and motivation.
Traffic fatalities are thus excluded from the homicide data, except in the
rare instance in which a motor vehicle is used deliberately as an instrument of
death, as the person responsible lacks culpability. A special category, infan-
CRIME IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 119
ticide, was established under the Infanticide Act of 1949, in which the effects
of childbirth are assumed to mitigate in those instances in which a mother is
responsible for the death of a child less than one year old. It is excluded. This
leaves two basic categories of homicide on which this chapter will focus:
murder and manslaughter. Murder is killing with malice aforethought, with a
clear intention to harm. Where that intention was absent, or where provoca-
tion existed, the lesser offence of manslaughter can be used. The distinction
between murder and manslaughter is not an important one for the purposes
of this study, though obviously it is of considerable moment to a defendant.
The classification of manslaughter can only be used if a suspect has been
identified, and the decision as to the offence in which a prosecution will be
undertaken does not necessarily reflect differences among incidents that
would be of interest here.
Murders and manslaughters in which the victims are more than one year
old form the operational definition of homicide used here. Victims of car
bomb explosions, of whom there were five in 1973 and 33 in 1974, are ex-
cluded as their deaths are unlikely to prove revealing of the nature of
homicide within the intentions of this study. Victims of political assassina-
tions or sectarian killings are included. In any case, it would be impossible to
exclude them with certainty. Therefore, homicide constitutes all killings of
designated victims more than one year old. It is the death that creates the dis-
continuity between homicides and other assaults: "most violent attacks with
deadly weapons, whether fatal or non-fatal, are pursued with ambiguous
intentions as to whether the victim should die" (Zimring, 1972, p. 111 ).
Table 19 provides the numbers of homicides so defined that occurred in
each year between 1951 and 1975. The numbers are adjusted to reflect the
most up-to-date information available, which results in some instances to of-
fences listed in the Report on Crime as murder being treated here as man-
slaughter. All figures refer to calendar years. The most important adjustment,
however, is to standardise the unit of counting. The Report on Crime in the
years of interest has used two methods of counting the number of homicides.
In some years, the total is that of incidents, with one incident possibly sub-
suming several deaths; an alternative counting procedure is to enter a
homicide for each death, there being as many homicides as there were vic-
tims. It should also be noted that the numbers cited in Table 19 are instances
in which a homicide has officially been noted. The acquittal of a particular
defendant does not alter that classification.
The trend over the 25 years towards an increasing level of homicide is clear,
but it occurs erratically. That is perhaps inevitable given the small numbers
involved. When the change is expressed as averages, however, the upward
tendency becomes clear. In the 1950s, the average number of annual
120 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
homicides was 7.2, in the 1960s, 10.1, and for the six years 1970-75, 20.8.
The remainder of this chapteris devoted to a study of the homicides from
two distinct periods: (1) the ten years, 1951-60, and (2) the five years,
1970--74. A description will be given before the data analysis of the variables
that have been abstracted from the files on homicide.
Table 19. Incidence of homidde and infanticide 1#51-1975
Calendar Years
(s)
(1) (2) Homidde (4)
Tear Murder Manslaughter (1) + (2) InfanticideI
1951 02 03 05 03
1952 03 03 06 07
1953 08 07 15 05*
1954 02 01 03 02
1955 05 02 07 04
1956 03 03 06 01’
1957 06 02 08 06
1958 07 00 07 04
1959 07 01 08 02
1960 00 02 02 02
1961 09 04 13 03
1962 03 04 07 04
1963 05 02 07 01
1964 04 04 08 02
1965 09 07 16 01
1966 05 06 11 02
1967 09 03 12 01
1968 07 03 10 02
1969 09 06 15 01
1970 06 09 15 02
1971 12 07 19 02
1972 11 10 21 03
1973 18 08 26** 02
1974 09 11 20*** 00
1975 20 04 24 00
’Includes all murder and manslaughter victims aged one year and under.
*Excludes 5 victims of infanticide discovered in 1953 and treated in the
Report on Crime as one offence, the actual dates of death being unknown.
**Excludes 5 victims of car bomb explosions.
***Excludes 33 victims of car bomb explosions.
Homicide and Social Structure
The use of the concept of stress to mediate the impact of societal conditions
on the potential for violence of particular individuals or groups defines the
basic model for a structural approach to the study of violence. Within this ap-
proach, two ways of specifying the structuremstress--violence connection
can be identified. Both depend on the premise that a social structure has an
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associated distribution of stress and coping resources among the extant
demographic and class groupings.
In the first, and more familiar, formulation, stress is translated into subjec-
tive experience through a process by which individuals assess their "objec-
tive" conditions as constituting a state of "relative deprivation" (Henry and
Short, 1954; Wood, 1961; Coser, 1970). This line of argument is most convin-
cingly deployed in Wood’s (1961) study of homicide in post-colonial Ceylon
in which structural locations esteemed within the traditional ascribed status
system of caste, but disreputable within the now ascendant achieved status
system, are singled out as conducive to homicide.
The second view, within which stress is a potential property of certain roles
or relationships, focuses on the social links of killers to victims (Bohannan,
1960; Goode, 1973). In Bohannan’s (1960) study of African homicide, a pat-
tern of homicide reveals "points of stress" within a society; a homicide "in-
dicates the anomic state of the institution with which it is connected" (1960,
p. 235). He argues from an assessment of the state of the major institutional
orders that particular relationships are especially stress-laden. Because of the
nature of the institutions in which they are located, participants in those
relationships are most "at risk" as victims or as killers. The stress that is the
motivating force in this formulation has its ultimate reference at an individual
level, but Bohannan’s explanatory framework is at the structural level: struc-
tural factors increase or diminish the propensity to violence in a relationship.
This approach to the study of homicide, a fusion of a Durkheimian perspec-
tive on deviance with an anthropologist’s ethnographic research tradition, of-
fers a more appropriate base for the sociological study of violence than
"relative depi’ivation" theory.
Goode’s (1973) essay on violence among intimates contains a more
coherent theoretical specification of the structural antecedents to violence in
relationships. It allows us to replace Bohannan’s emphasis on the vague con-
cept of stress with a focus on the efficacy of institutionalised methods for cop-
ing with stress. Variation among structural locations in the possibilities for
avoiding and resolving disputes is given particular emphasis (Goode, 1973,
pp. 184-187). Structural locations differ in the ranges of satisfactions and
pleasures that are available, as well as in the availability of non-violent tech-
niques for conflict resolution. In the African tribes Bohannan studied, a
category of social relationships could be abstracted for study, and its propen-
sity to stress considered; in an industrial society the potential for violence is
not intrinsic to a type of relationship but rather assumes a value determined
by the structural locations of the participants. At each structural location the
intensity of conflict among the participants in a type of relationship, together
with the mitigating influence of the available coping resources, yields the
potential for violence associated with that type of relationship.
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Where mutually understood rules and symbols contain hostilities, threats
and even blows may be exchanged without necessarily endangering the sur-
vival of the parties to a conflict or of their relationship. It is when the level of
stress within a relationship exceeds the capacity of institutionalised coping
procedures that injury and death become real potentials. To the extent that
conflict is successfully institutionalised, clearly defined "termination points"
to episodes of conflict, or to ~eries of such episodes, are operative (Coser,
1970, pp. 37-51). Therefore, to adopt Goode’s approach is not to equate con-
flict with pathology. As Simmel (1923/1955, p. 17) observed: "A certain
amount of discord, inner divergence and outer controversy, is organically tied
up with the very elements that ultimately hold the group together; it cannot
be separated from the unity of the sociological structure". As a static theory,
the argument treating violence as a property of types of relationship can be
summarised as follows: structural inequalities are concomitant with a dis-
tribution of conflict potential and conflict regulation mechanisms that shape
the pattern of homicide at particular structural locations. At any structural
location, relationships where conflict cannot be institutionally regulated will
be over-represented in the incidence of homicide. That over-representation
should give each structural location a distinctive pattern of age differences
between victims and offenders, with homicides varying on a dimension of
inter-generational to intra-generational.
To employ this formulation in the study of change requires identification of
those locations and relationships experiencing the most substantial alteration
in levels of conflict and in modes of conflict regulation. First, the pervasive
structural changes of the period in question must be delineated; then it is pos-
sible to assess the implications of change for basic categories of relationship in
terms of the ability to control conflict. Though only the rudiments of a theory,
this provides a procedure for studying homicide in periods of social change.
By applying that procedure to Ireland during the last quarter century, a
preliminary .assessment of its efficacy can be made.
A Perspective on Irish Homicide
Two periods, the 1950s and the 1970s, have been singled out for study.
These can be described as periods of secondary social change in Ireland dur-
ing which institutions and roles adjusted to major disjunctures in social struc-
ture. The impact of structural change in each period can be construed in
terms of differences established between urban and rural areas, between oc-
cupational categories, and between regions. An assessment of the effects of
structural change on conflict potential and conflict regulation will be made
for three broad categories of relationship - family, acquaintance, and stranger
- which will be further differentiated in the course of the exposition.
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During the 1940s a rapid decline in agricultural employment, without a
compensating expansion in service or industrial employment, ensured that
the consequences of structural change during the 1950s were more acute in
rural than in urban areas. It was the small farmers of Connacht and West
Munster - the western region - who were most detrimentally affected. Other
regions had, for some time, been gradually adapting to the dictates of com-
mercial agriculture, but until the late 1940s the western region manifested the
demographic and economic characteristics of a peasant socio-cultural system
(Hannan, 1979; Hannan and Hardiman, 1978). The poorest farmers in that
region had the highest marriage and replacement rates in rural Ireland; their
marriage and inheritance decisions were not governed by the economic
evaluations that prevailed elsewhere. This distinctiveness disappeared in the
1950s when, in the course of massive depopulation through emigration, the.
region’s population became a residual, post-peasant class, its members
marginal in every sense: elderly, poor, geographically and socially isolated.
What impact did this process of marginalisation have on conflict and the ef-
ficacy of conflict management in major categories of relationships? A com-
parison of the picture of the rural community presented by Arensberg and
Kimball for the 1930s with that offered by more recent ethnographers
(Leyton, 1966; Messenger, 1968) and by Hannan’s (1978; 1979) survey of
farm families highlights the likely changes. These studies, while speaking"
most directly to rural areas in the west, indicate trends broadly applicable to
the more prosperous farming regions of the east and midlands.
The most influential view of Irish peasant life, derived largely from
Arensberg and Kimball’s (1940) ethnography, emphasises consensus and
co-operation to the virtual exclusion of conflict. A high potential for stress
in family relationships is acknowledged, but it is countered by the presence of
an effective system of stress management. The potential is understandable:
relationships most prone to conflict, those involving property rights and
authority, were solidly embedded in the family. Dependence of children on
their parents - and particularly of sons upon their fathers - extended into late
middle age. Recognising the latent violence, Synge (1907/1964) made the
tension between generations the theme of The Playboy of the Western World, and
thus marked patricide as the archetypical rural Irish murder; Gibbon (1973,
p. 490) asserts that inter-generational conflict figures in nearly every serious
fictional description of rural Ireland published in the past 50 years.
Similar distributions of stress amo_ng relationships were found by Leyton
(1966) during the 1960s in a Northern Ireland village and by Messenger
(1968) in a west of Ireland community. In both studies, the potential for con-
flict was judged to be high in relationships between relatives. But where the
potential was greatest - among those related through the paternal line - overt
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conflict was rare. In general, conflict between relatives took the form of verbal
arguments or the severance of contact; attempts to injure were confined to
rare disputes between non-kin. Despite the potential for conflict in the
traditional community, "it seemed possible to contain the inevitable tensions
resulting from the very high rate of postponed adulthood, non-marriage, and
the persistent subservience of women and older sons" (Hannan and Kat-
siaouni, 1977, p. 2). Conflict regulation in this view occurs at the level of the
interdependent community through shared ideals for the conduct of interper-
sonal relationships, and at the family level through the possibilities for
avoidance and withdrawal offered by extreme role differentiation. But such
mechanisms of conflict regulation may only be viable in the insular
traditional village.
The dependence of the rural economy on the fulfilment of mutual as-
sistance obligations makes neighbourhood acquaintance a particularly
significant relationship in rural areas. At the same time, the economic and
symbolic importance attached to land proprietorship makes trespassing,
rights of way, and grazing rights potent sources of contention between
neighbours. Contrary to the claim that it is "occasional, superficial and un-
structured" (Leyton, 1966, p. 541) it can be argued that acquaintanceship in
rural areas (in contrast to urban areas) is likely to involve individuals as
"whole persons", to use Simmel’s (1923/1955, p. 44) phrase. Likewise, the
proposal that stress and conflict are controlled by the "villagers’ clear
awareness of the consequences for group relations of open disputes between
non-kin" (Leyton, 1966, p. 54) needs to be balanced by a recognition that the
dissolution of the peasant-system reduced the effectiveness of shared ideals.
While contact with strangers remained infrequent and disinterested, acquain-
tanceship was subject to considerable stress in marginal rural areas.
To derive a set of expectations as to patterns of conflict in rural Ireland dur-
ing the 1950s is not then a straightforward matter. The inter-generational
balance of the population was drastically altered by emigration - of farm
children, only one-twentieth of the girls and one-fifth of the boys stayed in
their native localities (Hannan and Katsiaouni, 1977, p. 26). But the very in-
trusion ofchange into a stagnant system acted to intensify the potential for
conflict between the young who remained and the older generation who
retained control over land and farming practices. Coser’s (1970, p. 79) more
general observation succintly expressed the tension involved:
The breakdown of tradition creates in the young two seemingly
contradictory expectations: the fear that the gradual advancement
in the age hierarchy is put into question, and the hope that it is no
longer necessary to wait the requisite number of years for the
rewards of maturity.
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In marginal rural areas, therefore, inter-generational homicide is expected to
be strongly represented.
Within this larger picture, long-term adjustments to changing role expecta-
tions within families began in the 1950s to affect patterns of interspousal ac-
commodation. Withdrawal and avoidance were no longer adequate since
adherence to traditional role definitions would itself lead to alienation
between spouses (Hannan and Katsiaouni, 1977; Hannan, 1978). Moreover,
to the extent that institutionalisation of conflict regulation is difficult when
one participant in the relationship maintains the old rules while the other
honours the new, the management of conflict was less likely to be successful.
Though the full impact of these changes would not be felt until the 1970s,
during the earlier period a relatively high level of intra-generational family
homicide is to be expected.
As was noted in Chapter 2, during the 1950s, the distinctive pattern of Irish
rural to urban migration blunted the impact on cities of rural change.
Emigration absorbed the bulk of those dislocated by farm mechanisation,
while migrants to Irish cities, and in particular to the capital, were primarily
drawn from the rural middle class. By the 1960s the locus of structural change
had shifted decisively to urban areas. A policy of industrialisation initiated in
1958 transformed occupational structure and moved major institutional ar-
rangements toward the pattern of the advanced capitalist societies. Changes
in the distribution of conflict potential among relationships followed this
momentum, and it was in the cities that the logic of these changes was worked
out most completely. Industrialisation, like farm mechanisation,
marginalised a large section of the labour force. Unskilled manual workers,
whose position had always been tenuous, found themselves competing for a
diminishing pool of available jobs. The safety valve of emigration deferred the
full consequences for a time, but, increasingly, a social welfare poor, depen-
dent on state transfer payments as their primary source of income, was
formed.
More broadly, industrialisation accentuated changes incipient in the 1950s
in the conflict potential of relationships. As property and authority became
less exclusively linked to the family, an enlarged set of relationships - per-
sonal friends, neighbours, work or business acquaintances -developed a
propensity for conflict. Further, the very density of urban population in-
creases the frequency of casual interpersonal encounters. Acquaintanceship,
which in traditional communities was a relationship between "whole per-
sons", is increasingly defined by a coincidence of one or a few common in-
terests or characteristics. A reciprocity of conflict potential and conflict con-
trol seems to exist in such relationships; but the more superficial the
relationship the less institutionalised is the conflict.
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Sociological or anthropological research on urban Ireland is sparse in con-
trast to that available for rural areas. Two studies, however, are directly rele-
vant to the issues discussed here. The level of serious injury from interper-
sonal violence in urban areas during the 1970s is very low by international
standards (Rottman, 1976). Nevertheless, O’Neill’s (1971, pp. 487-488)
observational research in a Dublin working class neighbourhood suggests
that the characteristics of participants in such violent incidents as do occur
conform to the pattern found elsewhere: they are young men of working class
backgrounds. A high level of conflict potential is present, and frequently leads
to violence, but conflict is largely confined to a highly institutionalised group
context (O’Neill, 1971, pp. 485-486; 491-492). The possibility of serious in-
jury being inflicted is therefore substantial only in the less frequent conflicts
among strangers and slight acquaintances. For this reason urban homicide in
the 1970s is expected to be predominantly intra-generational, the young vic-
tims and offenders sharing similar marginal backgrounds.
By the 1970s, the complexities involved in successfully maintaining family
relationships in urban areas had greatly increased. In part this stems from an
accentuation in urban centres of trends, identified as incipient in rural areas
during the 1950s, that diversify the potential flashpoints for family conflict.
Mistreatment, for example, of a wife by her husband is less likely to be pas-
sively endured, either by her or by sons and daughters; alliances between
family members become more likely. An increased involvement of women in
family conflict is implied, but the major consequence is that the ability to
regulate conflict increasingly depends on a family’s class position. Those in
marginal structural locations are least equipped with the material and inter-
personal resources needed to deal with the new complexities.
The diminution of the conflict potential within families through the
transfer of property and authority relationships to other contexts, the chang-
ing content of the acquaintance relationship, and the increased contact
among strangers are the clearest contrasts between the 1950s and the 1970s.
It is expected that homicide will, as a result, shift from predominantly inter-
generational to intra-generational. That expectation emerges when farmers in
the west region are used to typify homicide in the 1950s and the marginal
working class to typify homicide in the 1970s. In each period, the residents of
the selected location were the most affected by structural change. However,
differences between the two periods did not emerge through one set of struc-
tural pressures and relationships superseding another as conducive to
homicide. Rather a gradual superimposition of new situations occurred.
These new situations were mainly urban, for it was there that change in the
1960s and early 1970s was concentrated. In rural areas, though the process of
accommodation to a transformed agricultural structure occurred-over
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decades, the major dislocations were experienced in the 1950s. And if this is
correct, then the contrast between the decades ought primarily to reflect
emergent patterns of urban homicide.
These expectations will be tested using data on 169 homicides that occur-
red in 1951-60 and in 1970-74. Of those 169 victims, some were attacked by
more than one offender, where the term "offender" denotes a person formally
identified by the gardai as responsible for an offence. Given this study’s pre-
occupation with the relationship between victims and offenders, it is neces-
sary to allow for homicides with multiple offenders. This is accomplished by
compiling the data for use in two formats - on the basis of victims and on the
basis of offender-victim pairs. Curtis (1974) discusses the analytic rationale
and implications of this approach, which allows for the use of either format
according to the research question being considered. The 67 homicides dur-
ing the 1950s involve 72 offender-victim pairs; the 102 homicides identified for
the 1970s involve 127 such pairs. The proportion of multi-offender homicide is
considerably greater in the 1970s.
Regional, urban/rural, occupational and relationship classifications,
together with the contrast of the two time periods, form the working
framework for the analysis. The data for the variables listed below were com-
piled from information supplied by the Garda Siochana from their files, sup-
plemented, where necessary, from contemporary newspaper reports of inci-
dents and legal proceedings (The Irish Times, various issues).
Region: four regions were derived primarily from the demographic studies
cited above (Hannan, 1979; Hannan and Hardiman, 1978). As well as the
contrasting east and west regions already discussed, there is a demo-
graphically intermediate South Region with prosperous farming areas, and a
residual Midlands/Border Region, demographically and economically dis-
tinct. The accompanying map shows the composition of these regions.
Urban~Rural Context: four categories form an urban/rural dimension that
ranges from "urban centres" to "villages, open country". The first category
includes the five major urban centres: Dublin, Cork, Waterford, Limerick,
and Galway. Cities over 10,000 in population form the next category along
the dimension, followed by towns with populations between 500 and 9,999.
All remaining areas are defined as "villages, open country".
Occupation: a five-category modified Hall-Jones scale was developed to allow
both isolation of particular groups and comparability with the occupational
data contained in the Census of Population. The five categories used in the
analysis are: farmers and agricultural workers, white collar workers, routine
non-manual occupations, skilled manual workers, unskilled and semi-skilled
manual workers (including casual labourers).
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Relationship: four relationship categories - kin, spouse, acquaintance, stranger
- are used. All relatives, other than spouses, are included in the first category.
Acquaintanceship is broadly defined to comprise non-kin relationships of any
duration.
Analysis
The first question addressed in the data analysis is the extent to which dif-
ferences between the two decades can be identified. Table 20 assigns the
homicides in each decade to the regional and urban/rural contexts in which
they occurred, with the resulting distribution compared to that expected if the
distribution were to correspond precisely to that of the general population. In
the 1950s, expected and observed distributions coincide: the majority of both
the population and the homicides were rural and the regional distribution of
homicides mirrors that of the population. Comparisons are less straight-
forward in the 1970s. Homicides in that period under-represent rural areas
and over-represent the urban centres, while more homicides occur in the east
region and fewer in the west and south regions than a random distribution
would predict. The prevalance of homicides of all types, therefore, is more
clearly implicated in structural differences in the 1970s than in the 1950s, and
the growth in incidence can be attributed to urban areas. However, chi
square tests do not allow rejection of the null hypothesis that the observed fre-
quencies of homicide are distributed in accordance with the population.
Table 21 examines the incidence of homicide by the four major categories
of relationship. In the 1950s, 35.4 per cent of all homicides were within the
family and 7.7 per cent involved people who could be described as strangers.
The corresponding figures for the 1970s are 24.4 per cent and 23.5 per cent.
The broadly defined category of "acquaintance" accounts for over one half of
all homicide relationships in both periods. The differences are less marked
when the homicide relationship is described on the basis of the sexes of the of-
fender and of the victim. Table 22 shows a slight increase in the incidence of
men killing other men and a comparable decrease of incidents in which men
kill women. Men were held to be responsible for 91.3 per cent of all homicides
in the 1950s and 93.5 per cent of all homicides in the 1970s; but incidents in
which women killed men were more common in the 1970s than in the 1950s.
While Tables 21 and 22 contrast the two decades, the differences present
within each period in the distribution of types of homicide among contexts are
ignored. Thus, a second question must be asked before the impact of struc-
tural change can be assessed: to what extent do categories of relationship and
the sex of victims and offenders differ between urban and rural areas? Given
the small number of cases recorded during the 1950s, the use of percentages
requires caution; both the percentages and the actual numbers will be given.
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Table 20: Expected and observed distributions of homiddes by urban~rural and regional
classifications
(based on number of victims)
1950s 1970s
Urban~Rural Expected Observed Expected Observed
per cent per cent
Urban centres 28.6 25.8
Cities 4.4 8.6
Towns 11.8 12.1
Villages 55.3 53.4
100.0"* 100.0
(N =58)
Chi square -- 2.40
Region Expected Observed
per cent per cent
East 32.3 34.3
West 23.0 20.9
South 29.7 32.8
Midlands/border 15.0 12.0
per cent per cent
34.9 41.6
5.4 3.0
16.4 21.8
43.4 33.7
100.0 100.0
(N = 101 )
100.0 100.0
(N =67)
Chi square = 0.88
Chi square = 6.40*
Expected Observed
per cent per cent
38.2 46.1
19.4 12.7
29.4 23.5
13.0 17.7
100.0 100.0
(N = 102)
Chi square = 6.84*
*Statistically significant at .10 level, 3 d.f. (.05 level~. 7.8; .10 level ~ 6.3)
**Deviations from 100.0 per cent are due to rounding errors.
For the 1950s, of the 21 urban homicides - defined by combining the "urban
centres" and the "cities" - one-third (7 of 21) were within families and 52.4
per cent (11 of 21) were between acquaintances. In the same period 34.2 per
cent (13 of 38) of rural homicides were within families and 63.2 per cent (24 of
38) between acquaintances. For the 1970s, 18.2 per cent (10 of 54) of the
urban homicides were within families and 47.3 per cent (26 of 54) among ac-
quaintances. Rural homicides in the 1970s were within families in 29.7 per
cent (19 of 64) of all identifiable victim-offender pairs and between acquain-
tances in 56.3 per cent (36 of 64) of all pairs.
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Table 21: Victim~offender relationships: 7950s and 7970s
(based on victim/ offender pairs) *
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Relationship 7950s 1970s
Kin
Spouse
Acquaintance
Stranger
per cent per cent
24.6 18.5
10.8 5.9
56.9 52.1
7.7 23.5
100.0 100.0
(N --- 65) (N = 119)
*Rounding errors explains totals not equal to 100.0 per cent; the number of cases in a decade
varies between tables according to data availability.
Table 22: Sex of offender by sex of victim: 7950s and 7970s
(based on victim/offender pairs)
Offender/Victim 1950s 7970s
Male-Male
Male-Female
Female-Male
Female-Female
per cent per cent
62.3 69.1
29.0 24.4
2.9 4.1
5.8 2.4
100.0 100.0
(N = 69) (N = 123)
Family homicides, therefore, formed the same proportion of all homicides
in urban and rural areas in the 1950s. By the 1970s that proportion had
declined for both types of areas, but the more marked decline in urban areas
results in a substantial urban/rural difference. In each period, the victim was
the offender’s spouse in seven of the homicide relationships. And in both
periods six of those seven homicides were rural. The incidence of spouse kill-
ings was far greater in rural than in urban areas in both periods, and rural
family homicides were concentrated in husband-wife relationships.
In the 1950s, a woman was the victim of 8 of 23 urban and 15 of 41 rural
homicides -just under one-third in both cases. This contrasts with the situa-
tion in the 1970s when 31.9 per cent (22 of 69) of the rural, but only 21.1 per
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cent (12 of 57) of urban offender-victim pairs involved a female victim. In
sum, differentiation among locations in the incidence of homicide and in the
nature of the victim-offender relationship was less marked in the 1950s than
in the 1970s.
The extent of differentiation in the ages of those identified as victims and of-
fenders is the next issue. The average ages of victims and offenders in both
periods are given separately in Table 23 for the major relationship, regional,
urban-rural, and occupational categories. In the 1950s the age of the victim
varies across categories while the average offender age is constant. Victims are
considerably older, on average, in the west region, outside of the urban
centres, and among farmers. The result is a clear pattern in those locations of
inter-generational homicide. For example, in the west region the average age
of victims (55.7 years) is higher and the average age of offenders (31. I years)
lower than in other regions. A low average victim age in the east region, in the
urban centres, and among semi and unskilled manual workers makes intra-
generational homicide characteristic of these locations. For the relationship
categories being examined, distinctive average ages of victims make homicide
appear to be predominantly intra-generational within families and inter-
generational in other contexts.
Victims in the 1970s are older in the west region, in the rural areas, and
among farmers, than in other locations: the pattern of inter-generational
homicide persists. A less emphatic tendency to inter-generational homicide in
other contexts is manifest in an overall trend toward younger offenders in the
1970s, and in an increase in the east region and in the urban areas in the
average victim age. For example, the average victim age in the east region in
the 1970s is 36. I years; that of the offender is 25.8 years. While the use here of
the label "inter-generational" is an overstatement, the clear pattern of intra-
generational homicide found in the 1950s for those locations is no longer iden-
tifiable.
Given that the age structures of the four regions are not equivalent, the west
region population being particularly weighted toward the elderly, the per-
suasiveness of the regional differences in victim ages, shown in Table 23, is
contingent on the age structures of the respective regional sub-populations. In
Table 24 the average age of victims is juxtaposed to that of the general pop-
ulation in each region and. ratios are derived. This procedure confirms and
clarifies the established pattern of regional differences. Not only are victims in
the west region older than elsewhere, but the average victim age exceeds that
of the population to a substantially greater extent than in other regions. The
victim-population age ratios of 1.61 in the 1950s and 1.48 in the 1970s for the
west region contrast markedly with those for the east region, where victim
and population ages are nearly equivalent.
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t950s                        t970s
Victims Offenders Victims Offenders
Relationship:
1 Family 36.7 34.1 41.6 30.2
(29.8/14) (12.2/14) (28.4/21) (8.6/22)
2 Spouse 39.4 42.9 50.3 52,3
(16.1/7) (18.4/7) (12.5/7) (11.6/7)
3 Acquaintance 43.5 33.8 37.2 27.3
(19.2/31) (16.1/35) (21.7/49) (11.6/62)
4 Stranger 49.6 27.8 38.2 23,8
(23.2/5) (3.3/5) (21.0/17) (7.0/27)
Region:
1 East 31.5 34.1 36.1 25.8
(17.9/22) (12.4/23) (22.4/47) (9.6/61)
2 West 55.7 31.1 52.8 30.1
(19.6/13) (15.6/14) (24.3/13) (17.0/14)
3 South 45.1 31.4 39.6 29.8
(23.0/20) (12.8/17) (23.1/24) (12.8/25)
4 Midlands/border 45.7 42.8 40.5 31.5
(18.2/7) (20.4/10) (23.0/18) (12.0/23)
Context:
1 Urban centres 28.7 32.0 38.4 25.2
(23.3/15) (8.4/17) (22.8/42) (8.3/53)
2 Cities 50.4 38.2 37.0 20.3
(29.0/5) (19.3/5) (26.1/3) (2.5/3)
3 Towns 45.6 31.2 36.5 27.8
(22.6/7) (16.0/6) (24.0/22) (11.5/26)
4 Villages 47.7 36.4 43.2 33.0
(17.0/29) (16.7/30) (23.4/34) (14.7/40)
Occupation:
1 Farming 51.5 36.7 49.8 35.8
(15.3/24) (17.2/24) (22.7/20) (15.6/17)
2 White Collar 39.9 45.2 44.2 30.1
(25.7/7) (10.5/5) (24.3/10) (9.5/7)
3 Non-Manual 37.4 32.3 42.0 33.3
(27.7/8) (15.2/6) (23.1/23) (15.3/14)
4 Skilled 39.0 36.5 27.7 28.2
(19.7/3) (12.2/6) (18.3/16) (9.5/24)
5 Semi/Unskilled 28.4 30.5 31.2 24.5
(18.0/15) (10.9/14) (18.7/23) (9.9/49)
Sex of Victim:
1 Male 43.0 34.3 36.7 27.1
(21.0/39) (15.0/41) (20.8/70) (10.2/90)
2 Female 41.8 33.6 46.7 31.2
(23.2/23) (14.9/23) (26.7/32) (15.1/33)
Grand Mean: 42.5 34.1 39.8 28.2
(21.6/62) (14.9/64) (23.2/102) (11.8/123)
*Numbers in parentheses represent (standard deviation/number of cases).
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Table 24: Regional variation in victim age: ratios of average victim and average popula-
tion ages
1950s                        1970s
Victim Population           Victim Population
Region          Average Average    Ratio    Average Average    Ratio
East 31.5 31.4 1.00 36.1 30.9 1.17
West 55.7 34.7 1.61 52.8 35.6 1.48
South 45.1 33.6 1.34 39.6 33.0 1.20
Midlands/
Border 45.7 34.0 1.34 40.5 34.3 1.18
Table 23 reveals regional, urban/rural, and occupational differences in the
average ages of victims and offenders for both the 1950s and 1970s. But the
complexities of differences in average ages, both within and between decades,
revealed in Table 23 cannot be resolved without further analysis. It is neces-
sary to examine how the various dimensions combine to affect victim and of-
fender ages, and to consider the manner in which relationship categories are
implicated in differences among structural location categories. Multiple
regression using dummy variables is the method of analysis adopted.
Formally, the issue is whether the mean age of offender and the mean age of
victim vary significantly with regional, urban/rural, and occupational
categories.
A dummy variable is a category of a nominal or ordinal variable treated as
a separate variable. In the present analysis, regional location will, therefore,
be treated as four dummy variables. For each observation, the region in which
the homicide occurred is assigned a value of one; the other three regions are
assigned the value zero. In carrying out the analysis, one category is omitted:
it forms the reference by which the metric (unstandardised) regression coef-
ficients obtained for the other categories can be interpreted. For example, in
Table 25 the "midlands~border region" category is omitted from the equa-
tions and the first column of the table indicates that, when the type of
relationship between victim and offender is controlled for, the mean age of of-
fenders in the east region is five years less than that for offenders in the
midlands/border region. The coefficient is the years to be added to or sub-
tracted from the reference category to derive the mean for the category at is-
sue. The choice of omitted category is arbitrary.
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Table 25 presents the additive effects on offender age of the four major in-
dependent variables: relationship, region, urban/rural context, and occupa-
tion. The results take the form of nine equations, run separately for each
decade, using various combinations of the predictors. Each column represents
an equation. In examining these equations, the main concerns are to identify
the best predictors, examine their stability when used jointly with other
predictors, and to find the overall predictive ability of the variables. For a
period, the multiple regression equations predict the ages of offenders in each
homicide, based on what is known about the location of the homicide, the
relationship the victim’ had to the offender, and the occupational group of the
offender. The metric coefficients in Table 25 therefore, can be interpreted as
the average age of offenders in a particular category of an independent variable
- say, for all homicides in the east region - controlling for all other indepen-
dent variables entered into that particular equation.
Table 25: Regression results: additive effects (metric coefficients) on the ages of
offenders, 7950s and f970s
Relationship:
1 Kin
2 Spouse
3 Acquaintance
4Stranger
Region:
1 East
2West
3South
4Midlands/border
Context:
1 Urban centre
2 Cities
3 Towns
4 Villages
Occupation:
1 Farming
2 White collar
3 Non-manual
4Skilled manual
5 Semi/unskilled
manual
1950s
7.5 8.0 6.0 3.7 6.6 8.2
13.6 15.1 11.5 8.2 14.0 15.1
4.6 7.6 4.5 1.6 6.1 6.9
--5.0 --14.7"
--14.1"
--6.5 --12.4
--13.8
--8.6
--16.8"
--18.4"
--5..1
--3.4
--6.5
--0.8 2.7
--5.5
--6.0 --6.9
--3.9
5.8 5.2 3.5 6.3
12.4 14.4 13.3 13.8
--3.9 --2.4
--3.6 --4.6
8.9 5.0 8.5 8.6
Constant 35.0 30.2 26.3 42.2 27.4 27.8 49.5 38.7 31.4
R2 .10    .10    .16    .27    .19    .06    .14    .04    .12
N 50     50    50    50     50     50     50     50     50
continued on next page
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Table 25 continued.
Relationska’p :
1 Kin
2Spouse
3Acquaintance
4Stranger
Region:
1 East
2West
3South
4Midlands/border
Context:
1 Urban centre
2Cities
3 Towns
4 Villages
Occupation:
1 Farming
2 White collar
3 Non-manual
4 Skilled manual
5 Semi/unskilled
manual
1970s
6.5* 7.4* 4.3 4.5 6.8* 6.5*
28.6* 30.2* 26.8* 26.7* 29.9* 28.6*
3.9 4.2 2.2 2.7 3.9 3.6
--7.5* -6.3* --7.2*
--2.3 -3.2 -0.6
--4.3
--3.6 --2.5
--7.3*
-6.4* -8.8*
--12.6" -10.0"
-13.4
-9.6* -9.6* -5.0
9.6* 7.9* 3.1 il.0"
1.5 2.4 2.2 5.9
4.5 4.6 3.8 8.5*
4.0 2.7 4.2 3.4
Constant 28.5 28.7 22.0 26.4 26.4 23.7 32.8
Rz .35* .40" .36* .39* .42* .29* .07
N 108    108    108    108    108    108    108
33.9 24.8
.11"    .12"
108    108
*Denotes metric coefficients that exceed twice their standard error and R2s
statistically significant at .05 level.
Average offender age does not vary significantly among locations in the
1950s; in the 1970s, however, strong and consistent effects are readily iden-
tifiable.The only unambiguous association of offender age in the earlier
period is with regional effects,but these do not differentiate the west region
from the east or south regions. In contrast, in the 1970s all three locational
variables and relationship are associated with offender age. In kinship, and
especially spousal relationships, offenders are significantly older than
elsewhere. The same is true when farmers are compared to non-farmers.
Significantly, younger offenders are found in the east region and in urban
areas generally during the 1970s. The explained variances in the 1950s,
however, are not statistically significant, while those in the 1970s generally
are.
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Most of the coefficients remain stable across equations within each decade.
The only real exception is the effect of farming in the 1970s - it does not re-
main significant when entered in the same equation as urban/rural context.
Overall, the predictors appear to be relatively independent; each location
variable has a moderate relationship to offender age, and in the 1970s par-
ticularly these effects cumulatively explain a substantial proportion of the
variance in offender age.
In Table 26 which gives the additive effects for victim age, the predictive
power of structural location is stronger in the 1950s than in the 1970s. The six
equations shown for each decade do not include relationship as a predictor:
the analysis is based on victims and where multiple offenders are involved it is
not always possible to associate one type of relationship with a victim. For the
1950s, statistically significant effects are associated with urban/rural loca-
tion, occupation and region. Victims in urban centres are younger than
elsewhere and the farmers among the victims are older. While the oc-
cupational difference appears to be the stronger of the two effects, the
urban/non-urban difference cannot be attributed solely to the situation of
farmers. Together, the three regional categories explain a statistically signifi-
cant 16 per cent of the variance in victim age, with victims in the west region
considerably older than those elsewhere and victims in the east region
younger. These effects are essentially duplicated in the 1970s, though in the
later period only the effects of occupation are statistically significant.
The overall explained variance is satisfactory in both periods: for the 1950s
urban/rural context and occupation explain 34 per cent of the variance in vic-
tim age, and in the 1970s region and occupation explain 21 per cent of the
variance. However, while the predictors appear to be independent in the
1950s, they are less so in the 1970s where the dominance of the occupational
category of farming over other effects is clear. Overall, the explained variances
in the 1970s are unsatisfactory, with only two of the six equations having
statistically significant R2s.
All of the regression results presented thus far were based on additive ef-
fects. But if the effect of categories of relationship on the ages of victims and
offenders varies with structural location, with a relationship category under
more stress in some locations than others, it is necessary to consider interac-
tion effects. To test for the presence of interaction, each category used in the
preceding analysis was treated as a dichotomised variable. For example, the
category "west region" was multiplied by each of the three relationship
categories. The result was a multiple regression equation with seven predic-
tors: the three relationship categories, the west region category, and the three
multiplicative interaction terms. Then, the predictive ability of the equation
was contrasted with that of an equation using only the four original dummy
Table 26: Regression results: additive (metric coefficients) on the ages of victims: 1950s and 1970s
1950s 1970s
Relationship:
1 Kin
2 Spouse
3 Acquaintance
4 Stranger
Region:
1 East
2West
3 South
4 Midlands/border
Context:
1 Urban centre
2 Cities
3 Town
4 Villages
Occupation:
1 Farming
2White collar
3Non-manual
4Skilled manual
5 Semi/unskilled
manual
-2.8 -3.9 -9.1
15.9 10.8 14.5
7.3 4.4 2.1
-15.8" -11.2 -19.6"
--1.3 0.9
-14.8
-3.2 10.5
-1.6
20.0* 25.0* 25.4*
12.8 15.2 14.4
7.4 15.4 11.9
16.7 26.3 21.5
Constant 42.0 26.8 26.3 41.5 47.1 25.5
R2 .25 .29*    .34*    .16"    .17"    .24*
N 52 52     52     52     52     52
-3.4 -4.9
-5.4
18.7 13.0 16.0
-0.9 -1.8 -1.8
--2.8 3.7 --6.6
--26.3
-5.5 -21.4
-4.2 3.2
-7.6
16.4" 21.8" 20.1"
15.0 13.9 14.5
12.6" 12.1 12.4
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CRIME IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 139
variables and an F-test was used to compare the two equations. Where the
difference in explained variance is statistically significant, the correct
specification of the association between type of relationship and the age
variable is interactive: it depends on the structural location within which it
occurs.
Tests for interaction were made separately for the two decades, using age of
victim, age of offender, and the victim-offender age difference as the depen-
dent variables. Only one test identified a statistically significant interaction
effect: the effect of relationship on age differences in the 1950s varies across
the regions. With the interaction terms included, the three relationship
categories and the west region category explain 33.1 per cent of the variance
in age difference; without the four interaction terms they explain 21.5 per cent
of that variance. The difference is statistically significant at the .05 level (F =
4.91, d.f. = 2,55).
Discussion
In taking stock of the results, important differences emerge in the incidence
and nature of homicide between the two decades and in each decade between
locations. These differences, by and large, though by no means entirely, con-
form to the expected pattern.
A clear pattern of diversification of types of homicide emerged when the
1970s were contrasted with the 1950s. Regional, urban/rural, occupational,
and relationship differences were slight within the 1950s, but marked within
the 1970s. The only major exceptions to this were age differences and the in-
cidence of spouse killings. The basic trends separating the two decades ap-
pear to be the diminishing importance of family homicide, an increasing
proportion of homicides involving strangers, and a greater incidence of
homicides in which women kill men. However, since rural homicide is essen-
tially the same in both periods, the differences found between the 1950s and
1970s can be attributed to changes that occurred in urban areas.
Though age differences between victims and offenders do vary
systematically in response to the major categories of relationship and to struc-
tural inequalities, the effect is not to create a clear shift from inter-
generational to intra-generational homicide. Rather, marginal locations
within each decade were marked by distinctive types of homicide. Two dis-
tinct patterns could be isolated for the 1950s. First, the expected pattern of
inter-generational homicide emerged clearly for the west region and, more
generally, for rural areas and farmers. The primacy of inter-generational
homicide in those locations, however, cannot be attributed to conflict within
families; family conflict was reflected in the homicide data, but largely in the
form of spouse killings. Secondly, offender age did not vary across locations
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¯ during the 1950s, but a distinctive pattern of intra-generational homicide was
evident in the low average victim age associated with marginal urban loca-
tions.
The impact of marginal locations is still evident in the 1970s. Rural
homicides, and those in the west region, replicate the patterns of the 1950s.
The only clear distinction between decades for the rural areas is the increase
in the average ages of victims and offenders involved in spouse killings,
perhaps reflecting the problems experienced by traditional families adjusting
to new expectations. That 35.7 per cent of rural homicides and 26.7 per cent
of urban homicides had a female victim suggests the differences that have
been created in the sources of conflict and the bases of conflict management
for urban and rural areas. In the 1970s, no clear pattern of urban homicide
can be selected; diversity is its defining characteristic. AS would be expected,
given the concentration of structural change in those locations during the
years of rapid industrialisation, nearly all the changes in the nature of
homicide between the 1950s and the 1970s can be attributed to urban centres.
Certainly the increase in incidence was concentrated there: the number of
urban homicides in the 1970s was four and a half times that in the 1950s;
rural homicides over the same period registered a 2.5 fold increase. Thus, it
does appear that structural change can be related to changing levels and pat-
terns of offences against persons. The roots of the change, however, are to be
found within relationships between persons, not in changing activities or in
disorganisation. As relationships change, so do the potential for conflict and
the potential for its peaceful resolution.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Implications
In the last three chapters, a substantial number of charts and tables have
been presented relating to Irish crime trends over the years 1951 to 1975.
They were preceded by three chapters which, though largely free of numbers,
discussed at a rather abstract level what factors, both within the society and
inherent to the statistics themselves, might account for changes in the level
and pattern of crime. In the present chapter, I hope to devise a vantage point
somewhere between the abstract level with which the paper began and the
specific statistical trends that were subsequently examined.
In seeking perspective, it may be useful to begin with a comment made a
half century ago on the problem of crime in Ireland. The General Prisons
Board in its report for 1925 issued a warning that will sound familiar to
anyone who today regularly reads a newspaper:
We have, within the last few years, to deal with an entirely new
class of criminal, composed of half-educated youths who would ap-
pear to have escaped early from parental control¯ They have grown
up in lawless habits, and the streets and the cinema have been the
main sources of their moral education¯ Full of new and unsatisfied
desires, these youths have been dazzled by sensational reports in
newspapers of large sums of money obtained by organised robbery
¯ .. Formerly a series of convictions for minor offences preceded of-
fences of a grave nature. Now the first offender starts with the more
serious form of crime (quoted in Molony, 1925-26, p. 183).
In the aftermath of the Civil War, a sense of a descent from previous stan-
dards of discipline and order is certainly understandable. But it is interesting
to speculate on how today’s assessments of the gravity of the problem of crime
will read in fifty years time. I hope that on the basis of the preceding six
chapters, it will be possible to make an assessment of the nature of the
problem and its likely future course that will prove durable.
Three objectives were stated in the introductory chapter: to collate a valid
set of indicators for the study of crime trends, to represent those trends in a
manner that indicates the changes that have occurred since 1951 in the level
and pattern of crime, and to interpret what took place. It was argued that if
those objectives can be met, the precision and the usefulness of the current
debate on crime would be enhanced.
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Crime Indicators
The first objective was approached by a process of selection and annotation
for the published statistics and the collection of supplementary information
specifically for this study. Of these, selectivity in the choice of offence
categories used is the most important. Nine indicators were chosen as
minimising the traditional difficulties associated with crime statistics but still
adequately reflecting the range of property crime. In my opinion, those in-
dicators are reasonable representations of the actual change that occurred in
the prevalence of crime.
From notes accompanying the annual statistics and from replies given by
the gardai to.my inquiries, it was possible to make some adjustments to the
figures used and, more importantly, to establish the rules being followed in
classifying and counting incidents. For aggregate statistics, further adjust-
ments and improvements would be difficult. However, the absence of disag-
gregated crime statistics, reflecting the geographical distribution of offences,
is a major limitation of the annual Report on Crime. The present study at-
tempted to remedy that limitation for the period of greatest interest: 1964 and
1975. As a result, it was possible to compare the level of reported crime in
three types of areas. A more refined breakdown of the statistics by city and by
county would make a substantial improvement in the available data on crime.
Such information can be obtained at present only when a question relating to
a specific area has been asked in the D~il.
The volume of reported crime that the gardai are at present processing
each year precludes the abstraction of details that might indicate the diversity
of the actions subsumed under each offence category. However, in terms of
what we need to know about crime, both to understand its origins and to res-
pond adequately to the social problem it represents, a plea for the availability
of additional descriptive information cannot be avoided. An offence category
such as burglary or larceny from shops comprises a multiplicity of targets, of
monetary values, and of methods. Similarly, the category of assaults is com-
prised of interpersonal violence that occurs in many contexts and with a wide
range of resulting injuries. Of the possible descriptive material that could be
collected, there is probably a relatively small number of variables that the
gardai themselves and others using the crime reports will view as essential.
That information should be collected and published. If that is done, not only
will the usefulness of the data on crime be far greater for both the gardai and
for researchers - the statistics will then meaningfully relate to the issues on
which public concern is based. At present, the crime statistics are of limited
relevance to those issues.
The alternatives to pol,ce crime statistics - such as surveys of self-reported
crime and of victimisation - will not overcome the limitations of the informa-
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tion already routinely published. In Chapter 3 a summary is given on the
evaluation that can now be made on those alternatives. The enthusiasm with
which survey estimates of crime were first greeted has not been sustained; the
expense is prohibitive, the reliability of the resulting data is dubious, and
there are few convincing studies in which the superiority of survey data to
police statistics as indices of the level of crime were supported. Though survey
data on crime may be desirable for specific purposes, there is no justification,
in my opinion, for routinely collecting it.
If the garda crime statistics are to be the primary index of changes in
criminal activity, how should it be used ? Cautiously, is the most reasonable
answer. However, this study does suggest some ground rules ,that should be
implemented as part of the process of collecting and publishing crime
statistics.
The most fundamental recommendation that can be made is that a hand-
book be prepared stating the rules operative in counting and classifying of-
fences for all the categories listed in the Report on Crime. That the gardai do use
a standard set of rules places the Irish crime statistics at a considerable ad-
vantage in comparison to what is available in most countries. If those rules
are not themselves published, however, the advantage largely evaporates. The
advantage disappears if modifications are introduced into the procedures that
underlie the garda statistics without careful annotation in the relevant annual
report. To summarise, the crime statistics should be placed on a sound book-
keeping basis.
The need for a more systematic approach to the publication of crime
statistics is clearly evident in the substantial modifications made since 1975 in
the format of the Report on Crime. For the most part, the changes are improve-
ments, providing greater detail and shifting attention to the types of offences
of interest to users of the report. But the modifications also introduce serious
difficulties for anyone who wishes to compare trends before 1976 with what
occurred in the remainder of the decade. It is essential that all changes in the
compilation of the crime statistics be clearly signposted and fully explained.
Where comparability with earlier reports is to be lost, consideration should
be given to making available on request the information equivalent to what
Was previously published. At present, the Report on Crime is too easily misused.
If that is accomplished, then the minimum condition for taking the crime
statistics seriously will have been fulfilled. But caution is still advisable.
Above all, it is essential to avoid simplistic associations between changing
crime levels and the effectiveness of the gardai. The resources and the ef-
ficiency of the Garda Siochana can also indirectly influence the level of
reported crime in a manner that is both laudatory and likely to increase the
crime rate. If the gardai are perceived by the public as capable of reacting to a
144 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
citizen’s claim that a crime took place, more crimes will be reported.
It follows that the crime statistics are not a particularly useful index with
which to assess the benefits derived from increasing the number of gardai or
the support facilities available to them. By being selective in the offence
categories that are monitored, some of the difficulties can be eliminated and
other sources of variation over time controlled, but the word caution must
again be inserted.
The results shown in this study also suggest that a distinction is required
between increases in the level of crime and increases in the seriousness of the
resulting damage. Though more crime, of whatever variety, may be un-
desirable, it is possible that while crime has increased substantially, no real
change has occurred in the type of crime that predominates. It is an impor-
tant distinction. If, for example, a decision is to be made on the deployment of
new gardai, or a re-distribution of gardai among districts and divisions, the
type of crime in a locality may be a more useful guide than sheer offence
levels. It is certainly more useful if decisions are being made on the desirable
ratio between detectives and uniformed police.
To conclude, the garda crime statistics are of considerable use in the study
of crime. It is a usefulness, however, that appears only after considerable ef-
fort has been expended. I hope that this paper has eased somewhat the work
others will have to do in making use of the published information on crime.
The Growth of Crime
The trends in the nine crime indicators were examined over the 1951 to
1975 period for the entire nation and over the years 1964-75 separately for
three types of areas. On the basis of the graphic, tabular, and statistical
analysis of those trends, an assessment can be made of the dimensions of the
change recorded in recent years.
The magnitude of the change dominates all the analyses. In Chapter 4, the
litany of increases registered over the full 25 years, some as great as 29-fold,
was depressing indeed. For all offences directed at acquiring property, with
the exception of pedal cycle larceny and receiving stolen property, the 1975
level was at least five times what had appeared in the 1951 Report on Crime.
The increase in both assault and homicide, included to represent violent of-
fences against persons, was also substantial. That crime has become more
prevalent since the 1950s appears to be indisputable.
That statement can be made with such confidence because alternative ex-
planations of the increases, and particularly the possibility of changes within
the gardai having artifically inflated the number of offences that become
known, has little supporting evidence. The initial period of substantial annual
increments in the statistics, the mid-1960s, was one of essentially declining
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garda manpower and an unchanging budget. In later years, the abrupt
decline in detection rates poses an unanswered question, but it seems unlikely
that the trends in known offences were seriously affected. This does not dis-
miss the possibility that part of the upward trend reflects a more rigorous
definition of what incidents must be treated as "official" and thus entered
into the statistics. But I do not see how such a change can account for the
massive increases that were noted.
The only major break in the gloom is when attention shifts to the
sophistication and organisation of criminal activities. If the average value of
property stolen in burglaries can be taken as direct evidence of such changes,
then crime is more prevalent today but not greatly different. The indirect
evidence of the amount of increase in the number of recorded receiving stolen
property offences leads to a similar conclusion. Both indicators recorded in-
creases of less than two-fold over the full 25 years, a sharp contrast with the
very substantial increases found for the other six property crime indicators.
The basic consistency of massive increases is paralleled by a consistent se-
quencing of the upward trends. For all offences except assault, the bulk of the
growth in crime levels occurred subsequent to 1964. Throughout the 1950s
and continuing into the early 1960s, the various indicators record cyclical
fluctuations around an essentially horizontal trend line. Few actual increases
were evident in the initial 13 years of the series. In all property offence in-
dicators except that of pedal cycle larceny, a dramatic and apparently perma-
nent break with that pattern occurs around 1964. Henceforth, the pace of in-
crease is rapid, though for some indicators it tapers off by 1973 or 1974. A
watershed clearly divides the trends in those indicators; the proper statistical
specification for what took place is that of a structural break. Two trends
rather than one are needed to accurately represent the changes. What occur-
red after 1964 had no precedent in the earlier years.
Two indicators just as clearly deviate from that basic pattern. The level of
indictable assaults increased over the 25 years in a growth curve that began in
the early 1950s. There is no basis for denoting the mid-1960s as marking an
abrupt shift in the trend. Pedal cycle larceny in effect manifests no trend over
the time-period. Rather, it has a cyclical pattern that persists throughout.
The perception that crime has become a more acute social problem,
therefore, appears to be accurate, as does the belief that the bulk of that in-
crease occurred quite recently. Indeed, it is reasonable to say that prior to the
mid-1960s the levels of crime were such as to be almost imperceptible and no
signs of the pending increases could be found. However, the use of crime
statistics to establish the true level of an offence is considerably less
reasonable than to use changing levels over time as indicators of trends.
Though the perception of the degree of change is verified by the evidence
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presented, the image of crime as predominantly an urban problem is not. The
comparison of urban and rural crime trends in Chapter 5 emphasised the
similarities rather than any clear differences. A predominance of urban trends
in shaping what occurred at the national level is obvious only for two offences
against property: housebreaking and larceny from vehicles. For the other in-
dicators, the changing level crime did not differ greatly between Dublin, the
four-cities, and the non-urban areas. Certainly, the presence of substantial in-
creases in crime levels outside of the major cities is clear; it is also contrary to
the basic assumptions underlying most discussions of crime in Ireland today.
The theme of similarity across types of areas is further highlighted by the con-
sistency in the sequencing of large increments over the 12-year period.
In one respect, crime is becoming a more serious problem in rural than in
urban areas. The average value of property stolen in burglaries is expanding
at a rate considerably in excess to that found for Dublin or the four-cities.
Though crime may be more prevalent in cities, the difference in the degree of
loss experienced, on average, from each offence that occurs elsewhere, sug-
gests that as a problem crime lacks the urban focus that is often attributed to
it.
As with the national crime trends, the alternative explanation of the impact
of garda procedures and practices had to be considered. If gardai in different
types of areas differ significantly in those respects, or if changes occurred in
one area but not in another over the 12 years, then. the comparisons become
suspect. However, the consistency in detection rate trends across the three
types of areas and the similarity in the detection rates themselves argue
against such a suspicion being justified. As a measure of the magnitude of the
problem of crime, the differences found for serious property crime - and es-
pecially burglary - tend to suggest that the situation is more precarious in
rural than in urban areas. Again, this departs substantially from what is
widely believed.
Taken together, the trends examined in Chapters 4 and 5 direct our atten-
tion toward a substantial transformation in the level and pattern of Irish
crime, a transformation that was pervasive to the society as a whole. The con-
sistency among the nine indicators examined is marked; given the variety of
offences that they describe, and the length of the time-period considered, it is
in many respects remarkable. It therefore seems reasonable to use those con-
sistencies in the final section of this chapter as a basis for interpreting what
took place and what is likely to take place in the near future.
Social Change and Crime
The trends summarised above support, by and large, the assertion that re-
cent changes in the level and the pattern of crime in Ireland can most usefully
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be understood as responses to the specific social structural changes that
originated around 1960. The comparisons shown between types of offences
and between types of areas produced evidence of a substantial consistency
that belies the view that the post-1964 increases took the form of a growing
disorgansiation within the society. The timing of the transformation from
cyclical fluctuation to a marked and sustained upward trend was generally
consistent at the national level and the increases registered in urban and non-
urban areas were essentially similar. On that evidence, it is reasonable to con-
clude that a watershed was reached, a departure from the level and pattern
that had obtained since the early 1950s.
When national level trends covering the years 1951 to 1975 were examined,
the extent of the transformation that occurred in the mid-1960s emerged
clearly. For seven of the eight property offence indicators, for the inter-
relationships among the indicators, and for the relationships the indicators
have with measures of property availability and of economic conditions, the
mid-1960s marks a watershed. The pattern of offence levels and of offence
characteristics that had prevailed for several decades came to a conclusion
around 1963, and was replaced by a new pattern. It seems reasonable to as-
sociate the emergent pattern with changes in Irish social structure that began
in the late 1950s: the increase in crime was one offshoot of the adjustments be-
ing made to deep-seated structural change. The nature of the evidence being
used precludes a formal rejection of social disorgansiation arguments, but
here too it can be concluded that their applicability to Ireland is at best
limited.
Urban/rural differences offer another concrete representation of the
usefulness of social disorgansiation and structural perspectives. Had recent
trends been such as to create marked disparities between types of areas, then
social disorganisation explanations would appear appropriate. Such dis-
parities were not marked, and while this does not in itself affirm the ,ap-
propriateness of structural explanations, it does suggest that the latter ap-
proach is the more promising. For Ireland, a single transformation could be
identified, largely ignoring boundaries between city and countryside, that
between 1964 and 1975 significantly increased the level of crime, and, to a
much lesser extent, altered the manner in which criminal activity is carried
out.
This leads to a second and more difficult question: What components of
structural change can be connected with the pattern of crime that emerged
after the mid-1960s? Only a partial answer can be attempted in this paper.
The amount of property available was used as one of many possible relevant
aspects of structural change. When trends in availability of property were
compared with those for offence levels and seriousness, however, a plausible
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connection did emerge. It is certainly sufficient to justify further research
along the lines advocated in this paper, and some tentative conclusions. That
belief is strengthened by the results obtained from the analysis of the effects
from economic conditions on crime: cyclical variation in economic conditions
have a minor relationship to changes in crime. Certainly that variation cannot
explain the "break" in Irish crime trends.
The strongest support for a connection between structural change and
crime levels was found for offence categories in which the most substantial
changes took place over the 25 years in the amount and distribution of the
property "at risk". Moreover, person offences - as represented by indictable
assault - did not evince the same pattern of a clear break in levels of in-
cidence; a continuous upward trend was present throughout the 25 years.
As I stated in Chapter 2, the difference between the social disorganisation
and the structural perspectives can be too emphatic. Both associate substan-
tial changes in a social structure with a higher incidence of crime. If
preference is to be given to a structural approach, it is because it directs our
attention to what is most important : the specific kinds of changes that Ireland
experienced in the course of industrialising. A structural approach also has
the advantage of eliminating the simple answer to the question of why social
change should cause a growth in the level of crime, that of equating crime
with disorder.
This summary of the monograph’s conclusions can be read in the context of
recent changes within criminology itself. Pessimism has of late come to be a
defining trait of mainstream criminology: an imagery of despair pervades the
recent work of many eminent criminologists. For example, Radzinowicz, as
he surveys the mid-twentieth century increase in crime statistics that occur-
red in most countries, decries yet another country "succumbing to the
plague" (1977, p. 7) and to the inevitable breaching of "the floodgates of
juvenile delinquency" (ibid. p. 8) by the impact of the development process.
Affluence and modernisation are his culprits, and, given the irreversibility of
those processes, the future appears bleak indeed.
I have not sought to place Ireland within such an international context.
Perhaps there is some world-historical process at work, of which Irish crime
patterns are but one manifestation. But I suspect that is too convenient an
answer, and also too simplistic. The diversity of change in the world today is
considerable; whatever is shared among countries is balanced by the struc-
tural differences that are present. I am therefore left with a responsibility to
provide my assessment of what the future course of crime in Ireland will be. If
the trends presented here are a valid guide, then cautious optimism is the
most reasonable basis on which to conclude. Placed in the context of the
social changes Ireland experienced in the 1960s, the increases in crime are
CRIME IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 149
perhaps less alarming than they would be viewed on their own. A transforma-
tion in the extent and pattern of crime occurred, one that is unlikely to be
repeated in the near future. It represented an adjustment to very substantial
changes in the social order. Now that the effects of those changes have been
largely absorbed within the system, though the level of crime may not
decrease, future increases may be more restrained than in the recent past.
Certainly statistical evidence for the late 1970s supports such an expectation.
Again, however, it is necessary to stress the limitations of the statistical
evidence. As an index of year to year changes, crime statistics are imprecise
and difficult to interpret. It is more sensible, I think, to view the statistical
trends in perspective, as achieved both by the use of interpretive frameworks
and a series of annual figures that cover a particular period.
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